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ABSTRACT 
THE ROMANTIC UNCONSCIOUS: 
CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN THE RESEARCH OF ROMANTIC LOVE 
by 
Joseph S. Reynoso 
 
Advisor:  Professor Elliot Jurist 
 
 Social scientists continue empirically researching the psychology of romantic 
love.  However, there is little attention spent evaluating the direction and nature 
of this work.  In this theoretical study, the author argues that the research 
literature presents a limited view of romantic relationships.  A contributing factor 
is the relative inattention to the interplay of conscious and unconscious mental 
processes in empirical models.  The author examines the prevalent model of 
studying relationships for its assumptions about the accessibility of psychological 
states and the accuracy of participant reports.  To support his case, the author 
reviews research that explores the limits of a psychology based on primarily 
conscious processes.  The argument is made that a more comprehensive 
investigation of romantic love would involve an integration of conscious and 
unconscious processing and an expanded notion of rationality (as it pertains to 
romantic relationships).   
       In the second part of this study, the author suggests that psychoanalytic 
thinking can help inform psychological research into romantic love. 
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Psychoanalytic theorizing is described as having a long tradition of exploring the 
subjective rationality and meaning that underlies the full range of romantic 
relationship motivations and experiences.  The author presents the usefulness of 
psychoanalytic ideas, including a dynamic unconscious and object relations, to 
construct a framework to study love relationships.  The study concludes with four 
guiding recommendations points (conceptual and methodological) for a future 
direction of romantic relationship research.  These suggestions offer a way of 
understanding how people seek psychological compromise solutions to all their 
(at times conflictual) motivational aims in their romantic lives.  The author’s 
framework allows for investigating how this process not only occurs, consciously 
and unconsciously, but also intrapsychically, interpersonally and culturally.       
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PREFACE 
 … so far as love or affection is concerned, psychologists have failed in their 
mission.  The little we know about love does not transcend simple 
observation, and the little we write about it has been written better by poets 
and novelists. 
 
Harry Harlow, at the sixty-sixth Annual Convention of the American 
Psychological Association, Washington, D. C., August 31, 1958 
 
 
Due to its mystery and prevalence romantic love is one of the most often 
written about topics from both research and artistic perspectives.  The 
anthropologists Jankowiak and Fischer (1992) examined the folklore, literature 
and history of 166 cultures, finding evidence of a form of romantic love in 88 
percent of them.  They proposed that love can be considered a “human 
universal” phenomenon that should be studied in all of its manifestations.  Thus, 
it is no surprise that researchers from various disciplines have produced 
countless pages of work on the topic of romantic love and its workings.  This 
proliferation has no foreseeable end.   
One reason for this concerns the very illusive, and seemingly contradictory, 
nature of the subject at hand.  The motivation to understand the psychology of 
adult love is inextricably tied to love’s ability to inspire a wide range of emotions, 
from excitement, enthrallment, comfort and satisfaction to confusion, 
disappointment, anger and despair.  It inspires and provokes both one thing and 
its opposite.  It unites but can also separate.  Love not only delivers the range of 
affective experience, but does so in a fashion that at once can feel individually 
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unique, though generalizable to others.  In short, the phenomenological 
experience of romantic love as so particular yet still universal renders it both a 
perfect and poor subject for scholastic scrutiny. 
 Given the immense amount of research devoted to the study of love’s 
psychology, it would seem appropriate to evaluate what has been learned up to 
this point.  I began this section with words spoken by then president of the 
American Psychological Association, Harry Harlow, to those in attendance at the 
1958 APA meetings.  His words reflect my critical view of the current state of 
researching romantic love’s psychology.  Close to fifty years later, a serious 
assessment of the empirical literature is needed to evaluate just what has been 
learned.  
 
Upon first approaching the empirical literature, one is quickly confronted with 
the multiplicity of ways investigators have attempted to answer these questions.  
The majority of this research is generated by soliciting people’s attitudes, 
thoughts, and feelings about romantic love experiences (usually by means of 
surveys or interviews).  Traditionally, studies have used college student 
classroom samples since most researchers are academic professors using the 
most ready-at-hand participants.  In the last couple of decades, however, 
techniques have evolved to study love with a wider-ranged population, through 
observational means both in experimental and clinical settings.  Though the 
majority of the research into romantic love’s psychology has studied a sub-
clinical population, there is a growing focus on understanding romantic 
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relationships along a continuum of health (including observations from the clinical 
consulting room).  The study of romantic relationships has also evolved to follow 
the course of science to investigate the biological structure of love through brain 
scanning technology.  
It is my view, however, that the expansive wealth of love research is both a 
strength and weakness.  That the empirical literature offers numerous divergent 
answers to the most basic questions about love is an example of both the variety 
and uncertainty in the field of relationship science.  Depending on the question, 
one can usually expect to find an assortment of ways to answer it.  For example, 
the question of romantic process has been answered by social psychologists 
interested in a person’s attitudes, behaviors and feelings in love, but also by 
neuroscientists interested in which regions of the brain are implicated in specific 
relationship functions.  Someone questioning what influences who we love can 
turn to the romantic attachment literature, the evolutionary psychology research, 
or even studies that understand love as a form of social exchange.  Clearly there 
are numerous research perspectives accounting for the psychology of romantic 
relationships.  What is not as apparent is how to make sense of all the 
information provided.        
One is faced with the impossibility of finding common definitions in the 
literature for such central concepts as love, commitment, passion, and 
relationships (similar observations have been made by Fehr, 1988; Hendrick & 
Hendrick, 1989).  On the surface, one may have difficulty understanding the 
difference between attachment styles (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) and love styles 
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(Lee, 1973), and differentiating one model’s emphasis on lust (Fisher, 1998, 
2004) and another’s component of passion (Sternberg, 1986).  Accompanying 
these seemingly semantic differences are the underlying divisions between the 
various theoretical orientations that guide researchers. 
While the majority of the empirical literature can rightfully fit under the 
umbrella of psychology, there are further subdivisions of theoretical orientations.  
These range from the evolutionary psychology of David Buss and the social 
exchange model of Caryl Rusbult to the wide-ranging general psychology of 
Robert Sternberg and the attachment perspective of Phil Shaver and Kim 
Bartholomew.  There are indeed some overlaps that can be found between some 
of the romantic relationship research models and respective investigators’ 
theoretical perspectives.  Even further, there have been attempts by researchers 
to integrate various models of romantic relationships.1  To a large degree, 
however, the romantic love research field still tends towards relative 
disconnection and independence amongst its various approaches.  This 
contributes to a disjointed quality of the research literature that represents a 
larger issue.  One is hard-pressed to find a viable way to evaluate the value of a 
particular study either by itself (that is, how well it answers basic questions about 
romantic love) or in relation to other models (that is, how does it correspond to 
other accounts of romantic love).  The romantic relationship research literature’s 
                                                 
1 Kenrick and colleagues (1993) have attempted to integrate evolutionary and 
social exchange theories regarding mate choice, and Babcock and colleagues 





lack of evaluative criteria and structural incoherency limit its capacity to provide 
reliable information about love.   
A good portion of romantic relationship research is based on gathering 
people’s reports of romantic relationship experiences, as well as preferences and 
beliefs about love.  The most popular format for research seems to be that of the 
survey, which is done through self-report measures and questionnaires asking 
people to rate how accurately statements fit their relationship experience.  The 
majority of research studies and models are correlational designs based on these 
surveys.  In other words, through these studies, researchers ascertain the 
statistical relationship between variables suspected or found to play a role in 
romantic relationships.  Once this data is collected, researchers demonstrate the 
strength and direction of these statistical relationships in order to construct path 
models that will map out the direction of influence between variables.  Guided by 
some theoretical framework, these researchers then use these models to 
articulate the psychological processes operative in romantic love contexts.     
Researchers have noted the problematic aspects of self-report surveys for 
decades.  Wicker (1969) reviewed the then current empirical literature studying 
social attitudes, and despite finding few methodological problems, found “little 
evidence to support the postulated existence of stabile, underlying attitudes 
within the individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his actions.”  
Wicker not only questioned the link between attitudes and verbal 
expression/behavior, but also the stabile and enduring nature of such attitudes.  
Meehl warned about a tendency of assuming the verisimilitude of a finding based 
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on the “feeble significance testing” as the “crud factor” of social science research 
(Meehl, 1990).  The “crud factor” points towards the understanding that studies 
with a large enough sample size can produce statistically significant relationships 
between otherwise trivial factors of “weak theories.”  Meehl observed that to 
some degree "everything correlates to some extent with everything else" (1990, 
p. 204); so one must be careful in the degree to which inferential interpretations 
are made.  Relatedly, Bank et al. (1990) referred to high correlations among 
variables that are obtained using a common method of measurement and one 
reporter as the “glop” problem.  
Subsequent researchers have sought to clarify the reliability of psychological 
correlational data by reporting that self-reported attitudes can predict behavior 
under certain conditions.  Examples of constraints on the degree to which self-
reported attitudes were found to predict behavior were attitude accessibility 
(Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) and the deliberateness of the behavior (Ajzen, 
1985; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).  Further difficulties attributed to the use of self-
report measures include: participants’ interpretations of the questions, recall and 
awareness problems, self-serving or social desirability biases (all discussed in 
Brehm et al 2002, p. 53).  Even attempts by romantic relationship researchers to 
use experimental and quasi-experimental, interview and case-study, or 
naturalistic observation designs are also susceptible of critiques on other 
grounds, such as translation into real-world applications, lack of establishing 
cause-effect, and generalizability to other individuals (discussed in Matlin, 1995, 
p. 37).   
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Despite the various problems that plague all the different social science 
measurement approaches, I am not about to espouse the view that romantic 
relationship researchers should “just pack up and go home” (Matlin, 1995, p. 40).  
Rather my position is that researchers should acknowledge the limits of scientific 
understanding and experimental designs in constructing and conducting their 
studies.  This means the incorporation of multiple research tools within single 
studies to take advantage of particular benefits of individual designs and offset 
shortcomings.  This also points towards continuing the implementation of more 
varied experimental and naturalistic settings, priming effects, and physiological 
and neuroscientific measures.  Most importantly it means directing romantic 
relationship research in a way that uses the research methods available to study 
the most accurate and current models of psychological processing, despite what 
limitations exist.  Despite some creative and integrative attempts, the current 
state of the psychological literature on romantic love passively reflects these 
limitations in scientific understanding and method rather than confronts them.     
Some of the problems in the empirical literature on romantic love are not 
particular to this field of research.  They involve larger issues of scientific 
communities and epistemology that are beyond the scope of my current study to 
address in full.  I will instead focus on a more local, but related, flaw in the 
empirical romantic love literature.  This weakness, which I will argue occurs both 
on an explicit and implicit level, hinders researchers’ capability to answer love’s 
most fundamental questions.  It is born out of a failure to acknowledge and 
confront limitations both in scientific understanding and method.  This failing is 
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due to romantic researchers relying on a model that does not fully integrate 
conscious and unconscious aspects of the mind. 
The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines the word conscious as an 
adjective meaning “having the witness of one’s own judgment or feelings, having 
the witness within oneself, knowing within oneself, inwardly sensible or aware.”  
The first premise of my argument is that the romantic relationship literature (as it 
stands as a collective grouping of individual studies) fails to use a model of the 
mind that sufficiently integrates conscious and unconscious processing.   
Specifically, researchers have privileged conscious mental functions in their 
study of romantic love.  This is despite little disagreement that the organizing 
principles, theories, or schemas that guide everyday interpersonal functioning 
operate on an automatic or implicit level.  Automatic, implicit or unconscious 
processing and thinking can be defined as that which is nonconscious, 
unintentional, involuntary and effortless (Aronson, Wilson, & Ekert, 1999; Bargh, 
1994; Wegner & Bargh, 1998).  I contend that the majority of empirical studies on 
romantic love use a psychology of mind that insufficiently integrates both 
conscious and unconscious factors.  This is reflected in the way that researchers 
attempt to ask participants to answer questions regarding their romantic 
experience with little attention to whether psychological aspects in love are 
accessible2 to conscious awareness or how reliable research subjects are as 
                                                 
2 Accessibility can be thought of as “the ease (or effort) with which the particular 
mental contents come to mind” (Kahneman, 2003).  Also see Higgins, 1996; 
Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966).  
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reports of their experience in relationships.  This has implications, then, for the 
kind of reasoning that takes place in romantic love.  
My aim in Chapter One is to review the empirical literature on romantic 
relationships.  I will present a sampling of the various approaches researchers 
have taken to study the psychology of love empirically.  While not exhaustive, I 
plan to describe the different empirical objectives, methods and findings on the 
subject, saving much of my commentary on this literature as a whole for 
subsequent chapters.  In Chapter Two, I will lay out my argument that the 
majority of studies fail to integrate conscious and unconscious aspects of mental 
life, and, by and large, privilege the former.  I will outline how a psychology that 
privileges conscious processing limits the investigation of romantic love.  I will 
present research that supports this thinking.  In Chapter Three, I will introduce 
my recommendation for a psychoanalytic solution to this predicament.  Namely 
that using insights from a psychoanalytic model of the mind can help understand 
the interplay conscious and unconscious factors in romantic relationships.  I will 
conclude in Chapter Four by presenting a framework for integrating the current 
empirical literature and guide future research endeavors.  Further I will 
recommend future paths of empirical inquiry to study romantic love. 
Let me offer a few caveats before beginning.  If one does a search for 
romantic love in the American Psychological Association’s research database 
Psych Info one will find different efforts to define, limit or articulate its meaning.  
The term “romantic love” gets associated with constructs such as sexual desire 
(Gonzaga, et al., 2006), intense passion (Aron et al., 2005), and attraction 
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(Critelli et al., 1980).  While some researchers have focused exclusively on this 
passionate aspect of relationships, I have chosen to apply a more general 
understanding of romantic love.  For my purposes I understand romantic love as 
broadly referring to the experience, sensation, thought, feeling, attitude, behavior 
and overall psychological process involved in what would be identified by one or 
both partners as a romantic relationship. 3    
       I am also taking a broad view in understanding what constitutes the research 
of love’s psychology.  My analysis will focus on research that explores the human 
experience of romantic love by studying the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
representing, guiding, and underlying romantic relationships.  My intention is to 
present a panoramic snapshot of the current state of the empirical field.  
However, based on the enormity of the research literature, some credible studies 
may not get sufficient attention.  Though I will consider many empirical issues 
that necessarily follow from an exploration of the research literature, my analysis 
will be done on theoretical grounds.      
                                                 
3 My conception of romantic love is limited by an understanding that is largely 
shaped by the psychology, philosophy and the overall cultural climate of Western 
academic thought.  While I would hope that my findings relate and apply to all 
forms of romantic relationships, I am cognizant of the predominantly 
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CHAPTER ONE: The research 4 
 
Love is simply too unruly to be categorized so easily.  It means different 
things to different people in different relationships at different points in time.  
Only with patient, open-minded exploration of several of the current 
approaches to love will we have any possibility of developing the overarching 
theory of love that still eludes us. 




 An early approach to studying romantic love was to attempt to distinguish it 
from other close interpersonal attitudes, such as friendship.  This involved 
separating out some of the various cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects 
                                                 
4 In choosing to review the romantic relationship research, I have had to limit 
which studies to discuss.  By and large, I have chosen to include empirical 
approaches to love that are theoretically embedded and have been influential in 
the field.  I have chosen not to directly discuss studies that, in my view, either 
target variables that are too discrete, general to all relationships or not 
contextualized in a larger theory.  Examples include the connection between 
perceived similarity and relationship satisfaction across variables such as 
physical attractiveness, religion, education, age and height among others 
(Berscheid & Walster, 1974; Hill, Rubin & Peplau, 1976; Huston & Levinger, 
1978; Skolnick, 1981).  There are also studies connecting positive romantic 
relationship variables to arousal levels (Dutton & Aron, 1974), proximity and 
familiarity (Newcomb, 1961; Zajonc, 1968), reciprocity (Worthy, Gary & Kahn, 
1969), and barriers (Driscoll, Davis & Lipetz, 1972).  Finally, there are studies 
linking romantic relationship quality to big five personality traits, with the most 
consistently robust finding that neuroticism is the strongest predictor of 
relationship dissatisfaction and instability (e.g., Kurdek, 1993; Bouchard, Lussier, 
& Sabourin, 1999).   
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of interpersonal relationships in an effort to isolate those belonging exclusively to 
or that combine together in romantic relationships.  Methodologically, 
researchers asked people to indicate on self-report questionnaires the degree to 
which certain feelings, attitudes and actions represent their love relationships.  
Empirical analysis of this data allowed researchers to propose which clusters of 
thoughts, feelings and behaviors combine to define the experience of romantic 
love. 
Rubin’s work (1970, 1973) focused on identifying love as a dichotomous 
feeling-attitude to be distinguished from other “moderately correlated, but 
nevertheless distinct, dimensions of one person’s attitude toward another person” 
(Rubin, 1974, p. 166).  Simply put, love was treated here as a unitary feeling-
attitude that one can experience towards another person.  It takes its place on 
the continuum of positive emotions one can experience interpersonally.  Rubin 
intended to demonstrate the difference between romantically loving and liking 
another person by isolating essential characteristics of each.  Though liking and 
loving could both be found in romantic relationships, he believed that the latter 
(as he defined it) would not be found in friendships.  Rubin’s research, using his 
self-report measure (Rubin Love Scale; RLS, 1974), speculatively identified the 
three components to romantic love to be affinitive and dependent need 
(attachment), predisposition to help (caring), and exclusiveness and absorption 
(intimacy).  The Rubin Liking Scale (1970) had components of favorable 
evaluation, respect and perception of similarity. 
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Rubin’s work, which tried to distinguish romantic love from other positive 
interpersonal orientations, produced mixed results.5  However, both his 
dichotomizing of love from liking/friendship and his assumption of a liking attitude 
involved in romantic love was influential in laying the groundwork for future 
research.  Other researchers followed Rubin’s work by constructing measures to 
further investigate love and its component parts.  Wanting to separate out the 
mixture of passionate and companionate love attitudes from Rubin’s construct of 
love, Hatfield’s collaborative studies (Hatfield & Walster, 1978; Hatfield & 
Sprecher, 1986) attempted to distinguish and measure two different kinds of 
romantic love.  Just as Rubin distinguished love from liking, Hatfield differentiated 
a separate passionate and companionate love.  Hatfield defined passionate love 
as “a state of intense longing for union with another…” that when reciprocated 
“…is associated with fulfillment and ecstasy” (1978, p. 9).  In contrast to the 
emotional wildness of passionate love involving the confusion of “tenderness and 
sexuality, elation and pain, anxiety and relief, altruism and jealousy,” 
companionate love means “friendly affection and deep attachment to someone” 
(Hatfield and Walster, 1978, p. 2). 
                                                 
5 As reported by Masuda (2003), such love researchers as Robert Sternberg, 
have criticized Rubin’s love scale for de-emphasizing sexuality.   Subsequently, 
the Rubin Love Scale has been used more as a measure of companionate love. 
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Her initial studies led to the development of the Passionate Love Scale (PLS; 
Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986), a Likert-styled6 self-report measure that proposes to 
tap “cognitive, emotional and behavior indicants of ‘longing for union’” (Hatfield, 
1988, p. 193).  The cognitive component of passionate love focused on the 
intrusive preoccupation with the person, idealization of that person, and desire to 
know the person; emotional indicators were physiological sexual attraction, 
longing for reciprocity, desire for union, physiological arousal; and behavioral 
correlates concentrated on actions to determine the other's feelings, studying the 
person, attempts to be of service to the person, maintaining physical closeness.  
Hatfield’s reading of research correlating the emotions such as anxiety, fear, 
embarrassment, loneliness, jealousy, anger and grief to heightened experiences 
of passion (e.g. Clanton & Smith, 1977; Peplau & Perlman, 1982) led her to 
conceptualize the presence of both positive emotions (such as happiness, joy, 
contentment, delight) and negative emotions (such as anger, fear, anxiety, 
depression) (Kim & Hatfield, 2004) in passionate love.  She explained further, 
“passionate love seems to be fueled by ecstasy or misery, whereas 
companionate love is intensified only by pleasure; any sprinkling of pain 
                                                 
6 The Passionate Love Scale (PLS) is a common form of self-report measure in 
romantic love research.  Using a Likert design to rate the degree to which they 
agree or disagree with a given statement, the PLS employs a 9-point rating 
continuum (with 1 indicating “not at all true” to 9 indicating “definitely true”) to 
measure a person’s attitudes regarding a current or recent romantic partner.  
Examples tapping various aspects of romantic experience are:  
(Cognitive)  _________ always seems to be on my mind. 
(Emotional)  Since I’ve been involved with _______, my emotions have been on 
a roller coaster. 
(Behavioral)  I feel happy when I am doing something to make ________ happy. 
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decreases companionate feelings” (1988, p. 207).  As a result, the PLS was 
designed to tap the negative cognitive, emotional and behavioral components of 
romantic love, as well as the experience of unrequited love, which is associated 
with separation and accompanying emptiness, anxiety or despair.   
Hatfield’s construct of passionate love stresses the uncontrollable and intense 
emotional feelings towards the object of one’s desire.  One can see the 
distinction made between the powerful emotionality of passionate love and the 
calm steadiness of companionate love.7  While both can be found in romantic 
relationships, Hatfield and others have been particularly interested in function 
and characteristics of passionate love.  Over a variety of studies, passionate love 
seeking or involvement has been associated with low self-esteem (Hatfield, 
1965), dependency and insecurity (Fei & Bercheid, 1977), and anxiety (Solomon 
& Corbit, 1974; Hatfield, Brinton, & Cornelius, 1989).  Interestingly, as Hatfield 
pointed out, though passionate love seems to be highly valued colloquially and 
culturally, little survey or experimental research has been done documenting the 
delights of passionate love (Hatfield & Rapson, 1993a). 
After Rubin’s separation of love from liking was followed by Hatfield’s 
distillation of romantic love as a combination of passionate and companionate 
love, Sternberg proposed a Triangular Theory of romantic love (1986, 1988, 
1998a, 1998b).  The Triangular Theory postulates three distinct, yet related 
                                                 
7 As Masuda recently pointed out (2003), Hatfield’s main purpose was in 
constructing a measure to extract a construct of passionate love from the Rubin 
Love Scale’s construct of love, which is thought to combine passionate and 
companionate loves.  Hatfield’s PLS measures passionate love, though she did 
not develop her own measure to measure companionate love. 
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components of intimacy, passion and commitment.  To collect evidence for his 
theory he devised the Sternberg Triangular Love Scale (STLS, 1986).  The STLS 
consists of 45 statements that a respondent rates (on a Likert scale) both for its 
accuracy and then importance regarding the person’s relationship.  Each 
component (intimacy, passion and commitment) is represented by fifteen items, 
presented in random and frequently stated in pairs of how one feels about one’s 
partner and how one perceives one’s romantic partner feels.  Sternberg’s 
Triangular Theory addressed not only love’s nature but its course through the 
lens of theories that account for emotion as resulting from the interruption of 
familiar and common interactional scripts between partners (Berscheid, 1983).  
Thus in the beginning of a relationship, when two people are beginning to form 
their scripts of interaction, one finds great rises and dips of emotion.  However, 
as time goes by this experience appears to level out.   
The intimacy component “refers to close, connected, and bonded feelings in 
loving relationships” (Sternberg, 1988, p. 120).  It is felt to represent the 
emotional texture of romantic relationships that leads to feelings of warmth and 
mutual rapport.  Intimacy develops slowly, “through fits and starts” and is difficult 
to achieve as it includes, among other things, experiencing happiness with the 
beloved, being able to count on the other when in need, desiring the greater 
welfare of the other, and the willingness to share both material and emotional 
resources (1998a).  Manifest levels of intimacy usually lessen in both successful 
and failed relationships because its latent and observable dimensions that can 
have different courses.  As comfort builds, intimacy can be taken for granted 
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leading to both positive and negative repercussions.  Sternberg himself likened 
the STLS’s intimacy component to what Rubin’s Liking Scale measured, 
however, others have argued that Sternberg’s intimacy component is more 
similar to Rubin’s love construct (Acker & Davis, 1992, Masuda, 2003).      
In the Triangular Theory, passion is highly dependent on psychophysical 
arousal and is best characterized by the needs that are consciously felt to drive 
romance.  Not confined to sexual needs, passion involves the more basic 
motivational drives that people may experience—such as those for self-esteem, 
affiliation, dominance over others, submission to others, self-actualization, sexual 
fulfillment and nurturance (1988, 1998a).  Passion and intimacy may have 
complementary, parallel, or opposing trajectories, though the two components 
usually interact in a love relationship.  Sternberg cited intermittent reinforcement 
as a powerful learning mechanism for continuing or sustaining passion.  Thus 
instead of being fueled by constant reward, passion thrives on periodic and even 
random rewarding; though one can experience a surge of passion almost 
immediately upon getting in contact with an arousing person.  Sternberg explains 
the course of passion from the vantage point of Solomon’s opponent-process 
theory (1980) of acquired motivation: 
 
At the peak of arousal, a negative force begins to work in opposition to the 
passion.  This force is important to a person’s equilibrium, because it can help 
prevent a person from becoming hopelessly addicted to either substances or 
to people. … At the peak of arousal, the passion you experience begins to 
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decrease; and under the influence of the negative force, you will gradually 
reach a more or less stable state of habituation of feeling in respect to the 
person or the object.  (1998a, pp. 39-40)     
 
As Sternberg explains further, once the passion-arousing object is lost, a person 
does not return to a state of equilibrium, but instead sinks into a distressed state 
of depression.  It is only after the effects of the negative force slowly disappear 
that the person is able to return to a baseline state.      
Finally, the commitment ingredient (also termed decision/commitment) is 
more cognitively governed and includes the short-term decision of loving another 
person, and the long-term commitment to do what one can to maintain that love.  
For Sternberg, this component is what keeps a relationship together and 
functioning, though commitment alone is not a sufficient condition for what most 
would think of as romantic love (1998a).  Rather commitment “is the extent to 
which a person is likely to stick with something or someone and see it (or him or 
her) through to the finish” (1998a, p. 12).  Commitment develops slowly and then 
ideally steadily increases before leveling out.  As opposed to intimacy and 
passion, it has the most predictable course.   
For Sternberg, all three components contribute to other forms of human 
relationships but in different degrees, reflective of the different properties of each 
ingredient.  As opposed to commitment and even intimacy, passion tends to be 
unstable and fluctuate unpredictably.  According to Sternberg, intimacy and 
commitment are subject to conscious control when a person has awareness of 
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the feelings that comprise these components.  However, one may not exactly 
know to what degree he feels intimately and committed towards another person.  
Passion can usually be consciously realized.  Due to these inherent properties, 
as outlined by Sternberg’s Triangular Theory, passion seems to be involved in 
the history of most types of romantic relationships, though it is absent in most 
friendships and in parent-child relationships.  On the other hand, intimacy usually 
can be high in any of the three.   
Subsequently, Yela (1996, 1998) expanded Sternberg’s model and divided 
the passion component into erotic (EP) and romantic (RP) types when he tested 
the temporal nature of the amended Triangular Theory.  Using a cross-sectional 
design, he suggested that the evolution of the components can be thought of as 
existing in three main stages in love relationships: “Being in love,” “Passional 
love” and “Companionate love.”  Being in love is characteristic of the first months 
of the relationship and: 
  
…is a relatively brief period, in which there is a vertiginous increase of all 
the love components, especially of [erotic passion], which reaches its 
maximum point, and of [intimacy], indicating that the person is subject to a 
wave of new and intense emotions towards the other, both of general and 
sexual physiological activation and of the gradually satisfied desire to 
establish a special affective bond with that person.  (1998) 
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Commitment is de-emphasized during this stage.  In the Passional Love 
stage, erotic passion oscillates around its maximum point, romantic passion 
continues to increase gradually, while commitment and intimacy increase steadily 
in importance.  Finally the diminishing of erotic and romantic passion marks the 
third phase of Companionate Love, in which intimacy and commitment reach 
their maximum level, in line with the decrease of romantic passion and especially 
erotic passion.  Yela’s study represents one of the few in the field to empirically 




Aside from treating romantic love as a unitary construct that can be reduced 
down to component parts, another way to research its nature has been to 
investigate it as a variety of types.  In fact Sternberg’s Triangular Theory allows 
for researching love like this.  He used the components from his Triangular 
Theory to describe seven types of romantic love relationships based on 
combinations of each component.  Sternberg was careful to say that his types 
represent extreme examples that are not meant to represent actual relationships 
found in natural life (1988).  Thus it would be rare to find a relationship that 
consists purely of commitment or passion, and the following types are probably 
better thought of as containing higher or lower levels of one or more of these 
components.   
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Liking is a love high in intimacy alone that is usually found in emotionally 
close friendships.  It is not high in arousal and devoid of long-term plans and 
hopes.  In infatuation there is strong passion as this kind of love is fueled by 
arousal.  It can be asymmetrical, based in idealization and short-lived in nature, 
with the lover tending to be obsessive and consumed by attraction for the other 
person.  Empty love is typified by mainly commitment and denotes a “normal” 
romance, which has run its course and has burned-out of passion and is low on 
intimacy.  It is often experienced as one-sided, occurs in marriages over time, 
and can be more normal in cultures that do not privilege intimacy or passion in 
romantic relationships.  Romantic love occurs when emotional intimacy mixes 
with physical attraction with commitment not being a priority.  Romantic love, in 
this model, can be thought of as a mixture of liking mixed with passionate 
arousal.  Companionate love occurs when intimacy and commitment combine to 
form a love that emphasizes mutuality and long-term investment in the couple 
more as true friends than lovers.  Infatuation may drive fatuous love, best typified 
in whirlwind romances that lead to immediate courtships.  Passion and a promise 
of a commitment, which usually winds up feeling shallow, rule it more.  Sternberg 
posited consummate love as an ideal kind of love with all three components 
present to an equal degree.  This complete kind of love is not only difficult to 
attain, but it is equally hard to maintain.  Nonlove represents the absence of all 
components, and as Sternberg said, “nonlove characterizes the majority of our 
interpersonal relationships, which are casual interactions that do not partake of 
love, or even friendship, in any meaningful way” (1988, p. 129). 
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Sternberg described how each romantic partner loves with the metaphor of a 
triangle that represents love for the other.  In this model there are ways to 
represent love that is real, ideal, self-perceived, other-perceived, felt and acted.  
Greater discrepancies between how one wishes to love and be loved can often 
lead to dissatisfaction.  A love relationship can be more or less characterized by 
having a greater or less degree of one or more of these three ingredients at any 
different stage of the relationship. 
While Sternberg derived his typology from his reduction of love to the 
components of intimacy, passion and commitment, and then re-assemblage in 
combinations, Lee’s (1988) work represents a somewhat different approach.  
Rather than dissect love into different aspects, Lee sought out to think of love 
more as a plurality than as a single construct.  He attempted to descriptively 
distinguish the different ways in which one loved another person romantically.  
Interested in individual differences in the experience of love he chose to study 
love’s (metaphorical) many colors and designed his Love Story Card Sort.  
Subsequently, he built a model of love as a taxonomy of different styles (1973, 
1988).  Lee’s Color Theory of love featured six types of love (three primary and 
three secondary) that differ in the levels of intensity experienced, commitment to 
the other, and the desired characteristics of and expectations on the other.   
Lee named his styles in Greek and Latin to relate them to their intellectual 
histories.  The first of the primary styles is Eros, which involves a powerful 
physical attraction, where the lover searches for the other who is felt to be ideal 
(at least physically).  It is characterized by an intensity that is sought after by the 
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lover, as he searches for the other to be his ideal partner.  Secondly, Storge is an 
easy-going, friendly kind of love that is found in a slowly developing attachment 
that leads to a lasting commitment.  The storgic lover is not consciously looking 
for love, as opposed to the erotic lover, and does not consciously pursue a 
partner who possesses some ideal qualities.  Finally, Ludus is characterized by a 
game-playing style of loving, where the lover does not search for a particular 
ideal mate, but takes a “pluralistic” attitude towards the art of love.  The ludic 
lover may engage in deception (intentionally or unintentionally) in his affairs with 
multiple partners at once.  In short, Ludus is a pleasure-seeking uncommitted 
kind of love.  
Lee’s three secondary styles are compounds of primary styles.  Mania is a 
love which of obsessive preoccupation with the loved object, requiring repeated 
assurances of reciprocated affection, and vulnerable to intense jealousy and 
possessiveness.  The manic lover can be said to be demanding in relationships, 
in love with love itself, to vacillate between intense feelings of pleasure and 
despair.  Pragma is a practical and rational love, in which the lover looks for a 
compatible partner based on reasonably weighing various valued characteristics 
that the lover esteems.  The pragmatic style describes one who pursues love in 
the form of a sensible partnership with an other with thoughts towards not just the 
present but the future.  Agape is a style of selfless and altruistic love that the 
lover practices as a duty.  Little is demanded of the other, as the lover feels the 
intense need to care for his partner.  Agape is gentle, patient, and is governed by 
reason and will more than erotic passion.   
 14
Lee’s qualitative interviewing and theoretical work led directly to empirical 
research.  While he did not empirically derive his styles of love from his data 
collection, his Color Theory led to the creation of love scales that sought to 
validate his theory.  The most widely used of these, the Love Attitudes Scale 
(LAS; Hendrick & Hendrick,1986), consists of statements on general love 
attitudes and behavior towards one’s partner that are answered in Likert format.  
It is understood that a person may not display the same love style in each 
relationship they have, as different partners may evoke distinct ways of relating.  
Rather than trait-like ways of loving, Lee’s styles can be thought of as ways of 
describing the way an individual currently loves another person within a given 
relationship.  Along this line, a person may love a current partner in a number of 
different styles over time.   
Despite its psychometric robustness, the research stemming from the LAS 
has been criticized for not measuring romantic love, “but rather some 
combination of love constructs and non-love constructs” Hendrick and Hendrick 
(1989).  This criticism has been levied specifically when each style is 
independently measured in relation to other relationship characteristics—for 
example, storge and pragma are seldom positively correlated to aspects of 
romantic love functioning.  In response to this charge, the Hendricks have claim 
that certain of Lee’s romantic styles may be less directly involved in the manifest 
romantic aspects of love, though may be implicated in an individual’s approach to 
love in general.  Sternberg has also asserted that, while Lee conceived of his 
primary styles as being distinct ways of describing the way one loves, Eros and 
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Storge are basically akin to Hatfield’s distinction of passionate and companionate 
love, which are not mutually exclusive and can be thought of as sub-components 
of romantic love (1987). 
 
Love’s attachment  
 
Attachment researchers have understood and measured aspects of love’s 
nature and its determinants.  It differs significantly from preceding offerings by 
virtue of its grounding in a developmental theory, its clinical applications, as well 
as its singular focus.  The importance of this last point will be elaborated further 
as I describe romantic attachment’s features.  Rather than a wide-ranging 
approach to understanding the nature of romantic love, the attachment 
perspective represents a way to understand how we go about loving and why we 
love.  Attachment researchers go beyond the here-and-now description of the 
nature and types of love seen in the previous approaches reviewed.  They have 
attempted “to situate love within an evolutionary framework . . . to explore how its 
infantile and childhood forms might be related to its adolescent and adult forms” 
(Shaver, Hazan & Bradshaw, 1988, p. 68-9).  The findings from this research 
have helped demonstrate the effect early childhood experiences and relationship 
histories have on the quality and types of adult care-giving situations and 
interpersonal bonds.     
In order to discuss romantic attachment in particular, it is necessary to 
provide a sketch of the ideas at the foundation of attachment theory in general.  
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Bowlby (1973) and Ainsworth (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978), were the 
primary architects of attachment theory.  Attachment researchers have used 
clinical encounters, parent-child observation, and narrative interviewing of adults 
reflecting on childhood experiences to construct a model of parent-child 
attachment styles.  According to Waters, Rodrigues and Ridgeway (1998), 
attachment security can be viewed as a set of expectations about others’ 
availability and responsiveness in times of stress, which are organized around a 
basic prototype or script.  Though particularly interested in studying the infant-
mother relationship, both Bowlby (1979) and Ainsworth (1989) articulated the 
need for understanding how attachment processes and internal working models 
functioned throughout the lifespan and across different types of intimate 
relationships.   
Bowlby originally studied attachment theory in order to understand human 
reactions to experiences of loss and separation (1969, 1973).  Serving as a 
protective mechanism in times of stress, the attachment behavioral system was 
to be triggered in order to promote safety and survival.  The child perceiving 
threat is thought to be able to seek the attention and support of a primary 
caregiver.  The ability to seek refuge in another person, who is expected to be 
available, is thought to create a sense of basic trust of oneself and others in the 
world.  This “secure base” (Bowlby, 1973) can lead to a sense of overall 
confidence, optimism, and self-efficacy specifically in being able to negotiate 
times of stress oneself and in being able to seek out others for assistance when 
needed (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Shaver & Hazan, 1993; Mikulincer & 
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Florian, 1998).  According to Bowlby (1988), then, attachment security hinges on 
having two interacting representational models: the first is that others are 
generally reliable, available, and responsive in times of distress, and the second 
is the self is worthy of care.  Bowlby laid out the various ways he believed one’s 
representational models affected one’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors 
throughout life (1973).  Representational models guide expectations of the 
availability and probable responsiveness of others, attributions of the behavior of 
others in ambiguous situations, and attention and memory (Cassidy, 2000).  
Though the coloring of one’s attachment security is formed in one’s early 
experiences of caregiving, Bowlby believed that other meaningful interactions 
with significant others later in life would influence one’s set of expectations about 
interpersonal availability (Bowlby, 1988; Mikulincer, Florian, Cowan & Cowan, 
2002).     
According to Bowlby, insecure attachment can be thought to originate in an 
early childhood that is characterized by the primary caregiver inadequately 
assisting the child in regulating affect, thus leaving the child with feelings of 
incapability when it comes to managing distress.  The failure to develop 
adequate attachment behaviors and inner resources may leave the child at risk in 
regards to low resiliency and poor coping skills in life (Mikulincer & Florian, 
1998).  Insecurely attached individuals find it difficult to obtain social support, 
may alienate others, will feel helpless and guilty about their inability to rely on 
others, and may feel angry and resentful towards both past and present 
attachment relationships that were and are experienced as unsatisfactory 
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(Bowlby, 1973; Rholes, Simpson & Stevens, 1998).  Underlying this experience 
is the belief and fear that others cannot be relied on in times of great need.       
Ainsworth and her colleagues (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978) 
translated Bowlby’s theory into an experimental situation and eventually 
articulated three styles of relationships to describe what they observed in their 
Strange Situation laboratory procedure.  In this setup, infants were briefly 
separated from their caregiver and left in an unfamiliar situation.  The resulting 
patterns of exhibited behavior allowed them to be grouped into three categories.  
The first group of insecure-avoidant infants did not seek comfort from their 
mothers upon reunion and failed to respond to and even avoided their mother’s 
attempts to reestablish connection.  Infants classified as secure confidently 
explored the laboratory environment and sought comfort from their returning 
mothers.  Finally, anxious-ambivalent infants explored the environment in a 
limited fashion, were greatly distressed by the separation, and exhibited a 
mixture of anger and anxiety with the return of their primary caregiver.  
Subsequent work to investigate the relationships between infants and their 
caregivers has used Ainsworth et al.’s threefold typology as the standard model 
of attachment.  However, there have been attempts to extend this model by 
proposing additional categories, such as Main and Solomon’s (1986) 
D/disorganized-disoriented type. 
Ainsworth (1989) believed that intimate attachment relationships in adulthood 
could be characterized by three principal behavioral systems—attachment, 
caregiving, and sexual.  As Cassidy summarized: 
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The attachment system involves behavior organized around maintaining 
proximity to or contact with an attachment figure, particularly in times of 
trouble; the attachment figure serves as a “haven of safety” during such 
times.  The caregiving system involves the organization of behaviors that 
provide care to another, again particularly in times of trouble.  The sexual 
system consists of behaviors related to sexual activity. (2000) 
 
Based on this conception of interacting behavioral systems, adult attachment 
researchers have sought to study how each independently operating system 
influences the other in the context of an intimate relationship.  For example, 
within a given relationship, one system may take priority over another at a certain 
stage in the relationship (i.e. the attachment behavioral system develops more 
gradually over the first two years; Ainsworth, 1989, Hazan & Zeifman, 1994).    
      
Making the leap to romantic relationships, researchers began observing that 
lonely adults would describe romantic problems in a way that suggested some 
continuity with dysfunctional attachment in early childhood (Weiss, 1973; Shaver 
& Hazan, 1989).  Hazan and Shaver (1987) and subsequent attachment 
researchers in their mold addressed the lack of a theoretical framework 
demonstrated in prominent models of love relationships using taxonomies to 
explain individual variability.  Hazan and Shaver came from the branches of 
personality and social psychology and wanted to approach this problem by 
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adopting Ainsworth’s classification system to conceptualize the motivations and 
ways adults behave in romantic relationships.   
Hazan and Shaver (1987; Shaver & Hazan, 1988) developed a method of 
investigation in which subjects were asked to choose from one of three 
paragraph-long descriptions that would indicate how they typically felt in romantic 
relationships.  These items were meant to reflect Ainsworth’s three attachment 
types modified for adult relationships—secure, avoidant and anxious.  Secure 
attachment in this context is described as especially happy, friendly, trusting with 
the capacity to be accepting and supportive of partners despite their faults.  
Avoidant love is characterized by fear of intimacy, emotional highs and lows 
mistrust, and dissatisfaction.  Anxious/ambivalent love involved obsession, desire 
for reciprocity that is rarely met, emotional lability, and extremes of sexual 
attraction and jealousy.  With their introduction of the first self-report measure of 
adult attachment and their initial findings, Hazan and Shaver proposed that love 
styles reported by other researchers (Lee, 1973) could be better explained by 
their three attachment styles.   
Studies comparing attachment styles with some of the prominent love 
taxonomies outlined above produced modest to moderate results (Levy & Davis, 
1988; Shaver & Hazan, 1988).  Secure lovers were positively correlated with 
experiencing all three of Sternberg’s (1986) triangular components of love—
intimacy, passion, commitment—to a higher degree than avoidant and 
ambivalent types.  The secure style also was associated to higher levels of Lee’s 
eros (passionate love/attraction to physical ideals) and agape (selfless and 
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altruistic love) and to lower levels of ludus (game-playing loving).  Avoidant 
attachment was linked to high levels of ludus and lower levels of eros.  Finally, 
anxious/ambivalent attachment styles were positively related to high levels of 
mania (possessive-dependent loving).     
From initially focusing on the comparison of close-ended self-report measures 
assessing people’s general attitudes towards love, the attachment field has 
evolved.  Attachment researchers eventually began recruiting romantic partners 
as subjects (Simpson, 1990) and exploring experiences of relationship break-up 
(Feeney & Noller, 1992).  Moving away from the structured methods of earlier 
studies, the 1990’s saw a trend towards more open-ended approaches to 
romantic attachment research that asked for unbounded descriptions of oneself 
and one's partner, indirectly assessed for saliency of attachment issues, and 
attempted to counteract both experimenter demand and social desirability.  For 
example, attempting to improve on the general trend of correlational models of 
attachment studies, Collins et al. (2002) attempted a prospective study of 
attachment.  Their goal was to explore whether attachment style measured 
during adolescence would predict the quality of romantic relationships years 
later.  The avoidant attachment style produced the most robust results, as 
demonstrated at a six-year follow up that found these individuals to have 
romantic relationships that were less satisfying than other comparison groups, as 
reported by both members of the couple.  They were also assessed to engage in 
less adaptive relationship behavior, with specifically male avoidants found to be 
more withdrawing and aggressive.  The anxious-ambivalent group produced 
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moderate results and seemed to be in the middle between the avoidant and 
secure groups in terms of relationship quality.  Closer analysis of the secure 
group showed that secure males did not have relationship outcomes significantly 
better than their anxious-ambivalent peers, in contrast to secure women who had 
the best overall relationship ratings. 
Bartholomew’s research (1990; Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991) ushered in 
major advancements in the romantic attachment field, only a few of which will be 
discussed here.  One development involved her demonstrating that romantic 
attachment styles in adults could be better explained by two continuously 
distributed dimensions: 1) view of self versus view of other and 2) positive view 
versus negative view.  Another concerned her distinction between types of 
avoidant attachment into two groups of “dismissing” avoidants and of “fearful” 
avoidants (1990).  Finally, Bartholomew’s methodology included a mixture of 
multiple forms of measuring attachment.   She acknowledged the difference 
between narrative attachment interviewing (utilized by Main and others; George, 
Kaplan, & Main, 1985) which concentrates its distinctions on “differences in 
communicational behavior and defensive style [which] are not necessarily 
noticed or acknowledged by the people who exhibit them” and self-report 
measures which “focus on conscious, potentially inaccurate summaries by a 
person of his or her own experiences and behaviors” (Bartholomew & Shaver, 
1998, p. 29-30).  Many of her studies would involve a combination of convergent 
peer and family reports, a revised form of Hazan and Shaver’s self-report 
measure (1987), along with an interview similar to the Adult Attachment Interview 
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(AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985) and one focusing on close relationships 
(friendships and romantic).   
Bartholomew’s research led to the establishment of a four-category 
classification scheme (Bartholomew 1990; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) of 
four prototypical attachment styles: 
  
Secure - (positive model of self and others) Secure individuals have an 
internalized sense of self-worth and are comfortable with intimacy in close 
relationships. 
 
Preoccupied - (negative self model and positive model of others) Preoccupied 
individuals anxiously seek to gain acceptance and validation from others, 
seeming to persist in the belief that they could attain safety, or security, if they 
could only get others to respond properly toward them. 
 
Fearful - (negative model of self and others) Fearful individuals are highly 
dependent on others’ acceptance and affirmation however because of their 
negative expectations, they avoid intimacy to avert the pain of loss or 
rejection.   
 
Dismissing - (positive model of self and negative model of others) Dismissing 
individuals avoid closeness because of negative expectations; however they 
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maintain a sense of self-worth by defensively denying the value of close 
relationships.   
         (in Bartholomew & Shaver, 1998, p. 31) 
 
These four attachment types have been understood as being super-imposed on 
top of two underlying dimensions: a person’s view of self (positive or negative) 
and a person’s view of other (positive or negative).  A related two-dimensional 
scheme involves the dimensions of dependence/anxiety over relationships 
versus avoidance/comfort with closeness.   
Using these four categories, the caregiving, attachment and sexual systems 
(Shaver, Hazan, & Bradshaw, 1988; Ainsworth, 1989) that attachment theorists 
propose underpin close relationships have been researched.  Kunce and Shaver 
(1994) constructed a measure to assess the quality of caregiving in romantic 
relationships.  The four factors that were produced were proximity/distance, 
sensitivity/insensitivity, cooperation/control, and compulsive caregiving.  Their 
study found that while secures reported high proximity and sensitivity, 
dismissives conversely were found to be low on both these counts.  Further, both 
secures and insecures did not register high on the compulsive caregiving scale, 
as opposed to preoccupied and fearfuls who also indicated low sensitivity.  
Marital satisfaction was found to be higher for securely attached spouses and for 
dyads where there was a high reported level of responsive care (a combination 
of proximity, sensitivity and cooperation) (Feeney, 1996).  Exploring sexual 
behaviors, researchers found that avoidants were the most accepting towards 
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casual sex (Feeney, Noller and Patty, 1993), were more likely to engage in “one-
night stands,” and endorse the attitude that loveless sex was pleasurable 
(Brennan & Shaver, 1995).  Hazan, Zeifman and Middleton (1994) reported the 
results of a relatively large study of 100 adults who completed self-report 
measures of sexual experiences and attachment.  They derived sexual styles 
from their results that paralleled the major attachment classifications.  They found 
secure individuals primarily reported mutually initiated sex within a relationship 
and the enjoyment of physical contact.  Avoidants were associated with sexuality 
indicative of low psychological intimacy and less enjoyment of physical contact.  
Finally, ambivalents reported not enjoying sexual behaviors that went beyond 
holding and caressing, though females did indicate involvement in exhibitionism, 
voyeurism and bondage.   
Empirical testing has demonstrated how a negative model of the self leads to 
high levels of abandonment anxiety and a negative model of others may lead to 
avoidance efforts (Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998; Scharfe, 1996).  In simple 
terms, dismissing and fearful people have a negative working model of others 
that results in less comfort with closeness compared to secure and preoccupied 
responders.  Also, preoccupied and fearful persons’ dominant anxiety over 
relationships may be the result of a predominantly negative model of self.  
Securely attached individuals, by this scheme have both a positive view of self 
and others, and are equally comfortable with being close to others and are able 
to manage anxiety related to such relationships.  There is an existing debate in 
the literature whether these attachment categories should be collapsed onto 
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underlying dimensions of a positive-negative self-other model or 
avoidance/anxiety tendencies (Fraley & Shaver, 2000).    
The empirical findings of attachment research are too prolific to do justice to 
in summary form here (Cassidy, 2000; Fraley & Shaver, 2000 offer excellent 
reviews).  In concluding this section on romantic attachment research, however 
let me be clear and state some assumptions that can be drawn from this 
literature.  In general, attachment researchers presume that internal 
representational working models of the availability and responsiveness of others 
and the worthiness of the self are formed in childhood and are carried into 
adulthood where they play a role in close relationships.  Specific configurations of 
internal working models can be translated into an attachment style that 
influences relationship outcomes by two general mechanisms (Bowlby, 1980; 
Collins, Cooper, Albino & Allard, 2002).  First, the internal working models (of self 
in interaction with others) underlying attachment impact on perceptive, affective 
and behavioral processes in a way that increases difficulties in maintaining 
satisfactory relationships.   
Research supporting this has shown securely attached individuals tend to 
have more optimistic beliefs about love relationships, were able to positively 
frame problems relating romantic coupling, and were more likely to be in 
marriage or cohabitation situations than those of insecure styles (Carnelley & 
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Boon & Griffin, 1996; Hill, Young, & Nord, 1994).  Of the 
few longitudinal studies that have been done (Kirkpatrick and Hazan, 1994; 
Klohnen & Bera, 1998, Crowell & Treboux, 2001) attachment security has been 
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suggestive of couple and marital stability.  Conversely insecure attachment to be 
linked with a number of maladaptive interpersonal behaviors spanning the 
domains of general social perception and emotion regulation (Collins, 1996; 
Feeney, 1999), social support and caregiving (Collins & Feeney, 2000); 
interpersonal violence (Dutton, Saunders, Starzomski & Bartholomew, 1994), 
and coping with conflict (Feeney, 1998).  Insecurity in attachment has also been 
related to desiring a greater number of partners in one’s life, infidelity and higher 
frequency of romantic break-up (Simpson, 1990; Feeney & Noller, 1992; 
Kirkpatrick & Hazan, 1994; Miller & Fishkin, 1997).   
The second mechanism of influence involves how these working models 
shape partner selection behavior.  The research supporting mate selection and 
attachment is not conclusive, but some correlational studies demonstrate that 
within romantic couples secure individuals pair with other secures (Feeney, 
1994) and avoidants (fearful) are matched with anxious (preoccupied) types 
(Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994).  As Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) researched, in 
general, secure potential partners elicited stronger positive emotions than did any 
of the three insecure partners.  Another consistent finding is that insecurely 
attached people are usually found to be in relationships with securely attached 
individuals, rather than another insecure type (Chappell & Davis, 1998). 
Attachment research also involves the dissection of love relationships into 
separate component behavior systems, of which attachment is only one.  This 
way of understanding love, is situated in a developmental bio-evolutionary 
context that has attempted to understand loving relationships in terms of 
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biological necessity.  By taking a lifespan approach, attachment researchers 
have also been able to move beyond the documentation of love styles and 
propose causes for why individuals love across a spectrum of functionality.  Also, 
as stated earlier, while attachment researchers do discuss the interaction of the 
three identified behavioral systems, their empirical research mainly targets the 
investigation of attachment behavior within relationships.  This will separate 
romantic attachment studies from other kinds of research that attempt to 




From talking about the developmental context that attachment research 
places romantic relationships in, it is a shift in scale to discuss the development 
of love relationships in an evolutionary context.  Evolutionary approaches to 
studying human behavior stretch across various disciplines including biology, 
ethology, anthropology and various branches of psychology.  Evolutionary 
psychology holds that:  
 
…the human brain, the organ that realises the human mind, is no different 
from any other organ with an evolutionary function, insofar as the human 
brain too is a system shaped by natural selection to solve adaptive problems . 
. . . The human brain is largely a system of adaptations: an integrated system 
of features that evolved because their behavioural effects tended to help 
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maintain or increase the fitness of organisms whose brains contained those 
features    
                                                           (Atkinson & Wheeler, 2004)  
 
Evolutionary psychology occupies a somewhat prominent, albeit controversial 
place in the landscape of the social sciences.  I will not devote much time to 
these arguments here, and will refer the reader to recent published debates on 
the merits and problems of evolutionary psychology (Buller & Hardcastle, 2000; 
Buss, 1995; Caporael, 2001; Davies, 1999; Gannon, 2002; Lloyd & Feldman, 
2002; H. Rose & Rose, 2000; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999).  Here I will present the 
research application of evolutionary psychology to the topic of romantic love.   
Evolutionary psychology approaches the topic of romantic love in the context 
of mating and the propagation of the species.  Evolutionary theorists have 
attempted to fit romantic love into a more overarching scheme of human 
evolution and adaptiveness (Buss, 1994).  Long-term relationships, including 
romantic ones, are seen in light of their function in aiding the solution of 
evolutionary problems of reproduction and survival.  Thus, some overriding 
evolutionary concerns that guide mating relationships are the protection of one’s 
potential sexual partners, suitability of mates for procreative reasons and 
protection of one’s offspring (Sternberg, 1998a).     
Buss has placed specific emphasis on the possible ways men and women 
have separately (due to innate differences) negotiated mating relationships within 
an evolutionary context.  He outlined eight evolutionary goals of romantic love: 
resource display, exclusivity/fidelity, mutual support and protection, commitment 
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and marriage, sexual feelings, reproduction, resource sharing, and parental 
investment (1988).  These goals, accomplished in the context of loving 
relationships, are ultimately geared towards increasing the chances for 
reproductive success.  From this perspective, finding and keeping a mate 
requires one to display the resources they possess to this end.  His research has 
attempted to attribute the distinct sexual strategies that men and women hold to 
the contrasting minimum obligation of parental investment between the two 
genders (9 months of gestation vs. one act of intercourse).   
One study testing his hypotheses in 37 cultures (across 6 continents and 5 
islands) found that men prefer women with the attributes of youth, physical 
attractiveness, good body shape, chastity and fidelity; while women desire men 
who exhibit economic capacity, social status, age, ambition, industriousness 
dependability, stability, compatibility, physical size and strength, good health, and 
commitment, among other attributes (1989).  Buss (1988) also found that these 
preferences may change depending on whether a person is looking for a long-
term relationship versus one more casual and short-term.  His explanation is that 
across millennia females have traditionally looked for males who could provide 
the resources and support necessary to meet the high costs associated with her 
reproductive tasks.  Men have preferences towards women who seem capable of 
successful reproduction.  The differences Buss found between genders, 
regarding preferred attributes of a mate, were more apparent when self-report 
methods were used compared to what their behavior exhibited.  Further research 
has also demonstrated different factors that influence some of the preferred 
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characteristics, such as the way levels of disease in a geographical area are 
positively correlated with the importance placed on physical attractiveness 
(Gangestad, 1993).  On the whole, Buss argues that current mate selection 
preferences and differences he found “reflect sex differences in the adaptive 
problems that ancestral men and women faced when selecting a mate” (1995).  
Buss (1995; Buss et al., 1992) has used his version of evolutionary theory to 
explain gender differences he found in relation to jealousy—in which men 
displayed greater psychological and physiological distress when prompted with 
or finding themselves in situations of partner sexual infidelity, often leading to 
drastic consequences.  Women tended to be more affected by perceived 
emotional infidelity.  Men cognitively were found to preferentially process and 
have greater memory recall for sexual infidelity, while women had evidenced the 
same tendency for emotional infidelity (Schutzwohl & Koch, 2004).  Relatedly, 
using a forced dilemma survey Shackelford et al. (2002) showed that men, 
compared to women, found it more difficult to forgive a sexual infidelity than an 
emotional infidelity, and indicated that they would be more likely to terminate a 
current relationship in which a partner was sexually unfaithful than emotionally.  
For Buss, jealousy can be understood then as an adaptive solution meant to 
protect a relationship by alerting an individual to threats to a valued relationship.  
Conceiving infidelity as one of the main threats to romantic relationships, Buss 
has researched how jealousy adaptively functions to inspire “mate retention 
behaviors” (Shackelford, Goetz, & Buss 2005).  Common examples of these 
behaviors, which Buss and colleagues measure with the Mate Retention 
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Inventory, are physical possession signals, emotional manipulation, and 
monopolization of time. 
Because of its wide-ranging scope, evolutionary psychology’s to romantic 
relationships addresses all three of the basic questions of love’s nature, 
determinants and course.  In the following section I will evaluate the utility of 
studying romantic relationships from a point of view of heritable functional 
adaptation to environmental problems over millions of years in regards to the 




Helen Fisher has conducted a research program over the last decade to specify 
and locate some of the neurochemical correlates of the experiences of romantic 
love (2004).  She has drawn on evidence from primate studies and paleontology 
research from diverse cultures to advance a view that the evolution of large-
brained, helpless hominid infants brought about the imperative for cooperation in 
child-rearing between mother and father.  Romantic love, typified by the 
experience of elation, intense labile feeling and obsessive focused attention on a 
beloved other, can then be thought of as evolving to facilitate a long-enough 
bond between women and men to conceive children.  For Fisher, romantic love 
may function to usher in the potential development of the attachment drive, 
characterized by the experience of calm security between couples.  She has 
investigated the biological drives that humans have (as well as some other 
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animals) to “prefer, pursue and possess specific mating partners” (p.47) and 
focused on the role of three neurotransmitters—dopamine, norepinephrine and 
serotonin.  Employing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques, 
which essentially locate areas of increased blood flow when the brain reacts to 
particular stimuli, Fisher and colleagues investigated whether the obsessive and 
passionate nature of romantic love was due to elevated dopamine and/or 
norepinephrine levels and decreased levels of serotonin.  By “scanning the brain” 
of men and women, involved in tasks, who were either reportedly happy in love 
or recently rejected by a loved other, she found support for the role of dopamine 
in the experience of focused attention, energy, concentrated motivation, and 
elation in romantic love.  Her collaboration with her colleagues has also led her to 
postulate that romantic love be thought more of as a “primary motivational 
system in the brain—in short, a fundamental human mating drive” (p. 74).   
In 2005, Fisher and her colleagues (Aron et al, 2005; Fisher, Aron & Brown, 
2005) looked at the link between participants’ responses on the Passionate Love 
Scale (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986) and their brain scans while looking at pictures 
of romantic partners while in an fMRI machine.  This resulted in a link between 
passionate (romantic) love and activation of the subcortical caudate nucleus and 
ventral tegmental areas of the brain (caudate nucleus activation was correlated 
with higher Passionate Love Scale scores).  These areas of the brain are largely 
responsible for dopamine transmission and are associated with mammalian 
reward and motivation.  Fisher has interpreted these results as evidence for 
understanding romantic love as a motivational system, rather than an emotion, 
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that is distinct from the sex drive (lust).  Fisher distinguishes what she calls 
romantic love, as being connected to two other distinct but related mating drives, 
lust and attachment.  She has proposed studying the neurochemical model of 
increased testosterone in lust and elevated oxytocin and vasopressin in 
attachment.   
While she has attempted to outline the role and interplay of neurochemicals in 
romantic experiences, she has admitted that the complex interactions of the lust, 
attachment and romantic love systems defy complete understanding at the 
current time.  Stating that the relative strengths of the different systems also have 
to be explored, Fisher suggests that the romantic love drive may be stronger than 
the other two.  Further, Fisher admits that that there are a whole host of 
variables, including one’s personal relationship history, developmental 
experiences, personal likes and dislikes, that combine to influence a “largely 
unconscious psychological chart” that guides who and when a person falls in 
love.  In other words, these “love maps” and evolutionary imperatives towards 
finding suitable mates to reproduce with direct one toward the particular loved 
other.  Her research is then an effort to understand the neurochemical 
underpinnings of what happens when these relationships are formed.            
Along these lines, she has tried to understand the trajectory of romantic love’s 
neurochemistry within mainly an evolutionary context.  For instance, she 
postulates that the steady diminishing of romantic passion is correlated to 
lessening effects of dopamine (either through less distribution, desensitization or 
counteraction by other brain chemicals—p. 204.).  Fisher believes:  
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This brain circuitry evolved to drive our forebears to seek and find special 
mating partners, then copulate exclusively with “him” or “her” until conception 
was assured.  At that point, ancestral couples needed to stop focusing on 
each other and start building a safe social world where they could rear their 
precious child together (p. 205).   
 
Fisher’s reading of evolutionary theory and related research has her postulate 
that our ancestral humans (some 3.5 million years ago) paired with a mate long 
enough to rear a single child through infancy (Fisher, 1992).  She has discussed 
a kind of primitive divorce precedent that has helped evolve brain circuitry for 
short-term, rather than long-term attachment.  Evolutionarily, she believes that 
ancestral divorce evolved in order to create the opportunity for serial monogamy, 
which allowed our ancestors to create beneficial variety for their lineage (2004, p. 
134).  Thus she understands the fickleness of human romantic love circuitry as 
evolutionarily programmed in order to allow for two complementary reproductive 
strategies in tandem—to allow for the mating and rearing of one set of offspring, 
while always being on the look out for potential other reproductive opportunities 
and resources.  It is in this way that she accounts for the common ubiquity of 
philandering and cheating among monogamous creatures (Daly, Wilson & 
Weghorst, 1982; Black, 1996; Mock & Fujioka, 1990).  As Fisher reiterates, “we 





Thibaut and Kelley’s interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Kelley 
& Thibaut, 1978) has influenced relationship science by lending itself to empirical 
researchers who have taken its core ideas and used them to study all sorts of 
interpersonal processes (Karney & Bradbury, 1995).  Interdependence theory 
assumes that people are bonded to and rely on each other for interpersonal 
rewards.  Dependence can then be thought of as the degree to which an 
individual is able to rely on another to enable the achievement of rewarding 
outcomes and the gratification of needs; with commitment the subjective 
experience of dependence (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).  A closely related way 
of thinking about relationships is in regards to social exchange (Blau, 1964; 
Homans, 1961).  It understands personal relationships as involving a series of 
calculated negotiated exchanges.  Crucial to interdependence and social 
exchange research applications is viewing romantic relationships in terms of 
rewards, costs, investments and comparison level for alternatives.  
Social exchange theory (SET) and its variants have been used to explore 
close relationships and mechanisms of interpersonal attraction (Brehm, Miller, 
Perlman & Campbell, 2002, p. 158).  SET emphasizes that relationships operate 
on a model of costs and benefits.  It abides by the economic model principle that 
“how people feel about their relationships will depend on their perception of the 
rewards they receive from the relationship and their perception of the costs they 
incur, as well as their perception of what kind of relationship they deserve and 
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the probability that they could have a better relationship with someone else” 
(Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1999, p. 388).  People seek relationships that they 
think will maximize their rewards while limiting the punishment involved, generally 
wanting to be rewarded in their areas of perceived insecurity.   
One can then think of evidence showing couples’ matching tendencies across 
attractiveness variables as an application of exchange theorizing in mate 
selection (Price & Vandenberg, 1979).  What is crucial is how an individual 
actually judges the attractiveness of personal relationships.  Brehm et al. (2002, 
p. 158-161) explained that one criterion involves one’s idiosyncratic comparison 
level, which denotes the value one believes he deserves in dealings with others.  
Obviously these expectations are built on variables like past experiences 
receiving rewards and punishments in relationships.  One’s satisfaction in 
relationships is measured by the standards associated with a personal 
comparison level.  Relationships length is also determined by one’s comparison 
level for alternatives, which refers to a person’s expectations about the level of 
rewards and punishments that could be received in another relationship.  Since 
all of these expectations and appraisals are highly subjective and implicit, there 
are many personal and situational characteristics that will affect these 
calculations, such as learned helplessness (Strube, 1988) and access to 
information (Rusbult & Martz, 1995).  Also, those who are more satisfied in their 
relationships may spend less time assessing and attending to possible 
alternatives (Miller, 1997). 
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SET’s findings have attempted to explain why satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) 
alone does not decide relationship outcome.  When Albrecht and Kunz (1980) 
described the trajectory of divorce they showed that usually unhappiness is 
present long before one or both members of the couple decide to end the 
marriage.  What changes is one’s perceived accounting of the relationship’s 
outcome (rewards minus costs) and comparison level of alternatives.  
Comparison levels of alternatives can be influenced by more global factors, such 
as cultural changes and socio-economic shifts that have little to do with any 
actions of either partner.   
Regarding the fate of outcomes and comparison levels, “people usually fail to 
maintain the outcomes that lead them to marry” (Brehm, Miller, Perlman & 
Campbell, p. 174).  This can be attributed to increasing lack of effort from both 
partners, over magnifying costs over benefits, increased intimacy that leads to 
increased vulnerability and exposure to harm within the couple, and unforeseen 
surprises (Miller, 1997).   
Another factor to consider in one’s relationship arithmetic is the level of 
investment in a present relationship.  Using the Investment Model Scale, Rusbult 
et al. (1994, 1998) showed that one’s investments, whether material or 
psychological, also impacts one’s decision to stay in a relationship despite what 
comparison levels look like.  In Rusbult’s model, investments are anything people 
have put into relationships that they perceive they will lose if the relationship 
ends (1980, 1983, 1991).  People’s commitment to a relationship will then 
depend on “their satisfaction with the relationship in terms of rewards, costs, and 
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comparison level, their comparison level for alternatives, and how much they 
have invested in the relationship that would be lost by leaving it” (Aronson, 
Wilson, & Akert, 1999, p. 399).    
In one study to test this model, she had undergraduates rate their 
heterosexual relationships every three weeks on the basis of their satisfaction 
level, what they thought of alternatives, and their degree of investment (1983).  
She found that each factor predicted both commitment to the relationship over 
time, as well as whether the relationship lasted.  Van Lange et al. (1997) further 
tested the importance of Rusbult’s model by finding an association between 
relationship commitment and willingness to sacrifice for one’s partner that was 
related to a high degree of satisfaction and level of investment, along with a low 
quality of alternatives. Additionally, the model has been shown to predict 
relationship continuance and termination, perspective-taking by partners, and 
illusions of perceived superiority of one’s relationship over others’ relationships 
(Martz et al., 1998; Rusbult et al., 1998).  A recent meta-analysis of empirical 
studies using the Investment Model, validated Rusbult’s original premise of the 
three factors of relationship commitment that lead to breakup decisions (Le & 
Agnew, 2003).     
Taking a different point of emphasis to social exchange models, though 
originating from the same core interdependency ideas, is equity theory (Walster, 
Walster & Berscheid, 1978), which focuses on fairness in relationships.  Instead 
of a model of interpersonal relationships in which a person aims to reap the most 
rewards possible, equity theorists suggest that the most stable and happy state 
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of a relationship is one in which both partners experience their contributions and 
benefits to be equal.  Unhappy relationships then can be explained by feelings of 
inequity by one or both members of the couple—whether feeling underbenefited 
or overbenefited.  People will then try to alleviate the relationship-experienced 
distress by attempting to restore a sense of balance.  Individuals thus assess 
potential partners by estimating and feel increasingly attracted to the other’s 
capacity to give and take proportionately in relationships.   
While short-term inequities in love relationships are inevitable, what is 
particularly of concern is the couple’s ability to detect and manage prolonged or 
sustained inequities.  Research has also found the different ways equity 
principles work in casual and less intimate versus long-term close relationships 
(Hatfield & Rapson, 1993b; Kollack, Blumstein & Schwartz, 1994).  In general, a 
looser form of accounting is done in the latter (designated as communal) as 
opposed to the former where a rule of equal ratio equity governs (designated as 
exchange).   Members of familial and romantic relationships tend to be mainly 
motivated to respond to the other’s needs, rather than focusing on restitution 
(Clark & Pataki, 1995; Mills & Clark, 1994).        
Most of the research conducted to investigate the claims of equity theory has 
involved self-report questionnaires.  In this form of relationship cost-benefit math, 
the traits that appear to be the most salient are: attractiveness, resources, 
resource (income potential), personality, knowledge and education, values and 
beliefs, and social status (Critelli & Waid, 1980).  Walster, Traupmann and 
Walster (1978) conducted research with a questionnaire in Psychology Today 
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that tested equity theory in relation to extramarital sex.  Their sample of 2000 
revealed that feeling underbenefited in relationships is associated to an 
increased amount of extramarital relations, as compared to those who 
considered their experience in relationships to be overbenefited or equitable.  
This finding has been recently supported for wives, but not for husbands (Prins, 
Buunk, & VanYperen, 1993).  Feelings of being underbenefited in relationships 
have also been associated to lesser sexual satisfaction in relation to the other 
two groups (Traupmann, Hatfield & Wexler, 1983).   
While earlier cross-sectional designs supported the claim that equitable 
couples were happier and reported less relationships anxiety than their 
overbenefited and underbenefited peers (Davidson, 1984; Sprecher, 1988, 
1992), more recent work using longitudinal and broader methods of inquiry have 
not supported equity theory as well.  Particularly, Sprecher found that 
overbenefited subjects are not always associated with feelings of discomfort, 
anxiety, and reduced relationship satisfaction (1998).  Buunk and Mutsaers found 
this to specifically be the case when partners who are now overbenefited once 
felt underbenefited in the past (1999).  Some have contended and produced 
findings (Cate, Lloyd & Long, 1988) to support the view that “the overall amount 
of reward that people receive is a better predictor of their satisfaction than is the 
level of equity they encounter” (Brehm, Miller, Perlman,& Campbell, 2002, p. 
179).  In general, while equity may be modestly associated with current 
satisfaction and commitment, it is less able to forecast relationship stability 
(Sprecher, 2001).    
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The mixed results from this brand of research may suggest that while 
judgments of inequity are very important in relationships, there are individual 
differences that may influence a person’s capacity to be more concerned with 
fairness than others.  Thus while underbenefiting is usually related to negative 
relationship attitudes, overbenefiting is sometimes related to increased 
satisfaction and other times to relationship guilt and discomfort (Brehm, Miller, 
Perlman & Campbell, 2002, p. 180).  Equity itself may also be more complex and 
difficult to measure due to the tendency for couples not to attend to its related 
issues when they are content (Holmes & Levinger, 1994).  Also, as studies have 
shown, the way equity is measured changes as the relationship lasts longer 
(Sprecher, 2001).  Grote and Clark (2001) have proposed a model based on their 
research that understands that perceptions of inequity initially arise out of 
feelings of distress and escalate along with it.  Future research appears to be 
focused on understanding the other factors that may influence estimations of 
equity and inequity.        
 
Love’s observation  
 
My review of the literature on married and couples observation will draw on 
recent published reviews that have focused on the trends and important 
contributions seen in this area of research over the last couple of decades.  It is a 
branch of observational research heavily influenced by the family systems 
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perspective.  My review will center on quite possibly the most prominent 
proponent and prolific producer of this brand of research, John Gottman. 
To situate this literature, let me say that the empirical observational research 
on married and dating couples can be viewed as existing in at least a couple of 
different contexts.  First is the cultural context that influences trends in marriage, 
divorce, monogamy, infidelity and overall relationship stability.  While statistics 
have shown that the majority of people marry in their lifetime (Stewart & 
Bjorksten, 1984), recent rates of marital dissolution have been found to range 
between 50 to 66 percent, with subsequent remarriages as likely to fail (Castro-
Martin & Bumpass, 1989; Cherlin, 1992).  The second context is the clinical 
setting in which the majority of this research is done.  The population that fuels 
this research is often a self-referred sample of couples reporting some form of 
relationship dissatisfaction.  As opposed to the other forms of romantic love 
research reviewed previously, clinicians addressing prevention and intervention 
concerns drive this field’s investigations.  Thus it is difficult to read the literature 
from this field without the influence of this bias, for more observations about 
relationships. However, the limitations of studying couples in crisis for what they 
can demonstrate about the nature and course of love also presents benefits.  
The nature of this research is such that subjects represent a love relationship 
that is always observable (in vivo) and is usually more mature than the standard 
research pool of university undergraduates.  Also, this clinical sample provides 
researchers to observe how relationships are viewed under the conditions of 
conflict and distress, widening the understanding of how current cognitive and 
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affective dispositions affect one’s view of a love relationship’s past, present and 
future.   
One of the ways marriage has been subjected to empirical study is by 
assessing rates of marital satisfaction.  A recent report found that since the 
1970’s the level of satisfaction in intact first marriages has declined (Rogers & 
Amato, 1997).  To this point, evidence has shown that marital satisfaction, on 
average, drops significantly over the first ten years of marriage before declining 
in a more gradual rate (Glenn, 1998).  Others have data that suggests that 
marital happiness takes on more of a U-shaped pattern, influenced in the middle 
years by the effect of raising children (Levenson, Cartensen, & Gottman, 1994).           
Recently, Bradbury, Fincham and Beach (2000) reviewed the methods and 
findings of this growing type of research centering on both the “interpersonal 
processes that operate within marriages and the sociocultural ecologies and 
contexts within which marriages operate” and the measurement of marital 
satisfaction.  They described the shift in marital research to observational studies 
in the 1970’s and the continued effort to understand the micro-processes of 
couple interaction.  One advancement that has been seen in this field over the 
last two decades is the emphasis on investigating the “less immediately 
observable aspects of marital interaction.”  I will review some of the important 
results.   
Over time and with an increase in strain within the relationship, individuals in 
a couple may become more susceptible to taking less responsibility for their own 
behavior while becoming more critical of their partners.  The accumulated effects 
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of this tendency can be destructive for relationships.  Research has shown that 
women may be more vulnerable to this negative attributional style (Doherty, 
1982).  Wives who have tendencies to attribute couples' problems to “undesirable 
personality traits or negative attitudes were more likely to verbally criticize their 
husbands in the problem-solving discussion” and have an angrier response style.  
Other investigations in experimental settings have demonstrated that happier 
couples more frequently emphasize the dispositional causes of favorable 
behavior and situational causes for unfavorable events; unhappy couples exhibit 
the reverse tendency (Fincham & O’ Leary, 1983).  Also, under observation 
married couples’ happiness tends to be more vulnerable to the presence of 
negative feelings and behavior, and exhibit a lower ratio of positive to negative 
interactions (Jacobson, Follette & McDonald, 1982; Gottman & Levenson, 1992).  
Gottman has done extensive work on the unfavorable effects of poor negotiation 
and management of negative affect within marital couples (1994).   
The incorporating of social-cognitive ideas into the field helped to broaden the 
definition of marital satisfaction as an attitude that can be assessed independent 
of the valence of the evaluation (Fazio, 1995).  This has helped researchers look 
at the possible mediating function of attitude accessibility on marital quality 
ratings.  Fincham, Garnier, Gano-Phillips, and Osborne (1995) found that 
spouses whose marital attitudes can be accessed easily (relative to their 
spouses) reported more stable marital satisfaction over an 18-month period.  
Findings concerning marital cognition linked maladaptive interpretations 
(attributions) of partner behavior to couple satisfaction rates across cultures 
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(Sabourin, Lussier & Wright, 1991) and marriage deterioration (Karney & 
Bradbury, 2000).  Bradbury and Finch (1992) described a pattern dervived from 
coded marriage interaction videotapes where maladaptive attributions were 
related to the reciprocation of a partner’s negative behavior (i.e., rejecting 
behaviors, hostility), specifically for wives.  Observational, longitudinal and cross-
cultural data has been published supporting demand/withdrawal patterns 
(Christensen, 1987) of marital interaction that are linked to declining rates of 
marital satisfaction (Klinetob & Smith, 1996; Heavey, Christensen & Malamuth, 
1995; Bodenmann, Kaiser, Hahlweg & Fehm-Wolfsdorf, 1998).  Bradbury, 
Fincham and Beach (2000) described a demand/ withdrawal dynamic: 
 
whereby one spouse, typically the wife, criticizes and nags the partner for 
change, while the partner, typically the husband, avoids the discussion and 
disengages from the confrontation.  According to this view, increased 
demands lead to increased avoidance, which in turn leads to increased 
demands for engagement, with the end result being a decline in marital 
satisfaction 
 
Specifically Heavey et. al (1995) demonstrated that the withdrawal by men and 
the female-demand/male-withdraw pattern was able to predict the decline in 
marital satisfaction for the wives 2.5 years later.  Observational methods that 
have been developed have allowed researchers to draw links between 
supportive behavior and changes in marital quality (Pasch & Bradbury, 1998).  
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Finally, observational studies of interactional styles have been able to link higher 
levels of negative reciprocation, anger and contempt to married couples reporting 
domestic violence. 
Studying married couples over time, Gottman and Levenson (1992) were the 
first to use observational data to predict divorce patterns.  Couples’ physiological 
responses (heart rates, finger pulse) during interactions and the higher degree of 
negativity (versus positivity) exhibited were factors associated with divorce.  On 
this last point, Gottman has described a pattern of how this negativity ensues 
between partners (1999).  He specifically attributed the prevailing insidiousness 
of negative affect to a failure in the couple’s ability to repair an interaction.  His 
sequential analysis of marital videos led him to arrive at a common dysfunctional 
model in which a spouse will attempt to repair a problem with negative affect, and 
will be responded to with reciprocated negative affect.  Subsequent examination 
of recorded marital interactions helped Gottman to identify another variable that 
is predictive of divorce, which is the presence of particular forms of negativity 
such as criticism, defensiveness, contempt and stonewalling (Gottman, 1993, 
1994).   
In a comprehensive review of the empirical study of marital processes, 
Gottman identified the seven patterns that have been consistently found across 
most of the prominent researchers in the field (1998): 
 
a)      greater negative affect reciprocity in unhappy couples (which may be 
related to the failure of repair) 
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b)      lower ratios of positivity to negativity in unhappy couples and couples 
headed for divorce  
c)      less positive sentiment override in unhappy couples 
d)       the presence of criticism, defensiveness, contempt and stonewalling in 
couples headed for divorce 
e)      greater evidence of the wife demand-husband withdraw pattern in 
unhappy couples 
f)      negative and lasting attributions about the partner and more negative 
narratives about the marriage and partner in unhappy couples 
   g)      greater physiological arousal in unhappy couples 
 
Gottman did acknowledge that what is presently lacking is an overarching 
theoretical model that would be able to synthesize what is known about these 
processes, explain how they are interrelated, and account for what is functional 
in satisfied and happy marriages.  Later, in a review of the advances in the field 
during the 1990’s, Gottman and Notarius (2000) highlighted the promising trends 
in the field, such as cross cultural and international observational studies of 
marital interaction (Van Widenfelt, Hosman, Schaap, & van der Staak, 1996), the 
observation of couples in naturalistic settings (such as mealtime, Hayden et al. 
1998), and the focusing on positive affect. 
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Love’s social cognition 
 
Over the last two decades there has been an increased output from researchers 
attempting to understand social behavior from the vantage point of cognitive 
processes (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kunda, 1999).  Social cognition has been 
defined as the study of how people “select, interpret, remember, and use social 
information to make judgments and decisions” (Aronson et al., 1999, p. 67).  
Social cognition researchers have combined the methods and insights from 
cognitive science and social psychology to understand interpersonal 
relationships and cognitive-affective processes.  Some of the established 
empirically supported concepts, such as attributional processes, from this field 
have been used to understand romantic relationships.  Though this field has not 
produced a major theory on love relationships, it represents one of the most 
prominent ways to study interpersonal relationships like romantic love. 
Attributional processes in relationships have been studied to understand 
whether personality styles or characteristics can influence one’s tendency to 
make attributions that harm or enhance the relationship.  Attributions refer to the 
explanations people use understand the causes of their own and others behavior 
(Heider, 1958).  People can emphasize external or internal circumstances in their 
attributions, and may use different attributional styles in accounting for their 
behavior versus others.  Actor-observer effects and self-serving biases, and are 
among the attributional processes researched in terms of romantic relationships.  
For instance Schutz (1999) found that non-distressed married couples account 
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for conflict in a self-serving manner.  Both partners attributed their own behavior 
to aspects that exonerated them, while blaming the other for starting the conflict.  
Findings also support the link between romantic partners’ satisfaction and 
attributional patterns.  Correlations were found between positive attributions and 
relationship satisfaction (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990), and conversely 
neuroticism, negative attributions and relationship dissatisfaction (Karney & 
Bradbury, 2000).  In other words, happier couples tended to evaluate positive 
actions by partners using internal, stable and global attributions, and negative 
actions with external, unstable, specific attributions that enhanced the 
relationship (Brehm & Kassin, 1990).  Unhappy couples display the opposite 
attributional pattern. 
Brehm et al. (2002) summarized that social-cognitive research has helped 
demonstrate that as opposed to striving for accuracy in our relationships with 
romantic partners, people see in their loved ones the attributes and motives that 
they expect or want (“or that they want”) to see (p.117).  Social-cognitive 
perspectives assume the active role a subject takes in interacting with others and 
perceiving the environment.  Thus, attention has been paid to the way one’s 
personal attributes and motivations can facilitate or hinder abilities to accurately 
judge and perceive others (Thomas, 2000).  Mashek and colleagues (2003) 
reported on the cognitive overlap that exists when subjects are asked to rate 
traits of self and romantic partners (versus non-close others).  There is evidence 
that individuals perceive romantic partners to be more similar to them in 
personality attributes and agree with them more than they actually do (Sillars, 
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1998; Watson, 2000).  This does not necessarily mean that relationship duration 
does not increase the accuracy of partner perception (Watson, Hubbard & 
Wiese, 2000).  However, what is more salient than relationship duration may be 
the levels of interest and motivation an individual applies in understanding the 
loved other (Graham & Ickes, 1997; Thomas & Fletcher, 1997). Another 
promising way this research is developing is in its attention to a person’s 
motivations in relationships. 
For example, Drigotas (2002; et al. 1999) reported on the tendencies people 
have to shape their representations of romantic partners along particular lines.  
His Michelangelo phenomena represents an interdependent process in which 
romantic partners shape or sculpt one another in order to bring each other closer 
to their respective ideal selves.  Key to this pattern is an underlying mechanism 
of behavioral confirmation, in which one’s expectations of one’s partner is 
facilitated by eliciting behaviors that confirm those expectations (Darley & Fazio, 
1980; Harris & Rosenthal, 1985; Merton, 1948).  In time one’s partner’s behavior 
may increasingly approximate and become aligned with one’s expectations.  A 
motivating factor in this interpersonal process is the striving towards one’s ideal 
representation of self, which is indirectly enhanced by being in relationship with 
an ideal other.  Using longitudinal designs, Drigotas (2002, et al., 1999) collected 
self-report data on a variety of couples (married and dating.  The information 
gathered supported this Michelangelo model and linked partner affirmation to 
movement towards an ideal self-representation and further to positive 
relationship and personal well-being effects. 
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There is further research on how people’s views of romantic partners depend 
on various expectation or ideals.  This research suggests that relationship quality 
is improved by the more positive, as opposed to accurate, views of the other.  
Murray has conducted research on the positive illusions that people have 
concerning their partners (1999).  She has found that faults of loved ones tend to 
be minimized, while “real” attributes that accord with what the subject would like 
the partner to be are emphasized and magnified (Murray & Holmes, 1999).  
According to this line of results, people’s judgments of their partners are more 
favorable than the loved person’s self-report estimations (Murray, Holmes & 
Griffin, 1996a).  On the benefits of positive illusions, Murray et al. (1996a) 
described that these positive beliefs are associated with behaviors that help the 
relationship.  Positive illusions about each other and the relationship may help 
buffer negatives and difficulties between the partners, and also lead both 
individuals to act in ways to maintain such idealized views.  Idealizing beliefs may 
also work in a self-fulfilling manner.  Murray et al. (1996b, 2000) found that 
idealization was positively associated with positive judgment of behavior, 
willingness to commit to a relationship and increases in self-esteem.  Contrary to 
positive illusions, Murray and colleagues (2001) have also researched the effects 
of negative beliefs of the self on viewing others.  Their results concluded that 
self-doubting and insecure individuals tend to underestimate their partners’ 
affection and interpersonal qualities.   
A different perspective on the cognitive processes underlying romantic 
relationships has investigated the degree to which partners “know” each other.  
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Swann’s (1984; Swann, Bosson & Pelham, 2002) assumption of pragmatic 
accuracy proposes that social relationships are limited in scope and goals.  This 
means that individuals must only achieve pragmatic accuracy, in accordance with 
their specific relationship goals, in their understanding of others.  Gill and Swann 
(2004) collected data that showed that romantic relationship partners had greater 
accuracy understanding the views of their partners that related to specific 
relationship domains.  This was as opposed to reporting aspects about their 
partners accurately that had less relevance for their relationships.  Additionally, 
this pragmatic accuracy correlated positively with indices of relationship quality.  
Thus, for Swann, having an accurate view of one’s partner is potentially possible, 
but only in circumscribed domains where there is increased relationship 
relevancy. 
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Appraising the empirical literature  
 
My review of the relationship research literature shows the field’s 
overwhelming reliance on self-report measures.  Prominent examples of 
researchers or measures that rely on self-report questionnaires are Sternberg’s 
triangular theory (1986, 1987), Hatfield’s Passionate Love Scale (Hatfield & 
Sprecher, 1986), the Hendricks’ Love Attitudes Scale (Hendrick & Hendrick, 
1986), Rubin’s two-factor love and liking scales (1973), Lee’s love styles (1977, 
1988), romantic attachment styles (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Bartholomew, 1990), 
investment (Rusbult, 1993) and equity models (Walster, Walster & Bercheid, 
1978), and evolutionary studies on jealousy (Buss et al., 1992) and romantic 
attraction (Fisher, 2000).  The fields of marital observation and social cognition 
also routinely incorporate types of self-report questionnaires.  For the most part, 
the use of these measures rests on certain assumptions about conscious 
awareness.  Of course, it makes practical sense for researchers to focus on 
behavior and mental states that are readily accessible and observable to 
research participants.  I have less of a quarrel with the employment of these 
measures, than I do of the way they are used.  Their use leads to questions 
regarding both the accessibility of mental states and behaviors in love, and the 
accuracy of first person accounts.  
By asking participants to reflect on their experiences in relationships, 
researchers make two assumptions—that the targeted aspects are accessible to 
conscious awareness and that people are reliable reporters of their inner life.   
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Since the first assumption is fairly self-explanatory it requires little clarification.  
Basically, when Hazan and Shaver (1987; Shaver & Hazan, 1988) presented 
their research participants with paragraph-long descriptions of ways of relating in 
romantic relationships, there is an implied assumption that these ways of relating 
(or attachment styles) were the kind of psychological contents that are accessible 
to conscious awareness.  The same applies for self-report measures on jealousy 
in relationships (Buss, 1995; Buss et al., 1992), marital satisfaction (e.g., 
Spanier, 1976), commitment (Sternberg, 1986), and others.  Once one assumes 
the accessibility of psychological states in romantic love, the next assumption of 
reliability or accuracy of first person reports follows.      
To indicate by self-report that one communicates well with one’s partner (from 
Sternberg, 1986, 1987) leaves open the question of this participant’s response 
accuracy.  If researchers do not assume the relative veracity of subject 
responses, they would have to account for the effect of inaccuracy or distortion.  
An investigator could then either measure these effects (e.g., social desirability 
measures) or conceptually study the phenomenon of report errors (as certain 
social cognition designs do).  However, the standard in romantic love research 
seems to be to assume that participants’ self-report of mental states as well as 
behavior is relatively accurate.     
To give an actual example from the literature, Kim and Hatfield (2004) had a 
cross-cultural college sample complete the Passionate Love Scale (PLS; Hatfield 
& Rapson, 1993b), the Companionate Love Scale (CLS; Sternberg, 1986), the 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Pivot & Diener, 1993), and the Positive and 
 56
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clarke & Tellegen, 1988).  With the 
Passionate Love Scale, Kim and Hatfield asked participants to think about the 
person they love most passionately and rating (on a 7-point scale) how true that 
statement is for them.  An sample item from the PLS reads, “I would feel despair 
if ______ left me.”  For this item, the researchers must assume that the person 
will rate their hypothetical level of despair as accurately as they can.  To trust 
their results, Kim and Hatfield must also assume the relative accuracy of a 
participant’s conscious self-rating of passionate and companionate love feelings, 
as well as satisfaction with life and experience of moods.  Beck, Bozman, and 
Qualtrough (1991) used an earlier version of the Passionate Love Scale (Hatfield 
& Sprecher, 1986) to study the experience of sexual desire.  They had 
participants complete a survey with questions concerning the frequency of sexual 
desire, sexual activity without desire, desire without sexual behavior, intercourse, 
and sexual dreams.  Of both of these studies, only the second one held that self-
report accuracy was a limitation of the study.  Their inclusion of a social 
desirability measure, however, only was used to explain reported sexual behavior 
and not sexual desire.  Thus while the authors suspected a participant’s 
misreporting of sexual behavior, they assumed accuracy in indications of sexual 
desire. 
This example is just one that shows the tendency for romantic relationship 
researchers to assume the accessibility of psychological states and the accuracy 
of first-person accounts of experience.  These assumptions are the starting point 
for the research into love.  In these two studies, not much attention is given to 
 57
considering that a person may inaccurately report the degree he would 
experience break-up despair or experiences sexual desire.  Even if one grants 
that a person may not intend to provide a false self-report, isn’t there the 
possibility that one’s ability to consciously reflect on topics in the realm of 
romance and sexuality may lack accuracy?  Variability in accuracy may involve 
the nature of the psychological aspect being targeted (the accessibility of certain 
mental states and contents), or other motivational reasons that I will discuss 
later.  I am suggesting that the average level of conscious introspection assumed 
for participants in the majority of romantic love studies is implicitly set at a flawed 
mark.8   
The various research approaches to romantic relationships, covered in this 
chapter, represent an attempt to primarily study the consciousness of love.  By 
ignoring or insufficiently accounting for the role of unconscious processes in love 
relations, these approaches have limited usefulness.9  Many of these studies 
predominantly rely on self-report questionnaires that assume participant 
                                                 
8 Shedler, Mayman and Manis (1993) conducted a well-cited study that speaks to 
this very point.  They found a significant number of participants’ self-report 
measures of mental health did not correspond to clinician’s ratings.  This group of 
subjects was associated with significant health risks.  The authors concluded that 
these subjects were illustrating a defensive denial of distress, which led to a kind 
of illusory mental health related to psychological costs and risk factors for 
medical illness. 
 
9 Let me state here that my use of the term unconscious in this chapter is meant 
to broadly denote aspects of the mind “not realized or known as existing in 
oneself” and aspects of one’s psychology “which a person is not aware but which 
have a powerful effect on his attitudes and behavior (Oxford English Dictionary 




responses reflect accurate accounts of psychological processes in love 
relationships. Relationship researchers have not sufficiently explored the degrees 
to which psychological aspects of love are even accessible to conscious 
awareness.  Relatedly, this research minimizes the tendency people have to 
consciously or unconsciously inaccurately report on their thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors in love.  As touched on in the social cognition relationship research 
(and to be discussed further next chapter), research subjects’ reports on 
romantic experiences may be regularly subject to distortion and confabulation 
based on the everyday workings of the mental apparatus. The likelihood of this 
casts doubt on the reliability one can place in the kind of reasoning subjects 
indicate on questionnaires and during interviews.  This is not to say that the 
reasons people provide for their love relationships in research studies are 
necessarily incorrect, but rather the current framework for investigating romantic 
love only allows for partial consideration of mental processes that may, at best, 
be partially knowable. 
This narrowness confines how one can think about the varieties of romantic 
relationship experiences and outcomes.  This can be seen most clearly in social 
exchange models where people are assumed to not only be consciously aware 
of their relationship motivations, but further share the similar pursuit of maximum 
gain. These approaches that people may seek less their maximum relationship 
benefit and still receive relationship satisfaction.  In this cost-benefit model of 
romantic love, less than optimal relationship outcomes in a given contextual 
situation result from errors in relationship mathematics.  This model differs from 
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an attachment one, which views secure attachment as the healthy mode of 
relationships.  At the same time this perspective allows for the varieties of 
insecure attachments that provide less relationship flexibility, but no doubt are 
prevalent.  Equity and investment models are prime examples of relying on a 
model of the mind that privileges conscious and rational mental life.   
This research hardly considers the extent of what is involved in one’s 
appraisal of relationship factors.  This is specifically problematic if one considers 
that a participant’s self-report of relationship commitment, benefits, equity and 
investment are subject to the limits of conscious awareness and rationality.  In 
this category I would list everyday forms of cognitive distortion, faulty reasoning, 
and biases, not to mention unconscious factors that limit one’s interpretive skills 
in relationships.  In Chapter Two, I will discuss research demonstrating that 
people are limited in their awareness of what influences their evaluative 
processes and decision-making.  In Part Two, I will discuss the dynamically 
unconscious influences on one’s conscious awareness of mental states.  For 
now, let me conclude that this reliance on conscious processes, minimization of 
unconscious mental life (including affects and conflicting motivations) and narrow 
conception of rationality and goal-seeking limit these social exchange 
approaches in their ability to address a range of relationship phenomenon.  
Three other approaches that were covered in Chapter One need discussion.  
All three, like others discussed in this section also are limited in their scope of 
studying romantic relationships and their incorporation of unconscious 
processes.  The observational studies of married couples, most notably 
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published by Gottman, have been enormously popular in the mainstream press.  
This has been partly due to his claims about predicting divorce among 
newlyweds.  In one sense, the multi-modal methodology used is exceptional in its 
design to observe couples in videotaped interactions, coding for adaptive and 
maladaptive relationship behaviors.  It joins the clinical and research realms in a 
way that produces empirically viable and experience-near data.  
The problem with this approach to studying love is that it is only experience-
near in relation to the investigators’ point of view.  These brief videotaped couple 
interactions get analyzed in a way that identifies behaviors as positive, negative 
and neutral from a third-party perspective.  I am not raising questions about the 
correctness of the sequential coding.  In the way I understand this research, 
distressed couples can be differentiated from nondistressed couples by the 
patterns they exhibit during these interactions.  The issue is not whether 
something valuable is being captured in these taped interactions or, more 
specifically, in the way Gottman and others code them.  The issue is more of 
understanding how to make sense of the meaning of these coded behaviors 
beyond categorization of positive, negative and neutral.   
While this research is influenced by family-systems traditions, the published 
studies focus less on understanding such interactions in the context of what is 
known about couples and family therapy.  Further this research does not take an 
approach that is necessarily exclusive to processes in love relationships.  In this 
way, this research is similar to social cognition approaches that studied romantic 
relationships on the process level without a larger view of how these processes 
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function and develop within a more general theory of love relations.  This 
research deals less with how the members of a couple consciously experience or 
understand such interactions or their antecedents.  For this brand of research the 
issue is not that unconscious mental life is less emphasized, since it does not 
privilege conscious experience.  In some sense, it embodies a behavioral 
emphasis on observable and quantifiable phenomena.  Take for instance a 
recent publication from this brand of research, which is described as “a 
mathematical approach for modeling the prediction of divorce or marital stability 
from marital interaction using nonlinear difference equations” (Gottman, Swanson 
& Swanson, 2002).  While offering a valuable method of descriptive behavioral 
analysis and relationship outcome prediction, this research has less to offer in 
understanding the nature, course and determinants of love.    
Buss’ evolutionary approach of mating is inadequate in its approach to 
romantic relationships in a variety of ways.  This may be because his 
evolutionary approach clearly takes the long-view of the adaptive forest, and, by 
and large ignores the trees it contains.  His approach is not necessarily fit to be 
included in this discussion since it is a study of sexual reproduction, via 
relationships, that may or may not include romantic love.  Buss’ evolutionary take 
on mating clearly implies a genetically-driven rationality that determines one’s 
preferences in romantic partners.  His studies on the evolutionary roots of mate 
selection, jealousy, and mate retention lead back to his guiding principle 
regarding the evolutionarily programmed sexual strategies that individuals use to 
ensure successful reproduction.  Buss’ approach has sought to study aspects of 
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relationships that concern either the entry into relationships or sexual relations or 
the attempts to keep a partner from leaving (mate retention).  His evolutionary 
account explains the junctures of relationships—what motivates people to get 
into relationships, why people choose the people they do, and why relationships 
may dissolve and how people attempt to prevent this.  The majority of his studies 
have been derived from self-report questionnaire data in which he tests certain 
evolutionarily inspired hypotheses (e.g. that men, relative to women find it more 
difficult to forgive perceived sexual infidelity than emotional infidelity).   
The key to understanding the assumed, or in this case imposed, rationality on 
Buss’ part is that he clearly begins with a stated premise.  His mating studies 
operate under the premise of evolutionarily-supported gender differences in how 
one chooses, retains or leaves a mate.  He assumes these differences in mate 
relations are consciously accessible and accurately reportable.  His program of 
research can be viewed as an attempt to answer the fundamental question of the 
nature of love, which for him is reduced down to a means of motivated 
reproduction and propagation of the species.  Similar to what I have said about 
social exchange models, Buss’ model (of sexual infidelity threatening a man's 
reproductive interests and a woman's reproductive interests being threatened by 
a male's emotional infidelity) is a viable way of understanding relationships once 
certain premises, in this case evolutionary ones, are assumed.   
Buss’ model of mating relationships only works if one assumes two things:  
first, the optimal relationship goal that all people strive for is reproductive 
success; second, people must have some conscious awareness of the feelings 
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and ideas related to this motivation.  His questionnaires contain forced-choice 
scenarios that by nature delimit the context for discussing mating relationships.  
For example, participants are asked to consider which kind of infidelity (emotional 
or sexual) is more disturbing.  This is as opposed to querying to what degree 
emotional infidelity is a priority for them.  Buss’ model, with its emphasis towards 
reproductive success prioritizes infidelity as a relationship threat to a degree that 
may or may not be congruent to the average participant.  I am not supposing that 
infidelity is not a threat to relationships, but rather suggesting that Buss’ model 
contains a certain kind of presumed rationality for his participants’ relationships.  
In it, the optimal goal of reproductive success is consciously realized and aspired 
towards through fairly consistent ways.  To not assume this would then have to 
extend the limits of his investigation, as others have done (DeSteno & Salovey, 
1996; Levy, Kelly, & Jack, 2006), to understanding jealousy as related to other 
factors (attachment, the covariation between both types of infidelity) that are less 
tied to gender related reproductive strategies.   
As has been the case with my critique of other models, one cannot be clear 
whether Buss’ evolutionary relationship motivations are best considered 
unconscious or conscious.  This is not an issue of importance to him, but one 
would have to assume that he believes that it is an ever-present genetically 
programmed influence-whether explicitly or implicitly experienced.  Reading his 
studies, one would imagine all relationship dimensions could be reduced to how 
they affect reproductive potential.  However, by relying primarily on self-report 
questionnaires, one would have to assume that Buss takes for granted that 
 64
people have some access to these evolutionary designs and can reliably report 
on them.  In summary, this approach narrows the terms of understanding 
relationship dynamics, which may be necessary in a wide-reaching evolutionary 
program.  At the same time it limits the degree to which one can consider other 
salient relationship factors that do not correspond to clear-cut evolutionarily 
adaptive motivations, as well as unconscious ones.    
Also coming from an evolutionary approach, Fisher has directly proposed a 
model of empirically-based research that would encompass an understanding of 
romantic love.  As described in the earlier section, her tripartite model describes 
three primary emotion systems of lust, attraction and attachment that correspond 
to the evolutionarily-prioritized functions of mating, reproduction and parenting, 
respectively.  Her research program has attempted to identify the brain 
mechanisms involved in each system, and, in a sense, demonstrate the 
biological underpinnings of the psychological processes implicated in romantic 
love.  While her research has focused particularly on the attraction component of 
romantic love, her work represents an attempt to subsume some of the other 
forms of romantic research within the context of her bio-evolutionary framework.   
As far-reaching as Fisher’s model seems to be in accounting for the different 
dimensions of romantic relationships, it is best understood as describing the 
neurochemistry of love.  In positing love’s three independent affective-
motivational systems she has laid out a design for understanding romantic 
relationships on primarily a biological basis.  Fisher, in some sense, leaps from 
her evolutionary explanation of mating, reproduction and parenting to the 
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possible underlying brain chemistry correlates.  What is ignored, as in Buss’ 
research, is an accounting of how the individuals’ supposed evolutionarily 
adapted agenda is translated into a human psychology. 
It may be an extreme characterization of Fisher’s approach to say that it 
attempts to reduce the experiences involved in romantic relationships to their 
underlying brain mechanisms.  In this way, she could be critiqued for upholding 
the dualistic mind-brain divide.  The extraordinary advances in the world of 
neuroscientific mapping techniques are important for furthering understanding 
human psychology.  However, the terms of investigating and understanding 
one’s psychological experience versus the brain chemistry that produces such 
phenomena are distinct.   
By respecting the different terms of what I believe are different discussions, 
one can appreciate Fisher’s work in terms of its usefulness in identifying parts of 
the brain that may be implicated in romantic processes.  Of course, it is important 
also to appreciate current understandings of brain science which have moved 
away from localizing specific parts of the brain as being solely responsible for 
certain functions.  Understanding all of this, Fisher’s approach is useful in its 
effort to further substantiate theorized aspects of love by demonstrating whether 
such ideas agree with existing knowledge of how the brain works.  It only runs 
the risk of being reductionistic if used to draw conclusions about cause and 
effect, where one’s subjective experience is only viewed as the result of neuronal 
firing.  In that way, I can say that Fisher does appear to focus on the brain in 
 66
love, rather than the mind-brain, or even more appropriately the “embodied mind” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
The same human experience can be studied psychologically and 
neurobiologically.  What is important is establishing and making clear the level at 
which one intends to study such phenomena, and not losing sight the need to 
integrate in a unifying framework the various levels at which human experience is 
investigated.  My critique of Fisher’s model is not only her scant view of 
unconscious processes, but also her slight treatment of the conscious experience 
of love. The only way that one can conceive of her fMRI studies as studying 
unconscious processes would be in a radically descriptive and literal sense.  Her 
research would be studying unconscious processes only in the sense that one is 
not experientially aware of how and when one’s brain hormones and synapses 
become activated.  Fisher’s approach to love is a neurobiological one that 
studies love’s psychology from a particularly non-psychological point of view.  
Though her studies have used self-report questionnaires (Hatfield’s Passionate 
Love Scale) to measure subjects’ level of passion, the main focus of her research 
strays from the subjective experience of people in love.  To be fair, Fisher is not a 
psychologist (but rather is a anthropologist), and has made no claims to 
necessarily be targeting the psychology of love.  However, she has used the 
psychological literature as a basis to form her tripartite model motivational drives 
in intimate relationships. 
Fisher’s approach to love is to understand the architecture and workings of 
the brain in love.  In other words, it offers insights into whether the brain is 
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capable of accommodating the psychological factors of love that have been 
proposed.  In her attempt to demonstrate the neural correlates of romantic love, 
lust and attachment she has endeavored to display which areas of the brain may 
or may not be involved and in which ways.  It is arguable whether this gets too far 
away from subjective experience in the quest for mapping the brain in love.  
There is a great difference between investigating a person’s subjective 
experience and noticing brain activation when a person looks at relationship 
words or pictures in an fMRI machine.   
Biological structure, to be sure, determines the nature of our conscious and 
unconscious romantic lives.  In 1915, Freud warned against the misguided efforts 
striving to localize mental activities, or aspects thereof, in parts of the brain 
(1915b).  Referring to his own conception of mental systems, he wrote, “our 
psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it has 
reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus, 
wherever they may be situated in the body.”  To put this in another way that 
others have discussed (e.g., Eagle, 1984), neurochemistry enters one’s 
psychological world by being represented in thoughts, perceptions, feelings and 
wants).  Fisher is targeting, at the level of brain function, the machinery that 
makes the mind operate.  Her level of investigation is separate from the study of 
the representational components of personality that are derivatives of the 
biochemical underpinnings of the mind she researches.   
Rather than reducing psychological processes in love down to their biological 
correlates, I can envision a mutually benefiting relationship between brain 
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science and social science.  The value of researching love at this different level 
of phenomena may be its potential for “constraining theories of psychological 
functioning” in love (Westen & Gabbard, 2002a).  The psychological registration 
and management of various aspects of love must have some biological parallel.  
However, it is a confusion of discourse to think of biological causes in the same 
sense as motivational reasons. The best future path of love research would 
involve as many research approaches using the unique insights of each other to 
mutually inform, guide, explain and limit the extent and range of inquiry and 
findings.  I will further discuss these points later in this paper. 
The two last approaches I will now discuss are ones that have researched 
love by broadening the scope of their psychology inquiry to focus on experiences 
in love that are not always readily conscious.  The social cognition and 
attachment research offer the best attempts to understanding love in terms of 
unconscious processes.  However, even these two fields of inquiry have 
questionable aspects regarding both the scope of their approaches to love and 
the nature of unconscious processes they assume.   
The social cognition approaches reviewed do not represent a theory of 
romantic relationship functioning.  They investigate romantic relationships by 
focusing on discrete forms of interpersonal information-processing.  Thus, as 
informative as this research is, its scope is restricted to the local or micro level. 
Though in the past social cognitive approaches could be said to rely on cognitive 
explanations for phenomena (see Westen, 1992), the research on love has 
demonstrated a further integration of the motivational and affective components.  
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However, it can still be said that this type of research fails to take a larger view of 
the history, personality and the psychological world of the person whose social 
information processing is being studied.   
For example, Drigotas has empirically documented unconscious interactional 
relationship processes by which “the self is shaped by a close partner's 
perceptions and behavior” (Drigotas et al., 1999).  However, his Michelangelo 
phenomenon, described earlier, is more of a study of a micro-process in 
relationships.  While this process has been contextualized in a particular theory 
of cognition and motivation (Aron & Aron’s self-expansion theory, 1996), this 
style of research appears less concerned with how these processes fit into a 
larger understanding of individual and relationship psychology.  This style of 
research is more concerned with documenting that such an interpersonal 
process like the Michelangelo phenomenon exists, rather than anything particular 
about romantic relationships.  This research insufficiently examines what this 
process suggests about the nature, course and determinants of romantic 
relationships.  It would seem that this phenomenon is proposed as a normal one 
found across varieties of romantic relationships.  However, there is a minimal 
attempt to understand if this mutual process of facilitating each partner’s move 
towards their ideal is a fundamental motivation in romantic relationships or 
across all relationships.  Social cognitive research still suffers from its lack of 
grounding in any particular personality or developmental theory to explain how its 
rich experimental data of information-processing, occurring on unconscious and 
conscious levels, corresponds to basic needs.  In this way, social cognition 
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approaches are properly embedding and linking themselves with larger 
theoretical constructs in order to properly explain the micro-level descriptive 
research they produce (e.g., self-expansion theory, interpersonal psychoanalytic 
theories, etc.).      
Another limitation about the social cognition approach to unconscious 
processes in romantic relationships is its purely descriptive focus.  In other 
words, these researchers understand that processes occur outside awareness 
for non-motivational reasons.  This is not to say that researchers have not 
suggested motivations for processes like the Michelangelo phenomena.  
However, no thorough rationale is given for which aspects of certain social 
cognitive processes are conscious and unconscious.  Processes seem to occur 
unconsciously because they are designed to for presumably adaptive efficiency’s 
sake (as Wilson (2002) has suggested).     
For another problematic point, while the processes are speculated to be 
unconsciously occurring, researchers measure them through self-report 
questionnaires, revealing that subjects are at least somewhat consciously aware 
of such processes.  In the Michelangelo phenomena example, partner affirmation 
and movement towards one’s ideal self are measured by assessing the 
participant’s conscious awareness of these variables.  The authors claim, “It is 
important to note that our measures of partner affirmation tapped self-reported 
affirmation rather than partner reported affirmation.  As noted earlier, we adopted 
this approach because we believe that partner affirmation frequently results from 
unconscious and automatic processes” (Drigotas et al., 1999).  I question the 
 71
degree of inference these authors are assuming.  Put another way, it is not 
entirely clear what type of unconscious process is occurring that allows for 
conscious reflection.   
Perhaps a better test of the unconscious form of the Michelangelo 
phenomena would be to measure aspects that were not conscious to subjects’ 
awareness that researchers had confirmatory evidence of (videotaped 
interactions, partner reports).  As it stands, the social cognition approach offers a 
valuable way of targeting romantic relationship processes that occur outside 
awareness.  However, their methods still rely on degrees of introspection and 
reflection that would assume a certain transparency of mind.  Further, while 
serving as an empirically viable way of understanding discrete interpersonal 
processes, social cognition models still seem better served when embedded 
within a larger theoretical paradigm that can satisfyingly explain the micro-level 
observations being studied.   
The second offering from the relationship literature that incorporates 
unconscious aspects is romantic attachment studies.  This approach 
incorporates the role of internal working models that act as cognitive-affective-
motivational schemas in attachment contexts.  From the attachment literature it 
would seem that these models are thought to operate largely outside the realm of 
conscious awareness (e.g., Bowlby, 1973; Bretherton, 1985; Main, Kaplan, & 
Cassidy, 1985).  While it may be the case that attachment behaviors and 
strategies are automatically activated in a fashion that would seem unconscious, 
for the most part internal working models in romantic love have been investigated 
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through exploring participants’ conscious awareness of these mechanisms.  
Others have paid attention to the differences between the use of semi-structured 
attachment interviews and self-report questionnaires (Bartholomew & Shaver, 
1998).  An entire issue of the journal Attachment & Human Development (Vol. 4 
No 2 September 2002) was devoted to exploring various conceptual and 
methodological issues between these traditions of measuring attachment.  One 
of the central questions discussed was the potentially different aspects of 
attachment that these measures target.  Some have articulated the difference as 
being between tapping the “unconscious processes of regulating emotion” (in the 
case of attachment interviews) and tapping “conscious appraisals of romantic 
relationships” (in the case of self-report questionnaires) (Jacobvitz et al., 2002).   
It has been pointed out that despite claims that proper attachment 
assessment requires the use of interviews that are able to study unconscious 
defensive processes, no research exists supporting the superiority of interviews 
over self-reports in predicting attachment behavior (Bartholomew & Moretti, 
2002).  Further, there is little empirical evidence showing that attachment 
interviews tap what can be considered unconscious processes (Bartholomew & 
Moretti, 2002; Shaver and Mikulincer, 2002).  A familiar claim made against the 
use of self-reports in attachment research is that they are limited by only 
accessing consciously aware material.  Research subjects are asked to endorse 
various attachment-related statements or to choose descriptions of relationship 
behavior that best typify them (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Simpson, Rholes, & 
Nelligan, 1992).  I echo this suspicion about the limited scope of self-report 
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questionnaires along these lines.  In response, attachment researchers are quick 
to point to the wealth of data in which behavioral and observational measures are 
used to support self-reported attachment behavior (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2000; 
Simpson et al., 2002).  These studies, some of which occur in naturalistic 
settings, provide evidence that people who endorsed a particular type of self-
reported attachment style will exhibit the predictable corresponding attachment 
behavior.  For example, coded videos of primed participant couples in waiting-
rooms showed that avoidantly-attached people displayed more negative 
emotions, irritation, and criticalness than less avoidant subjects (Campbell, 
Simpson, Kashy & Rholes, 2001).   
Even more salient for my purposes is the way attachment researchers have 
embarked on the empirical testing of unconscious attachment processes.  Over a 
series of studies, Mikulincer and various collaborators have combined self-
reported attachment data (dimensionally measured) and techniques (measuring 
response times and performance on cognitive tasks, observational, priming, 
projective measures) aimed at demonstrating unconscious processes.  In one 
study, Mikulincer and colleagues (1990) found that self-reported anxiously 
avoidant individuals reported low levels of death anxiety when this was directly 
questioned.  However, they demonstrated elevated levels of this same construct 
of death anxiety, when it was unconsciously measured using the Thematic 
Apperception Test.  This serves as a form of empirical evidence of the avoidant 
person’s tendency to consciously distance from a source of distress that is 
unconsciously experienced.  More related to the present topic, Mikulincer and 
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Arad (1999) explored the connection between the accessibility of attachment 
working models on cognitive openness.  They found that secure attachment was 
related to higher cognitive openness allowing secure people “to react to 
incongruent behaviors of a partner in a flexible and adaptive way.”  This is as 
opposed to the more rigidly accessed and held representations of less-secure 
people.       
In summary, attachment research, conducted primarily through self-report 
questionnaires, seems to be better at predicting romantic attachment behavior 
than interview measures (which intuitively seem to be better equipped at taping 
unconscious attachment schema).  Attachment researchers studying romantic 
relationships have been able to incorporate various techniques (including using 
subliminal word presentations) to prime unconscious attachment states.  They 
have targeted unconscious processes in order to demonstrate the disconnect 
between one’s conscious awareness and underlying intrapsychic processes.  
This is represented in the avoidantly-attached person’s conscious denial of 
needing love and support on self-reports, while indirect measures (such as 
projective and physiological) demonstrate the heightened activation of 
attachment themes (Dozier & Kobak, 1992; Mikulincer, Florian et al., 1990; 
Mikulincer, Gillath & Shaver, 2002).  Even more impressive is the number of 
these studies conducted in experimental and naturalistic conditions.       
Romantic attachment research has produced valuable results and evidence 
regarding behavioral and emotional regulation in close relationships. That being 
said, the limitations of this research relates to both the nature and the scope of 
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the attachment system.  In terms of what is being measured, what attachment 
researchers are demonstrating seems to be preconscious, not unconscious, 
awareness of attachment.  Considering the three major styles of attachment, 
Secure, Anxious and Avoidant, only a person categorized as avoidant is 
assumed to have an inaccurate or inaccessible view of attachment needs.  
Secure types, by virtue of their self-reported attachment ratings, understand that 
they need not get anxious nor avoidant about attachment-related themes.  The 
anxious type has enough insight to endorse attachment-related items reflecting 
high levels of anxiety about close relationships.  It is the avoidant type that 
consciously dismisses attachment needs which are nevertheless highly operative 
and easily activated.  
These self-report measures do not tap unconscious processes, but rather 
thoughts, feelings and attitudes about attachment that are available by effortful 
degrees of turning one’s attention to them.  As Shaver and Mikulincer correctly 
put it: 
 
Social psychologists and others who use self-report measures view them as 
convenient surface indicators of differences in attachment-related cognitions, 
emotions, and behavioral tendencies which are partly unconscious, indicators 
that can be examined in relation to more direct measures of unconscious 
processes to see whether those processes work the way attachment theory 
leads us to expect. [their italics] (2002)   
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Attachment researchers are gathering attachment thoughts, feelings and 
attitudes that are available to the surface of consciousness.  In this way, this 
research is not so different from the social psychological research on romantic 
relationships (e.g., Sternberg, Hatfield, Lee’s models).  What distinguishes this 
research are its demonstrations of the ways that attachment processes are 
proposed to work implicitly (i.e., can be triggered outside one’s awareness).  Self-
reported attachment data are the conscious indicators or proxies for how one’s 
attachment system works.  I believe it is correct to think that attachment concerns 
are consciously or preconsciously available.  The fact that the attachment status 
is organized around how people consciously report their attachment-related 
attitudes, thoughts and feelings reveals that individuals are assumed to be more 
or less consciously aware of their attachment functioning, unless there is reason 
for them not to be (avoidants).   
With research showing that attachment involves processes outside one’s 
awareness, it seems to be an aspect of human life that lies at the intersection of 
conscious and unconscious mental systems.  While this literature has 
demonstrated the different unconscious ways that emotion-regulating attachment 
behaviors are triggered, important work still needs to be done investigating the 
separate but interacting realms of conscious and unconscious attachment.  In my 
judgment, those who register high on attachment-related avoidance have been 
researched the most along these lines.  One may even want to order the three 
main types of attachment dimensionally at levels of conscious awareness at 
which attachment needs are operative and knowable.  In other words, one could 
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say that anxiously attached individuals may experience attachment needs 
consistently at an all-too conscious level, secure types at a preconscious level, 
and avoidant types at an unconscious level.  More research is needed to outline 
how various attachment-related dynamics become conscious or unconscious, 
and the differences, if any, between the two systems.  In the literature, the 
conscious and unconscious levels of attachment are not differentiated or 
integrated enough, except for in the case of avoidants.  Only the accounting for 
the internal dynamics of avoidants, whose attachment needs are defensively 
relegated unconscious and denied access to consciousness, has demonstrated 
the complexities of both systems.  Is one to think that it is only in the case of 
avoidant attachment that the unconscious takes on a complexity, not needed in 
thinking about secure or anxious attachment?  This brings up the question of the 
nature of unconscious processes—are they simple, unsophisticated and 
unconnected to psychoanalytic conceptions, as some have argued (Greenwald, 
1992; Kihlstrom, 1990)?  
The other limitation for this brand of research is its scope, discussed by 
attachment researches themselves.  As Fraley and Shaver (2000) discuss there 
are problems with how attachment theory has been used to research romantic 
relationships.  One such problem involves whether all romantic relationships can 
be considered “attachment relationships” in the strict sense, the relevancy of 
proximity maintenance, safe haven, and secure base issues being prevalent.  If a 
romantic relationship does not involve the use of the partner as an attachment 
figure then this may change the applicability of attachment theory to these 
 78
romantic relationships.10  Thus attachment research has to be viewed as a way 
to study attachment behavior within romantic relationships, rather than a study of 
romantic love proper.  This brings up the issue of whether the attachment 
literature is broad enough to study romantic love.   
One must only consult reviews from within the attachment literature to see the 
various difficulties attachment research and theory is confronting in stretching the 
model to accurately account for the nature, determinants and course of romantic 
love (Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Stein et al, 1998).  Some of the current difficulties 
faced by attachment researchers seeking to explain romantic love involve: the 
unresolved distinction between romantic attachment behavior and romantic love; 
the accessibility of the adult attachment system; the under-researched interplay 
between attachment and the other behavioral systems of care-giving and 
sexuality in romantic relationships; and deciding what qualifies as a romantic 
relationship versus an attachment relationship and what this difference means. I 
was previously articulated my strongest criticism regarding the further work 
needed to explain distinctions between conscious and unconscious levels of 
attachment functioning.  The same differentiation would be eventually required to 
explain the postulated care-giving and sexuality systems; furthermore to explain 
how they interact with the attachment system in romantic relationships.  While I 
                                                 
10 This raises a more general issue that has not reached any form of consensus 
in the research literature regarding standards for what is considered a romantic 
relationship.  Many studies impose somewhat arbitrary specifications of the 
number of months for a relationship to be considered a romantic relationship or a 
dating relationship suitable for study.  Depending on what kind of relationship 
phenomena one wants to study, it is arguable how to determine which standards 
can be used to designate what qualifies as a “romantic relationship.” 
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am aware of some research addressing this (e.g., Mikulincer & Goodman, 2006), 
more direct investigation is needed before the attachment theoretical claims 
become further removed from the empirical evidence. 
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A concluding note 
 
The research I have covered in this chapter represent ways that investigators 
have sought to study the psychology of love via its biology, evolutionary place, 
consciousness, and interpersonal observable processes.  In addition, love 
researchers have designed taxonomic systems of love and attempted to 
demonstrate the implicit aspects of relationship functioning.  While these different 
approaches each have some contribution to make regarding what is involved in 
people’s experience of romantic relationships, each is too limited in scope to 
serve as a comprehensive framework for understanding love.  Some of these 
drawbacks are due to research approaches taking various degrees of myopic 
viewpoints.  As a result, the literature is confined by researchers operating under 
the influence of various kinds of reductionistic principles (i.e., evolutionary 
approaches considering love as a means to survival and reproductive ends).  
This myopia of research viewpoints results in the empirical approaches to 
investigating relationship psychology providing only partial ways of researching 
all that is involved in adult love relations.  Thus the research literature becomes 
populated with a growing number of studies, which talk past, envelop, repackage, 
contradict and remain isolated from each other.  In the conclusion to a recent 




…there are still no specific definitions, and there is a lack of a common 
conceptual vocabulary of love to allow for unambiguous discourse about love.  
When engaging in such a scientific discourse, it is important to make sure that 
everybody talks about the same thing and has the same understanding when 
talking about a certain concept.  When people talk about romantic love or 
attachment love, do they really have the same concept in mind?  At this point 
in the development of the field of love, such clarity of terms does not 
necessarily exist.  It presents one area where more research is needed to 
reach a convergence…. (Weis, 2006, p. 320) 
 
Despite the lack of coherency and agreement, collective limitations and individual 
shortcomings, I believe that these studies do provide information regarding the 
nature, course and determinants of romantic love.  Probably the best way to view 
them is as representing distinct levels of inquiry into romantic relationship 
phenomena, including, among others, brain function, couple’s interactions, social 
cognitive information processing, and attachment representations.  
As I have argued, the level of inquiry that has been the most neglected in 
research attempts to investigate love is that of the unconscious psychological 
functions in love.  In my estimation, the attachment and social cognition 
psychological literature on romantic relationships reflect the necessary inclusion 
of unconscious mental functions lacking in the rest of the research field.  While 
limited in their own ways, they still offer the most promising attempts to address 
the needed aspects of conscious and unconscious romantic processes.  
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A study of unconscious mental processes in love represents a needed 
dimension of research to the present field.  The various romantic love models in 
this chapter lack both theoretical and empirical efforts to structure disparate ends 
of investigative inquiry.  The study of unconscious romantic life is a necessary 
corrective to this.  By offering a more comprehensive understanding of the mind 
in love, a unified framework can be established to research and conceptualize all 
levels of relationship psychological phenomena.  In Chapter Two, I will discuss 
research approaches, outside of the romantic love field, that support the general 
importance of investigating unconscious psychological functions.  This will further 
develop my aim for the end of this study: to articulate a framework for a 
comprehensive research program studying the interplay between conscious and 
unconscious romantic relationship psychology.    
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CHAPTER TWO: The limits of conscious awareness 
 
Only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of unconscious events 
would explain consciousness at all.  
Daniel Dennett from Consciousness explained (1991) 
 
 
I ended the last chapter contending that the romantic relationship empirical 
literature suffers from too narrow a view of the mind in love.  Beginning with a 
model of the mind as relatively transparent and knowable to conscious 
introspection can lead to the idea that people correctly know their reasons for 
loving who they do, why they do and how they do.  I do not question whether a 
kind of rational logic can be used to understand romantic relationships.  
However, the notion that the factors in love can be reasoned about does not 
ensure that this kind of reasoning actually takes place in romantic relationships.  
Nonetheless, the empirical literature consists of researchers asking subjects to 
indicate preferences and explanations of their romantic relationships based on 
the assumption that people can do this accurately. The accumulated research 
that I will review in this chapter, both from within psychology and neuroscience, 
confirms the limitations of privileging a model of the mind that is fundamentally 
rational and aware of its own workings. 
Lest one think that the investigative neglect of unconscious romantic life is 
merely an intentional decision by social science researchers, let me offer some 
thoughts on the impediments to studying unconscious processes. To be sure, the 
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status of the unconscious has been controversial for psychologists, especially 
experimentalists (Erdelyi, 1985; Weinberger & Levy, 2005; Westen, 1992).  The 
tenuous place of unconscious processing in academic psychology is contrasted 
by its long history.  One can find strands of empirical research on mental 
processes occurring outside awareness, while still influencing conscious 
functioning, throughout the 20th century, if not before.  From the pre-Freudian 
work of 19th century thinkers like William Hamilton, Thomas Laycock and William 
Carpenter, one can derive the understandings that: lower-order mental 
processes occur outside of awareness; people can consciously attend to one 
thing while nonconsciously processing another (divided attention); thinking can 
become so habitual as to occur outside of awareness; emotional reactions can 
occur outside of awareness until our attention is drawn to them; and that habits 
acquired early in life become an indispensable part of one’s personality.    
Up until the last few decades, unconscious processes were either ignored 
entirely by psychologists (as with the rise of American Behaviorism) or studied in 
ways that disavowed links to its psychoanalytic lineage.  Though areas of 
research on unconscious processes, such as subliminal perception (see Dixon, 
1971), have surfaced, only recently has it become a viable area of empirical 
study.11  As recently as a little over twenty years ago, one could find major 
academic journals in psychology openly doubting and rejecting research 
submissions on the existence of critical mental faculties occurring outside 
awareness (Beier, 1985).  Aside from ambivalence towards psychoanalysis and 
                                                 
11 Many full-scale reviews exist on the research on unconscious processing (e.g., 
Bornstein, 1999; Erdelyi, 1985; Schacter, 1992; Westen, 1998).  
 85
an outright rejection of its central tenets, methodological dilemmas have also led 
to the lack of research activity in this area of psychology.  It was recently 
suggested that to empirically demonstrate repression, one would have to 
construct a methodology that would illustrate: that people are motivated to keep 
thoughts, feeling, or memories outside of awareness; that the attempt to keep 
material out of awareness is itself an unconscious process; that people succeed 
in removing the undesired material from consciousness; that the material, once 
removed from consciousness, still exists in memory and continues to influence 
people’s thoughts, feelings, or behavior; and that the material is recoverable (i.e., 
people can become aware of it if the repressive forces are removed) (Wilson & 
Dunn, 2004).  The development of a study for individual components to this 
recommendation, not to mention all of them together, is quite a formidable task.       
Despite the significant challenge in empirically demonstrating types of 
unconscious processes represents, recent years have seen a resurgence of 
research into the role of nonconscious mental processes.  With specific 
relevance to romantic love, the main fields of empirical inquiry on unconscious 
processes have been neuroscience, cognitive science and social psychology 
(particularly social cognition).  This work demonstrates the need to attribute 
primary status to the connection and disconnection between conscious and 
unconscious mental life.  
In 1987, the cognitive psychologist Kihlstrom published an article in Science 
on the “cognitive unconscious.”  There he reviewed a long line of research that 
demonstrated the need for studying cognitive processing that occurs on an 
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unconscious level outside of perceptive awareness.  The processing he was 
referring to was the type that becomes automated and unavailable for 
introspection.  What he surmised about the limits of consciousness can be 
encapsulated here: “Consciousness is not to be identified with any particular 
perceptual-cognitive functions such as discriminative response to stimulation, 
perception, memory or the higher mental processes involved in judgment or 
problem solving.  All of these functions can take place outside of phenomenal 
awareness.  Rather, consciousness is an experiential quality that may 
accompany any of these functions… but it is not necessary for complex 
functioning.”  Kihlstrom’s assertion reflected ongoing shift in cognitive science 
from an almost exclusive focus on conscious systems to one that included the 
role of unconscious systems.     
The movement towards researching unconscious processes still reflected the 
ambivalence researchers had to the psychoanalytic lineage of the area of inquiry.  
Studies in academic journals on unconscious mental functions were (and still 
are) published using such terms as implicit, automatic, nonconscious to both 
avoid sounding psychoanalytic, but also to add some needed differentiation.  As 
will be explained, the movement to explore all kinds of unconscious mental 
processes was also gradual, beginning with the unconscious cognition and 
memory.  One of the prominent areas of empirically studying the unconscious 
has been implicit memory.  This refers to the influence of a remembered 
experience on someone’s behavior without the experience being consciously 
brought to mind (Schacter, 1992).  Types of implicit memory include procedural 
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and associative memory.  The latter is usually investigated in experiments using 
subliminal priming, where a stimulus is presented outside the subject’s conscious 
awareness.  Though the stimulus is presented outside of conscious awareness 
its effect on the subject is demonstrable (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Aside from 
implicit memory, other cognitive topics of unconscious empirical investigation 
have been implicit learning (Lewicki, 1986; Reber, 1993) and automaticity 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).   
More controversial (see Westen, 1999) has been the accumulating evidence 
for unconscious affective and motivational processes.  The empirical basis for 
believing the existence of unconscious affects and motivations has had multiple 
sources.  Some of the earliest evidence was that of Milner’s patient, H.M., whose 
hippocampal damage impaired his ability to register new explicit long-term 
memories (Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968).  Despite this, he was able to 
demonstrate the registration of implicit affective leaning, which did not translate 
to explicit expression or conscious recognition.   
Zajonc (1968, 1980) used subliminal emotional priming to study emotional 
unconscious processes to show that affective judgments may be independent of 
and precede cognitive operations.  His mere exposure effect, in which “repeated 
exposure of the individual to a stimulus object enhances his attitude toward it,” 
has proved a viable empirical test of unconscious affective processing.  
Subsequently, Bornstein (1992) showed that the mere exposure effect is stronger 
when stimuli are subliminally presented rather than freely available for conscious 
inspection.  In other words emotions may be more easily influenced when one is 
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not aware that the influence is occurring.  This type of work has leant support for 
Zajonc’s contention that preferences need no inferences (1980).  Taken to an 
interactional level, Bargh’s work (1990, 1992) evidenced that emotions, attitudes, 
goals and intentions can be activated outside of awareness to influence 
interpersonal thinking and behavior.  Thought of this way, automatically triggered 
behavior may then lead to a cycle of reciprocated behavior from another person 
(e.g., racial stereotypes).  In Bargh’s studies what is critical is a person’s lack of 
awareness of the ways in which the priming stimuli are implicitly categorized and 
interpreted.  That the person is not aware of the stimuli’s effect allows it to be 
unconsciously effective.  
Unconscious cognition, motivation and affect have proved also to be involved 
in aspects of reasoning.  An early study which helped demonstrate the effects 
that the limits of conscious awareness has on reasoning was Nisbett and 
Wilson’s (1977; Wilson & Nisbett, 1978).  Their “stocking study” demonstrated 
that people are often mistaken about the causes of their actions and feelings.  
They showed that when relevant and believable causes are not available, people 
will devise their own.  In this study, the authors asked people to report on their 
preferred choice of panty hose among pairs that were (unknown to the 
participants) identical.  Though subjects were able to give reasons for their 
preference, the significant factor (which went unnoticed) was the position/order 
the panty hose were presented.  Drawing on a number of their own similar 
studies and other available sources, Nisbett and Wilson suggested “there may be 
little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes” (1977).  
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Further since people are often unaware of what stimuli influences them, attempts 
to report on cognitive processes are not done on “the basis of any true 
introspection.”  Though people are privileged to special access to the contents of 
their minds, they may not be so well versed with the processes (Wilson, 2002).  
This can be reformulated in terms of unconscious processing as people only 
having privileged access to the conscious contents and processes of their mind 
to the degree that unconscious factors (which are inaccessible) are not operative.  
When unconscious factors are involved people tend to confabulate reasons for 
their behavior and responses based on a priori implicit causal theories and 
judgments (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002).  Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
make an important point that accurate self-reporting will occur when “influential 
stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce.”  In 
terms of romantic love, this will prove important because it appears that the 
accuracy of self-reports depends on how salient and plausible the person 
evaluates potential influences.  In other words, I am attempting to make the case 
that it is difficult to know how to interpret a respondent’s report on attachment 
status or intimacy importance when the salience and influential plausibility of 
attachment and intimacy to the person are unknown. 
More recently, Wegner’s work (2002) on the “illusion of conscious will” has 
involved a variety of research studies that have demonstrated that people vary in 
the reliability of their accuracy in identifying and attributing cause to their own 
actions (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985, 1987, 1989; Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 
2003; Wegner & Vallacher, 1986; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).   He has outlined a 
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model of a mental system in which unconscious mental processes give rise to 
conscious mental states (intentions, beliefs) about actions an individual performs.  
Wegner asserts that, in actuality, it is unconscious mental processes that cause 
the apparent voluntary action.  Consciousness creates the experience of the path 
between the conscious mental states and the action, which is thus taken to be a 
person’s given sense of will: “When we think that our conscious intention has 
caused the voluntary action that we find ourselves doing, we feel a sense of will” 
(2000, p. 68).  A nonconscious factor (or intention) is the third variable often not 
taken into consideration in determining causation of an event.   
He identifies three primary sources of this experience of conscious will—the 
reason we don’t just experience an event as unrelated to ourselves, but instead 
feel some sense of agency and causality—which he describes as the priority, 
consistency and exclusivity of the thought about the action.  In other words, “for 
the perception of apparent mental causation, the thought should occur before the 
action, be consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other potential 
causes” (p. 69).  The priority principle indicates that to produce the experience of 
conscious will the mental states must occur within a “particular window of time” 
prior to the action.  The consistency principle indicates that the thoughts that 
serve as the potential causes for the action must be meaningfully associated with 
the action.  The exclusivity principle suggests that people feel more of a sense of 
conscious will when other causes of the action are less available.  Without 
plausible and compelling internal (impulses, emotion, habit) or external 
alternative causes for the action people are likely to experience that they 
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consciously caused the action.  Wegner argues: “Experiences of conscious will 
thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself—not from processes 
whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we 
think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by 
which the action was produced” (2004).     
Wegner distinguishes between conscious and accessible thoughts by 
discussing levels of cognitive activation.  Surface activation describes thoughts 
that are conscious but not accessible—such as the experience of studying 
subject matter when one is distracted.  Full activation occurs when a person is 
fully engrossed in something and has thoughts about the matter that are both 
conscious and accessible—thinking of a favorite vacation.  Finally, deep 
activation refers to the realm of unconscious thought that is accessible, but not to 
consciousness.  Wegner supports the idea that thoughts can influence action 
from all three levels of activation, however only surface and full levels of 
activated thought will lead to the experience of conscious will.  Since actions can 
have (deep activation) causes that are not accessible to consciousness, because 
of individuals’ propensity to shift the ways they identify actions (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1985), and due to the human tendency to confabulate or misperceive 
intentions (via cognitive dissonance or perceptual limitations) Wegner argues that 
conscious will and agency are limited.       
In fact he makes a case that since humans are not conscious of every 
intention of every action, there must be more research into how unconscious 
processes work to understand the limits of human intending, willing and agency.  
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He identifies that the idealization of conscious agency “leads us not only to 
fabricate an experience of conscious will and to confabulate intentions consistent 
with that will, it also can blind us to our very actions, making us see them as far 
more effective than they actually are” (2000, p. 186).  However, for Wegner, the 
purpose of conscious will is to act as a guide to oneself that guides both 
achievement seeking and experiencing, leads to one’s self of confidence as well 
as responsibility for actions (morality).  Wegner links his understanding of illusory 
conscious will to the work of researchers who have investigated the positive 
effects of perceived control (Glass & Singer, 1972), locus of control (Rotter, 
1966), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
and attributional style (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993).  Thus as important 
as it is to acknowledge that individuals are limited in regards to their conscious 
will, it may be equally important to further understand the function of this illusion. 
Though some ambivalence can still be seen in how psychologists carefully 
approach the meaning of “unconscious,” few now dispute the relevance of 
studying nonconscious processing.  Even more recently, some non-
psychoanalytic psychologists have begun directly discussing these phenomena 
in the context of their similarities and differences to the general psychoanalytic 
understanding of the unconscious mind.  Wilson’s recent publications synthesize 
not only his but others’ research on what he terms the “adaptive unconscious” 
(2002; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).12  Wilson contends that there are boundaries to 
how much people can introspect about themselves and how their mental 
                                                 
12 This section leans on the summaries provided in Wilson’s book Strangers to 
Ourselves (2002) and his review article with Dunn (2004).  
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processes work because many parts of the mind are inaccessible to conscious 
awareness.  This inaccessibility is partly due to the nonconscious processing 
regions of the mind evolving before ones related to consciousness did.  
Accessibility, used in this way, refers to the activation potential of information in 
memory.  For Wilson, relevancy and recency of encounter (certain ideas and 
categories become chronically accessible as a result of frequent use in the past) 
contribute to detrmining accessibility.  He asserts that aspects of judgments, 
feelings and motives, not to mention mental processes that operate perceptual, 
language and motor systrems, occur outside awareness for efficiency reasons.  
Wilson is quick to point out that the unconscious processing occurs on many 
levels: “Just as the architecture of the mind prevents low-level processing (e.g., 
perceptual processes) from reaching consciousness, so are many higher-order 
psychological processes and states inaccessible” (2002, p. 8).  Within Wilson’s 
way of thinking, the unconscious characterizes mental processes that are 
inaccessible to consciousness but that influence judgments, feelings or behavior.   
Wilson differentiates properties of the adaptive unconscious and 
consciousness.  Primary in these is the adaptive unconscious being comprised of 
multiple systems and modules that serve the function of automatically detecting 
“patterns in the environment as quickly as possible . . . to signal the person as to 
whether they are good or bad” (p. 50).  This is consistent with LeDoux’s 
rendering of humans possessing a nonconscious “danger detector” that crudely 
analyzes a situation for threat potentially triggering a fear response (1996).  A 
more controlled and closer analysis of the situation is followed in consciousness.  
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The adaptive unconscious works automatically in fast, uncontrolable, 
unintentional ways; it is rigid and sensitive to negative information.  The 
inflexibiltiy of the adaptive unconscious serves its purpose of scanning the 
environment for changes, patterns and potential threats well.  The assessment of 
threat is one way in which conscious and unconscious processes use their 
independent properties in tandem. 
Of central interest are the reasons why mental aspects are kept outside of 
awareness.   The detection of danger seems to work best at the nonconscious 
level for reasons of evolutionary adaptive efficiency.  These limits to what people 
can apprehend about themselves have been divided across motivational and 
nonmotivational lines.  Among motivational reasons, acts to supress differ from 
acts to repress mental contents (i.e., thoughts, attitudes).  For many like Wilson 
(e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), what distinguishes the former from the latter 
is the conscious awareness of attempting to keep something outside of 
awareness (suppression).  Empirical research has demonstrated both the ways 
supression may work and fail to work (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Erdelyi & 
Goldberg, 1979; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).   Repression, which can be thought 
of as unconsciously intercepting the mental content before it reaches 
consciousness, has been harder to empirically demonstrate.  However 
Moskowitz and colleagues’s work (1999, 2000) suggests that continued 
engagement in successful supression of unwanted material may lead to the 
process becoming automatic, and thus occur outside of one’s awareness.   
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More research exists on the possible nonmotivational reasons why aspects of 
the mind are kept outside of awareness.  Wilson’s focus on nonconscious 
processing led him to describe differences between his “adaptive unconscious” 
and the psychoanalytic unconscious (2002).  His view, which reflects other 
researchers of nonconscious processing, assumes that “a great deal of mental 
processing is simply inaccessible to mental scrutiny” for adaptive reasons which 
are not to be thought of as motivational (Wilson & Dunn, 2004).  This 
nonmotivational reason for the limits to self-knowledge assumes that “the 
architecture of the mind” is not designed for conscious awareness of all its 
properties.  Rather than something being relegated to the unconscious because 
it is unwanted or anxiety-provoking, something is nonconscious for efficiency 
reasons.  Examples of this are processes of attention, danger detection, 
judgment, learning and perception.  In this line of thinking, the make-up of the 
mind has inaccessible aspects that are not “recoverable” or retrievable.       
There is a considerable literature demonstrating the independence of 
conscious and unconscious mental functions including the areas of visual 
perception (Bhalla & Proffitt, 2000) and motor learning (Gabrieli, 1998).  More 
relevant for my purposes is the research on the apparent dissociation between 
nonconscious/implicit and conscious/explicit aspects of personality and 
character.  This has been used to show that there are elements of one’s 
personality that do not reach awareness but still influence daily life.  There is 
evidence that comparing self-reported motives and goals with those measured 
implicitly by projective techniques correlate poorly (Spangler, 1992).   Similar 
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findings exist on the discrepancy between implicitly and explicitly measuring 
attachment styles (Bartholomew & Shaver, 1998), dependence (Bornstein, 
1995), and explanatory style (Peterson & Ulrey, 1994).  Social psychological 
research has found low correlations between measuring explicit and implicit 
prejudicial attitudes (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995) 
Researchers have attempted to account for the consequences of discordance 
between conscious explicit and unconscious implicit aspects of oneself.  
Brunstein and colleagues (1998) published results measuring the incongruence 
between unconscious and conscious goals.  They found that congruency 
between both sets of goals was related to greater emotional well-being.  
Robinson and colleagues (2003) found a correlation between incongruent implicit 
and explicit self-esteem and pleasant affect.  The research literature contains at 
least two prevailing ways of accounting for the disocciation between conscious 
and nonconscious aspects of onself, such as attitudes (Nosek & Banaji, 2002).  
The first actually involves what would seem to be a motivation to distort or 
disguise how one feels about a particular thing when asked to express this 
attitude.  The motivation here involves maintaing self-presentation.  This has 
been shown in relationship to areas where there is greater suspected self-
presentation motivation to hide implicit attitudes upon expression (racial 
attitudes)   (Fazio et al., 1995).  Another explanation of the independence of 
conscious and nonconscious attitudes describes two systems of evaluation.  This 
dual attitude theory suggests that a person can concurrently have two 
independent attitudes towards the same object (one implicit and automatic, and 
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one explicit) (Wilson et al., 2000).  These attitudes may be the same or different, 
but discordance may only be expressed under certains situations of cognitive 
load or using implicit measures.  The difference between this dual attitude theory 
and the first self-presentation one is that the former allows for two concurrent 
independent evaluations.  While self-presentational concerns are still operative in 
the dual attitude scheme, it does not assume that either implicit or explicit 
attitudes are more “real,” or that explicit attitudes are always attempts to distort 
implicit attitudes.   
This collection of research builds towards the understanding of the human 
personality being split between conscious and unconscious parts.  For thinkers 
like Wilson, the two sides of the human self are relatively independent.  One’s 
conscious and unconscious selves have different functions and predict different 
types of behavior: “the adaptive unconscious is more likely to influence people’s 
unconctrolled, implicit responses, whereas the constructed [conscious] self is 
more likely to influence people’s deliberate, explicit responses” (2002, p. 73).  
Due to the inaccessibility of aspects of the adaptive unconscious, Wilson 
concludes that self-knowledge is inevitably limited.  In fact, since intropsection 
does not reach the unconscious parts of the self, attempts to reflect on one’s 
psychology are not only fixed but potentially have negative effects. Wilson’s 
research (Wilson & Dunn, 1986; Wilson & LaFleur, 1995) has demonstrated that 
analyzing the reasons for one’s feelings and attitudes can lower people’s ability 
to predict their own behavior, satisfaction with choices, and the correlation 
between expressed feelings and later behavior.  The reason offered for this is 
 98
that people do not realize the incomplete nature of introspection.  That is, people 
often may feel one way but have a difficult time analyzing and accounting for 
such a feeling because of the role of nonconscious processes.  Introspection can 
then be focussed on unrepresentative or incomplete data causing “people to 
construct incorrect or incomplete narratives” about themselves (Wilson & Dunn, 
2004).  As possible routes to increasing self-knowledge, Wilson suggests, 
inferring behavior indirectly from the reports of others. 
Dovetailing nicely with the work of Wilson on the limits of self-knowledge are 
studies which also demonstrate that one’s awareness of one’s psychology is 
often flawed, or at least incomplete.  Andersen’s work (Andersen & Chen, 2002; 
Andersen & Glassman, 1996) is an attempt to empirically study transference as a 
means of social information processing.  Using priming techniques with cues 
presented submliminally she has demonstrated that people will react differently 
towards strangers if they remind them of a significant other.  Participants were 
more emotionally open when a stranger resembled a significant other versus one 
bearing little resemblance (Berk & Andersen, 2000).  Because significant other 
representations are chronically accessible they have a special readiness to be 
activated, even by associated transient cues.  In other words people will 
unconsciously draw on cues from strangers associated with significant others 
and be influenced by them without being aware.  The unconscious aspects of 
Andersen’s empirically researched transference relate to either the transferred 
content or the activating cues being kept out of awareness.  So a person may not 
be aware either that an evaluation of a newly encountered other is being based 
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on similarities to a significant other or what about the new other reflects the 
significant past other.  
Her work has been an attempt not to only demonstrate empirically the 
ubiquity of transferential processes in everyday life in normal populations.   
Further she has proposed a model that is supported by experimental research, 
which exhibits how significant other represenations automatically spread 
activation to representations of the self (Andersen et al., 1997). The unconscious 
activation of positively or negatively affectively-tinged representations of 
significant others also sets in motion “the affective, emotional and behavioral 
elements that characterize the self in relation to the relevant significant other” 
(Andersen & Chen, 2004).  She also has findings which indicate that threatening 
transference reactions may trigger compensatory self-protective and self-
regulatory responses (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996).  Andersen’s work not only 
higlights the important aspects of interpersonal interactions that occur outside of 
awareness, but also the automaticity, effortlessness and lack of control of such 
phenomena.  In this way her work joins the literature on implicit stereotyping 
(Banaji & Hardin, 1996), mere exposure (Bornstein, 1992; Zajonc, 1968) and 
primed self-evaluation (Baldwin, 1994).        
Of course this literature would not be without its own problems.  As difficult as 
it has been to find agreed upon definitions and criteria for what constitutes love, 
one can find a similar dilemma in research on conscious and unconscious 
processes.  As mentioned before, even the use of the term “unconscious” still 
carries with it psychoanalytic connotations that many researchers appear wary 
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of.  As a result, there exists some semantic confusion and disagreement over just 
what is meant by studying nonconscious or unconscious (or implicit, automatic, 
etc.) processes.  While researchers may tend to agree that qualities of mental 
functioning occur outside of awareness, there is disagreement over the degrees 
of conscious access, control, effort and intention involved (Wilson & Dunn, 2004).  
On the one hand conceptualizing the unconscious in this adaptive non-
motivational way has allowed for nonconscious processes to be researched by 
simply investigating processes outside awareness that influence people’s 
thoughts, feelings and behaviors.  However the deemphasis of the conflictual and 
motivational aspects of unconscious processes (such as repression) also seems 
to create problems in accounting for the reason for nonconscious aspects of the 
mind.  One seems to have to stretch the argument about the adaptive 
evolutionary efficiency reasons for certain processes to be outside awareness to 
be able to cover the extent of nonconscious fucntions of the mind.  The other 
alternative is a hedging on the definition of what motiviation can mean.  For 
example, it seems curious that Wilson and others would consider conditions for 
the expression of dual attitudes and self-presentation concerns outside the realm 
of motivation (Wilson & Dunn, 2004).  Similarly, Wegner’s work (2002) on the 
illusion of conscious will begs for a thorough exploration of unconscious 
motivation of thought and action.  In the next chapters I will suggest some 
solutions to these issues by turning to the psychoanalytic literature and returning 
to the topic of romantic love.   
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Another important source of research has been the neuroscientific evidence 
of unconscious affective responses—including Damasio’s on consciousness 
(1999) and LeDoux’s on emotional learning (1996).  Damasio’s findings on 
patients with hippocampal lesions, resulting in explicit memory failures, 
demonstrated the ability to register the emotional response of an aversive event 
outside of conscious awareness.  LeDoux’s findings (1985, 1989,1996) on the 
parallel pathways of affective processing helped demonstrate how types of 
emotional responses can bypass conscious remembering.  By providing 
evidence for the existence and independence of unconscious processes from 
conscious ones, neurological literature on unconscious processing has helped 
clarify the specific role and limits of conscious awareness and reasoning.   
From his work LeDoux has made observations regarding the overestimation 
of conscious cognitive processing due to the flawed historic privileging of 
cognition, reason, and thinking over emotion, feeling and passion.  The 
neurological research has evidenced that nonconscious factors, including 
emotional states, play a crucial role in reasoning processes.  Damasio’s research 
(1994) led him to conclude that emotion directs reason.  He postulated that the 
general function of emotion may be to act as “somatic markers” that are 
unavoidable reminders of the embodied self’s interests.  Gazzaniga and LeDoux 
(1978) studied split-brain patients and found that they would tend to attribute 
explanations to situations as if they possessed the introspective knowledge (they 
did not) into the causes of behavior.  From this these authors concluded that “one 
of the main jobs of consciousness is to keep our life tied together into a coherent 
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story, a self-concept” (LeDoux, 1985, 1996).  Their view suggests that the (left-
brain verbally dominated) conscious self may attempt to weave a story together 
that makes sense of experience even with limited access to relevant information.  
Apropos to romantic love, LeDoux has stated: 
 
the inadequacy of any approach to emotion based solely or mainly on 
introspectively accessible aspects of the mind is apparent [because] much of 
emotional processing occurs (or can occur) unconsciously, as well as by the 
fact that people often find their emotions puzzling.  Consciously accessible 
appraisal processes cannot be the way, or at least not the only way, the 
emotional brain works.  Even when we are conscious of the outcome of some 
emotional appraisal (for example knowing that you dislike someone), this 
does not mean that you consciously understand the basis of the appraisal 
(knowing why you dislike the person) (1996, p. 64) 
 
In many ways, this represents my own central critique of the romantic 
relationship research literature, which relies on what are proving to be the limited 
capabilities of conscious awareness and reasoning.  Due to these limitations and 
what is still unknown about unconscious processing, research based on studying 
people’s self-reported psychological observations is bound to be inadequate.  In 
other words, the research focusing on conscious verbal domains can only yield 
data on those psychological aspects that are consciously accessible and 
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expressible verbally.  This renders academic research into romantic relationships 
as investigations into the consciousness of love.     
More specific to the topic of love, in A general theory of love (2001), Lewis, 
Amini and Lannon lay out a conceptual model based on reviewing a century’s 
worth of neuroscientific research on emotions and attachment.  Using MacLean’s 
model of a triune brain (1973, 1990) as a jumping off point, they argue for the 
primary importance the palleomammalian or limbic system to all forms of love 
relations.  The importance of this for this discussion is that these authors 
construct a theoretical model of love that focuses on the non-linguistically 
mediated limbic brain as the “center of advanced emotionality.”  The limbic 
system is responsible for recording memories of behaviors that produced 
agreeable and disagreeable experiences.  According to MacLean, the limbic 
system is concerned with emotions and the most primal instincts having to do 
with feeding, sex, fighting and bonding.  In this scheme, it can be considered the 
place of origin for many of the value judgments that we make, often at a level 
outside of consciousness.  The limbic brain is evolutionarily designed to 
orchestrate the congruence between one’s internal bodily states and the external 
environment.  It “collects sensory information, filters it out for emotional 
relevance, and sends outputs to other brain areas” (Lewis et al., 2001, p. 54).   
These other brain areas include the primitive reptilian or basal brain (the 
preverbal autonomic center), and the neocortex (which is responsible for higher 
cognitive functions and modes of complex consciousness.   While all three 
systems of MacLean’s Triune brain must interact and communicate to 
 104
accomplish even some of the most mundane human behaviors, each have 
different functions.   
Lewis and colleagues synthesize a range of mammalian research, done with 
hamsters (Murphy, MacLean & Hamilton, 1981), rats (Hofer, 1975) on up to 
humans (Spitz, 1945) and construct a theory of love based on the limbic-driven 
capacity to ascertain, orient and connect oneself to the emotional state and 
motives of others.  It is the limbic capacity that allows a human to read the 
emotion and intentionality of another person and send a message to the 
neocortical brain, which then leads to a conscious thought about the state of the 
other person.  As the authors point out, it is only the newest neocortical brain that 
traffics in reason, logic and language.  The limbic brain, while responsible for the 
intuition one uses, “can move us in ways beyond logic that have only the most 
inexact translations in a language the neocortex can comprehend” (p. 34).  
Further they argue for the centrality of the limbic brain, in allowing for the social 
regulatory bond between humans.  Relating this to love, the authors use a term, 
limbic resonance, to describe the capacity for mammals of “mutual exchange and 
internal adaptation whereby two mammals become attuned to each other’s inner 
states” (p. 63).  Originating first in regards to child-rearing, their understanding of 
the limbic system of humans necessitates an open-system of bodily self-
regulation or “limbic regulation”: 
 
Because human physiology is (at least in part) an open-loop 
arrangement, an individual does not direct all of his own functions.  A 
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second person transmits regulatory information that can alter hormone 
levels, cardiovascular function, sleep rhythms, immune function, and 
more—inside the body of the first.  The reciprocal process occurs 
simultaneously: the first person regulates the physiology of the second, 
even as he himself is regulated.  (p. 85).   
 
All of this mutual regulation occurs very quickly, and mostly outside the 
awareness of both parties, though is partially accessible to conscious reflection in 
the feeling one gets when in the company of a trusted partner.  The authors 
explain the time it takes to build up patterned relational regularity in the form of 
limbic resonance and regulation.  In optimal conditions early in life, a person 
establishes limbic pathways that represent “healthy emotional interaction” with 
another.  These pathways then act as “limbic attractors” that search for a similar 
emotional feeling with others.  Since such states occur, often outside the 
awareness of the person, they often can be triggered when one’s limbic system 
senses the emotional resonance of another person.  Conscious awareness 
follows soon after of such a level of limbic attunement; however such states of 
between two partners can also be lost, leading to states of dysregulation.  The 
authors view limbic resonance and regulation as neural building blocks for love, 
which operate largely outside of one’s awareness with results that get 
symbolically transformed into a language of consciousness.   
A final form of neuroscientific research worth mentioning is the neuroimaging 
evidence of Bartels and Zeki (2000, 2004).  Their work has targeted the areas of 
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the brain implicated in the neuro-chemisty of love.  I chose not to review this 
study in the last chapter since it does not as yet represent an overall research 
program or psychological theory of love.  One of the most interesting aspects of 
this research, utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques, 
is what Bartels and Zeki may have revealed about areas of the brain deactivated 
in romantic love.  These authors investigated the neural correlates of romantic 
and maternal love by scanning the brains of subjects as they looked at pictures 
of their partners and children, respectively.  They found overlapping activation in 
parts of the brain for romantic and maternal love (specifically in the brain’s 
reward system which contains high levels of the attachment-related 
neurohormones, oxytocin and vasopressin).  Bartels and Zeki’s findings also 
showed that their romantically and maternally loving subjects demonstrated a 
suppression of neural activity in brain areas associated with: negative emotions, 
attention, short- and long-term memory, and social/moral/theory of mind tasks 
(2004).    
This last category of deactivations is particularly interesting for how it further 
supports challenging what I believe are academic psychology’s assumptions 
about the role of conscious reasoning in romantic love.  Bartels and Zeki’s 
neuroimaging findings represent another research avenue for demonstrating that 
“strong emotional ties to another person … affect the network involved in making 
social judgments about that person” (2004).  The authors tentatively suggest that 
their findings on the inhibition of the ability to determine other people’s emotions 
and intentions, otherwise known as mentalizing (Frith & Happe, 1994; Happe, 
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1995), may be due to the decreased need for critical social assessment in close 
familiar relationships.  If aspects of people’s critical capacities are subject to even 
temporary arrest when people  reflect on loved others, how can researchers 
using questionnaires, which demand for social assessment be relied upon?  Let 
me put forth another way of viewing this inhibition of psychological functioning in 
love that has less to do with a decreased need for critical assessment.  These 
effects to one’s social judgment skills can be thought of as defensive restrictions 
on one’s mentalizing capacities in the service of self-regulation.   
As I will further outline in Part Two of this study, the academic psychological 
and brain sciences fields do not currently have a way of explaining why usually 
operative interpersonal reasoning abilities may become inhibited to some degree, 
except for positing the lack of need for such processes.  For now let me offer a 
tentative hypothesis to Bartels and Zeki’s findings: the kinds of elevated affects 
experienced in romantic relationships may produce a kind of mental tension state 
that triggers processes by which psychological contents, processes and states 
may be restricted to some degree.  In Part Two, I will elaborate a framework for 
thinking of such kinds of dynamic mental processes in love by which 
psychological functions and states can be inhibited for self-organizing purposes.  
For know, the point to grasp from Bartels and Zeki’s work, along with the other 
neuroscientific evidence discussed previously, is that studying the mind in love at 
the level of brain mechanisms further casts doubt on relying on measures of a 
person’s conscious self-awareness and reasoning about love.   
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Limited awareness leading to bounded rationality 
 
The romantic relationship research field (with all its disparate parts) has been 
slow to integrate the findings I have reviewed in this chapter on unconscious 
mental processes.  This can be seen in the literature’s reliance on self-report 
measures and focus on participants’ conscious reasonings about love 
relationships.  The research I canvassed here demonstrates the limits of being 
consciously aware of one’s thoughts, feelings, behaviors, motivation and 
reasons.  By assuming the accessibility of love’s psychology and relying on the 
accuracy of first-person reports of experience, romantic relationship researchers, 
by and large, have taken a flawed approach to understanding love.  They have 
minimally considered the degree to which there are aspects of love that evade 
conscious awareness and bare little or, at the least, a complicated relation to a 
person’s self-report.  Instead a general assumption guiding romantic love 
research has been that the mind is transparent enough to introspection, thus 
allowing for relatively unfettered access to mental contents and psychological 
processes.        
The assumptions of romantic relationship researchers in regards to reasoning 
in love relationships lead to a more rational view of love.  The research in this 
chapter has demonstrated that there are profound limits to what people can 
understand and reflect on regarding their reasons for feeling, thinking and 
behaving.  In addition to failing to incorporate what has been shown about 
unconscious processing, romantic relationship researchers have largely ignored 
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the central thesis of the work Simon (1957) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974).  
This research helps illustrate that everyday decision-making does not normally 
rely purely on rule-governed logic or abstract reasoning.  It indicates that people, 
wittingly and unwittingly, draw on past strong emotional experiences, implicit 
understandings, and guesswork based on shortcut biases to solve everyday 
problems.  Though this expanded view of rationality has been applied to 
economic models, the field of romantic love research has not welcomed its 
significance.   
Simon’s (1957, 1972, 1982) work on bounded rationality helped to explain 
that people are only as rational as they have to be and naturally relax their 
rationality whenever possible.  Simon expanded the general understanding of 
reasoning in order to explain constraints on rationality that lead to different 
possible forms of rational thinking.  For Simon, rationality is somewhat context 
bound, as what is rational may differ depending on the individual, cultural and 
situational factors.  Simon’s thinking opposed classic economic theories, which 
featured a view of human striving towards the achievement of optimal goals.  
These goals are achieved rationally by acquiring as much pertinent information 
as possible in order to reason the most logical course of action.  This kind of 
rationality involves the consideration of multiple possibilities before a decision is 
made.  Using his concept of satisficing, Simon outlined conditions under which a 
person would not strive towards an optimal solution or goal, and is satisfied 
choosing an option, which meets the minimal requirements (March & Simon, 
1958).  Examples of such conditions are constraints on computational capacities, 
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knowledge or time.  In such cases of constraints, the rational course may not be 
to consider and calculate all alternatives to the fullest degree, but rather to 
achieve a kind of compromise.   
Simon’s work is radical, and was for its time, for its expansion of the ways of 
thinking about rational thought and behavior.  He challenged the then current 
thinking about rationality in terms of objective rules of logic and reason, and even 
proposed that having all possible information does not necessarily guarantee the 
most rational or optimal solution.  From his work, one understands that everyday 
constraints require the use of seat-of-the-pants, instinctive, and experiential 
knowledge.  In fact, at times it might be more rational to not use all the 
information one has, but rather rely on intuitive decision-making.  Part of 
rationality is deciding which kind of deliberation process to engage in—the 
experiential decision-making, perhaps involving the quick recognition of patterns, 
versus solving a problem by formal logic, or some compromise of the two.  In this 
view, a reasonably good solution is good enough most of the time, and may often  
be even better than the optimal one.     
Simon’s bounded rationality, which takes into account the limitations of the 
human mind and situation, teaches that the most rationally intended behavior is 
still limited by cognitive and contextual constraints.  Influenced by Simon’s ideas, 
Kahneman’s research (done in significant collaboration with Tversky) has 
provided empirical evidence to challenge idealized models of everyday judgment 
and reasoning.  Kahneman’s work has been described as research on decision-
making under uncertainty, or a heuristics and biases approach (Kahneman & 
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Tversky, 1996).  He has studied the way people make predictions about the 
future, estimate frequencies based on limited evidence, and choose the best 
alternatives among a variety of topics.  The key feature of this approach is the 
emphasis on cognitive processes that mediate intuitive predictions and 
judgments.  The goal of this work was to investigate the judgment strategies or 
heuristics, such as representativeness, availability and anchoring that lead to 
valid and invalid judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  This work has been 
influential in both psychology and economics, leading to Kahneman’s reception 
of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. 
To illustrate some of their research, the availability heuristic is used whenever 
one estimates probability or frequency based on the ease of being able to think 
of examples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  The availability heuristic factors into 
the way a person is able to judge himself.   Studies have demonstrated that the 
way a subject views and assesses qualities about himself (e.g., self-efficacy, 
assertiveness) can be manipulated by making such attributes more available to 
consciousness (Cervone, 1989; MacLeod & Campbell, 1992).  Influencing 
availability are such factors as the recency and familiarity of a particular mental 
content.  One can imagine how availability might operate in the research into 
romantic love, with certain aspects (e.g., intimacy, attachment) of relationships 
either being more accessible to conscious introspection (e.g., passion, lust) or 
implicitly primed by research designs.   
Decisions based on representativeness hinge on how typical and appropriate 
something seems to a person rather than probability.  Representativeness leads 
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people to ignore how often something actually occurs in the population (known 
as the base rate).  By empirically studying common judgmental and perceptual 
biases, including neglect of base-rate information, overconfidence, and 
overestimation of the frequency of events, Kahneman has demonstrated the 
implicit side of reasoning.  It is important to remember that these heuristics do not 
all lead to incorrect decisions or assessments.  Despite its neglect of actual 
percentage estimations, representativeness can generally be a useful heuristic 
for making decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).  This research helps 
demonstrate not the reasoning limitations that lead to judgment errors, but rather 
the implicit biases underlying all uncertain decision-making and assessment. 
Though Kahneman should not really be considered a researcher of 
unconscious processes, his work represents a significant challenge to models of 
rational judgment.  As opposed to a model that attempts to refute the use of 
logical reason in uncertain situations, this research expands narrowly unrealistic 
views of what judgment and decision-making involves.  More recently his work 
has focused on attribute substitution, which occurs “when the individual assesses 
a specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting a related heuristic 
attribute that comes more readily to mind” (Kahneman, 2003).  For my purposes, 
what is important to understand here is the automatic quality of this unconscious 
intuitive reasoning process, which accompanies conscious reasoning.  
Kahneman has recently attributed the intuition-based decision-making processes 
to a kind of system of processing information that is effortless, emotionally 
charged, associative, not available to introspection, and governed by habit.  This 
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conceptualization between systems of processing draws on the same literature 
that Wilson’s ideas of the adaptive unconscious did (see Stanovich & West, 
2000).  
Though Simon and Kahneman’s respective research has not focused on 
understanding the implicit perceptual and reasoning biases that are involved in 
relationship choices, their challenge to economic models of rational economic 
man apply to this current discussion of romantic love.  Guided by Simon’s 
insights, Kahneman’s empirical studies have mainly dealt with probability and 
frequency decision-making that are fairly removed from a person’s romantic life.  
However, the research field he has helped build has demonstrated the effects of 
ever-present intuitive biases.  I mentioned studies that demonstrated how these 
heuristic effects potentially could affect one’s self-assessment.  If operative in 
relatively abstract impersonal hypothetical situations (involving such things as 
frequency estimations) and self-assessment contexts, the existence of heuristic 
biases in assessing romantic relationships would seem probable.  One may even 
wonder how much more operative perceptual and judgmental biases are, when 
the targeted object for evaluation is the affect-laden associative realm of one’s 
romantic life.   
It would seem that psychological researchers of romantic love took their lead 
from the classic economic model of homo economicus.  This is the model of 
human functioning driven by rationality, in order to obtain the most profit in the 
most cost-effective manner.  The romantic relationship empirical literature 
implicitly overestimates a person’s baseline psychological capacities.  The 
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hypothetical person featured in this literature consciously introspects, both within 
the research situation and in everyday life, with relatively good accuracy about 
past, present and future relationship motivations, feelings, and thoughts.  Just as 
Kahneman and Simon have done with economic models, it would behoove 
relationship researchers to understand the role of unconscious processing in the 
rationality of romantic love. 
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From a psychological mind to a psychoanalytic one  
 
This chapter has been devoted to presenting research and ideas 
demonstrating the limits of conscious awareness, the existence and role of 
unconscious processes and an expanded version of human reasoning.  Empirical 
literature from fields such as neuroscience and social cognition agree that it is 
difficult to ground psychological research on first person accounts of experience.  
The human capacity to consciously reflect and organize experience is 
constrained by the inaccessibility of certain mental processes and contents and 
the tendency for confabulation in the face of insufficient information.  The 
insufficient information does not just refer to unknown facts about a given 
situation or object in the environment, but also concerns the obscured aspects of 
one’s mind.      
As researchers like LeDoux and Wilson postulate, the role of consciousness 
may be to create coherency and meaning for an individual in the face of limited 
information.  To state this in terms of internal life, these limitations include the 
degree to which one can understand the range of affectively invested motivations 
that influence everyday decisions in multiple ways.  Due to the limits of conscious 
awareness, a person is only partially cognizant of the various motivations that are 
at play at any given time.  As the research in this chapter indicated, relying too 
heavily on consciousness to provide accurate instruction about one’s reasoning 
may be a wrong-headed approach towards investigating complex phenomena 
like love.   
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While the work I reviewed in this chapter represents a vital effort in research 
psychology to report the less than conscious functionings of the mind, it demands 
future development.  As I mentioned before, the majority of the research in this 
chapter does not deal with the unconscious mind in love.  To be sure, many of 
the types of everyday decision-making examples presented here undershoot the 
cognitive, affective, bodily, and motivational complexities of romantic 
relationships.  My purpose in this chapter was not to exhaustively portray the 
empirical science of unconscious mental processes.  It was to gather research 
data from various fields that have converged around a singular point arrived at 
and expressed though different means.  The varied workings of the brain and 
mind that effectively total one’s psychology are only partially knowable to 
conscious introspection.  This has implications for how to think of the reasoning 
people offer for their choices, whether movies, political candidates or love 
partners.    
The research in this chapter supports my contention that romantic relationship 
investigation needs to explore and demonstrate unconscious processes in love.  
From the emotional priming studies of Zajonc to Wegner’s demonstrations of the 
illusion of conscious will through the neurological work of Damasio and LeDoux, 
this collection of work raises similar questions as the ones I asked earlier about 
accessibility and accuracy in self-reporting on mental states.  This research also 
strongly suggests that of further necessity, beyond illustrating the unconscious 
workings of the mind in love, is empirical evidence and conceptual understanding 
of the interplay between the levels of mental life.  
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Despite the limitations in the empirical relationship research, I am convinced 
that there is much to be garnered from this published literature.  A new 
framework is necessary to make use of the valuable insights from these studies.  
To my mind, the significance of the empirical research lies in its contribution to 
illustrating the various levels of phenomenal experience involved in romantic 
love.  I have touched on the problems of having such diverse empirical 
approaches to love that, at times, seem disconnected and confusing.  This 
multiplicity in perspective, while needed for understanding romantic love, requires 
a way of organizing itself.   
The current structure of the literature features not only different ideas about 
what love is but distinct ways of studying it.  Let me offer a way to categorize the 
research into different groups.  One such group contains biological-evolutionary 
approaches (the work of attachment researchers, Fisher, Buss), which endeavor 
to understand the function of romantic love and its physical underpinnings.  
There are also ways of measuring love’s different styles or components, which 
result in romantic love taxonomies (e.g., Sternberg, Hatfield, Lee, etc.).  Finally, 
there are those studies which focus on romantic relationship process, 
investigating the way that two lovers explicitly and implicitly interact, 
communicate and treat each other (couples observation, social exchange and 
investment, social cognition approaches).  To be sure there are overlaps 
amongst these categorizations, as individual research approaches may also 
address the issues of another grouping without focusing on them.  I chose not to 
organize the research literature in Chapter One in this schematic way since I do 
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not advocate this kind of simplification.  What is required is a more integrative, 
albeit complicated, methodology to structuring the research.  Complex 
phenomena, like romantic love, at times breed complex problems that require 
multifaceted solutions.   
Having articulated my criticism of the romantic relationship research, let me 
offer a first suggestion.  A potentially effective way of organizing the existing and 
future research endeavors is by first understanding the various empirical 
perspectives as referring to motivational aims in love.  From the research 
literature from Chapter One, one can identify motivational aims in romantic love 
such as reproduction, survival, caregiving, attachment, sexuality, commitment, 
intimacy, equity, self-esteem regulation, passion etc.  Since most approaches 
have restricted their inquiry to very few motivations, they have excluded 
discussion and exploration of other possible aims in love.  A framework is then 
needed to study how motivations in love are psychologically registered and 
managed.   As I have suggested throughout Part One, I believe that this includes 
conscious and unconscious levels of mental processing.   
In asserting that there is a percentage of the mind in love that is not open to 
direct unencumbered introspection, let me acknowledge that the roads leading to 
romantic unconscious life can be serpentine by nature.  Thus the empirical (and 
even conceptual) investigation into this quality of psychological life is formidable. 
What is needed is a way of understanding unconscious mental states and 
functions beyond those that are categorically nonconscious and implicit by nature 
and design.  The type of unconscious psychology I am suggesting moves 
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towards a dynamic unconscious mind.  A dynamically unconscious mind takes 
into account factors that lead to aspects of mental life becoming and being 
transformed out of consciousness for a motivated reason.  These ideas have 
been most cultivated in the psychoanalytic literature.    
I believe that psychoanalytic ideas are essential for creating an integrative 
way to study the interwoven threads of conscious and unconscious processes in 
romantic love.  Psychoanalysts have endeavored to study the dynamically 
conscious and unconscious mind through theory, case study, and, to a lesser 
extent, empirical research.  In the next chapter, I will navigate through the 
psychoanalytic literature to present views of the mind that are distinct from the 
models presented here in Part One.  I will then review how psychoanalytic writers 
have approached the topic of romantic love.   
Some of the terms of the discussion in the next chapter may seem radically 
different from the discourse on love and the mind in Part One, but my aim in Part 
Two is an integrative one.  By the end of Part Two, I will lay out my own original 
framework for researching romantic love.  I am of the mindset that empirical 
psychology (and related brain science) and psychoanalysis can forge a mutually 
benefiting relationship.  In fact, a comprehensive study of complex psychological 
phenomena requires a diversity of approaches that are able to inform each other 
through collaboration and dialogue.  With the subject like romantic love, there 
may be no better example of an area of human life more suitable and in most 
need of this kind of integrative scholastic endeavor.      
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER THREE: The view from psychoanalysis 
But human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow 
from the psychological research of the present time which seeks to prove to 
the ego that it is not even the master of its own house, but must content itself 
with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously it its mind.”  
 
Sigmund Freud, lecture 19 from Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis  
(1916-1917) 
 
… psychoanalysis enters the twenty-first century with its influence in decline.  
This decline is regrettable, since psychoanalysis still represents the most 
coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind.” 
 
Nobel-prize winner Eric Kandel, American Journal of Psychiatry (1999) 
 
 
In this chapter I would like to argue that a psychoanalytic approach to the 
mind can help address some of the problems of the empirical literature on 
romantic relationships.  Since Freud began his work at the end of the nineteenth 
century, psychoanalysis has grappled with both the knowable and unknowable 
aspects of everyday psychological life.  Psychoanalytic ideas have questioned 
the extent of both conscious and rational mental processes in an effort towards 
understanding the psychological experience of the individual.  In a certain sense 
the psychoanalytic literature serves as a counterpoint to the assumptive positions 
I outlined in Part One.  Before reviewing how psychoanalysis has directly dealt 
with romantic relationships, let me touch on some critical concepts.   
It has been argued that the intellectual history of unconscious mental life pre-
dates Freud by a number of centuries (Ellenberger, 1970; Whyte, 1960).  
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However, psychoanalysis is set apart from other attempts with its self-assured 
conviction in and dedication to studying the functions, manifestations and nature 
of the conscious and unconscious interplay that informs psychological life.  In 
Chapter Two, I mentioned the “cognitive unconscious,” so let me begin by 
describing the “psychoanalytic unconscious.”  As is the case with many central 
concepts in psychoanalysis, not to mention in Freud’s own thinking, one would 
be hard-pressed to find a single indisputable definition in the literature.  Tracing 
the evolution of this concept in Freud’s thinking and subsequent theorists has 
been a topic that has drawn much attention (Erdelyi, 1985; Laplanche & Pontalis, 
1973; Weinberger & Weiss, 1997).  In the simplest sense, unconscious 
descriptively refers to that which a person is not conscious of at a given moment.  
Given what was subsequently demonstrated about the limits of consciousness 
and working memory (Miller, 1956), Freud appears to have been correct in his 
assertion: “At any given moment consciousness includes only a small content, so 
that the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be 
for very considerable periods of time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being 
psychologically unconscious” (1915b, p. 167).  Conceived of in this way, this 
descriptive unconscious corresponds to current understandings of 
procedural/implicit and working memory (Kandel, 1999).   
As touched on in Chapter Two, this descriptive sense of unconscious is fairly 
broad and, for the most part, uncontroversial in research science.  This 
categorization can be applied to phenomena that lie outside immediate 
conscious awareness but still possess some degree of importance for a person.  
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Thus under the heading of descriptive unconscious can be such varied mental 
contents as the name of one’s first grade teacher, the birthday of one’s romantic 
partner, the value of religion and morality, how one cooks a Spanish omelette, 
and the complex ways that guide one’s social functioning.      
For Freud and psychoanalysis, the descriptive unconscious is the veritable tip 
of the iceberg.  What follows are two other more specific and radical renderings 
of the unconscious mind, accompanying topographical and structural models.  In 
the former, the metaphor of the mind is of a tripartite split between conscious, 
preconscious and unconscious parts (1900, 1915b).  Consciousness is equated 
with awareness, but now all mental contents that are potentially available or 
accessible, though not currently, are designated preconscious.  The 
preconscious system (Pcs.) though descriptively unconscious, is more closely 
aligned with the conscious system (Cs.) in the way it works.  In this topographic 
model, the contents of the unconscious system (Ucs.) are drive or instinctual 
representatives that are unavailable to consciousness.  For Freud, this system 
unconscious, with its own set of rules, which evade normal logic, constituted the 
majority of mental life.  These rules correspond to a form of more pleasure-driven 
primary process mentation that is “seemingly disorganized, irrational, illogical, 
and even bizarre and contradictory” (Meissner, 2005, p. 27).  This is opposed to 
secondary process, which works in accordance with the constraints of reality, is 
more integrated with other mental operations, and is generally more organized 
and rational.  In this topographic model, primary process is more characteristic of 
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the Ucs., just as secondary process is more descriptive of the Pcs. and Cs.13  A 
censorship prohibits unconscious contents, wanting release, from entering the 
Pcs.-Cs., thus dividing those two systems from the Ucs.  Accounting for this 
censorship is a central concept missing from most academic psychology 
accounts of unconscious processes—the operation of repression. 
Along with the way the Ucs. operates (under the sway of primary process 
thinking), the idea of repression distinguishes the dynamic sense of unconscious 
from all other forms.  In their dictionary of psychoanalysis, Laplanche and 
Pontalis defined repression as “an operation whereby the subject attempts to 
repel or to confine to the unconscious, representations (thoughts, images, 
memories) which are bound to an instinct” (1973, p. 390).  In Freud, as well as 
many psychoanalysts after, one finds a psychology of biological instincts and 
drives.  In large part, much of his modeling and remodeling of the architecture of 
the mind concerned his attempt to understand how one negotiates the influence 
and pressure of innately bodily instincts.  Williams recently encapsulated this in 
relation to a psychoanalytic clinical theory: “The construction of flexible defenses 
is required to manage derivatives of instinct, and if the trajectory of instinct 
management does not run evenly, or defenses become rigid or overemployed, 
symptoms can arise” (2005, p. 190). 
                                                 
13 Meissner (2005) has pointed out that subsequent years of psychoanalytic 
theorizing and general psychological research has softened Freud’s original 
dichotomy between primary and secondary forms of thinking.  The two forms can 
now be thought of as existing on a continuum, with actual examples of 
“undiluted” forms of either quality of thinking being rare. 
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The psychoanalytic model of the mind centers on aspects of one’s personality 
that are not only unconscious, but specifically are rendered unconscious.  One 
way of understanding the reason why a person represses and defends against 
something is in order to reduce the subjective sense of aversive affect related to 
awareness of such material.  So on the one hand, while a person may be moved 
to have a certain reaction and thought, the anxiety-evoking nature such mental 
activity may also prompt a defensive response to then obscure such content.  
Extending this thought, this version of a person’s psychology contains multiple 
layers of motivational forces, many of which remain outside of and are directly 
untranslatable in consciousness.  What makes the dynamic unconscious 
dynamic is the conflictual interplay of competing motivations, affects and 
concerns.  Even with the subsequent evolution of Freud’s topographical model, 
motivation continues to represent the heart of psychoanalytic theorizing, 
including its concept of unconscious mental life.   Fundamental to psychoanalysis 
is the assumption that all mental functions, conscious and unconscious, primary 
and secondary, are motivated.  Since every behavior, affect, fantasy and thought 
can be linked to a reason, an idea of psychic determinism follows.  As Meissner 
has argued, a psychoanalytic psychic determinism “has more to do with 
meanings and the relations of meanings than with causal connections” (2005, p. 
24).   Before discussing motivations in a psychoanalytic context, let me move on 
to reviewing what is unconscious in Freud’s structural model. 
In 1923, Freud’s topographic conscious-preconscious-unconscious model 
would change to match his clinical insights.  In The ego and the id (1923) the 
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system unconscious is redesigned as the id, inheriting the drive-dominated 
primary process characteristics of the Ucs.  The agency of the mind that is more 
reality-oriented and operates with secondary process is the ego, which takes on 
much of the characteristics of the former Pcs.-Cs. (Weinberger & Weiss, 1997).  
The ego has access to both conscious and unconscious material, and on its 
border with the id it uses defenses (which are unconscious) to manage drive-
related impulses (emanating from the id).  As Weinberger and Weiss have 
written, “resistances and defenses thus fall somewhere between primary and 
secondary process.”  The third mental agency of the 1923 structural model is the 
super-ego.  This represents moral and social concerns that are first delivered to 
the developing child through their parents.  Though technically conceived of as 
part of the ego, the super-ego functions as a combination of primary and 
secondary processes.  As an internalized system of rights and wrongs, its 
judgmental and demanding nature can result in pressure as unrelenting as those 
felt from the id.  As a result, the ego must mediate between the often-opposing 
obligations of the id and super-ego.  Different from the topographic model, the 
three systems of the structural model should be thought about less in terms of 
gradations of consciousness or unconsciousness.  Since unconscious processes 
can be found in all three, Erdelyi has suggested defining each in terms of their 
goals and functions (1985).  The structural model not only alters the way that 
unconscious processes are understood, but widens the degree to which one’s 
multiple motivations can not only conflict with each other but also remain outside 
awareness. 
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One cannot speak of goals and functions in psychoanalysis without 
thoroughly considering motivation.  For psychoanalysis, this discussion begins 
with Freud’s thinking about primary drives or instincts that seem to be at the root 
of all forms of behavior.  His thinking draws on a 19th-century Darwinistic 
understanding of fundamental survival instincts that drive human functioning in 
one way or another.  As Eagle stated, “in such theories, all behavior either serves 
to gratify these primary drives or other drives which have secondarily developed 
in association with the so-called primary drives” (1984, p. 7).  Freud categorized 
instincts into two types, where the competition between would result in forms of 
psychological distress.  The nature of these instincts evolved from the self-
preservative ego and reproductive sexual instincts to the life and death instincts.  
Subsequent theorists have articulated the need to rethink Freud’s scheme of two 
antagonistic instincts (Brenner, 1982; Holt, 1976; Kernberg, 1992; Kohut, 1977; 
Lichtenberg, 1989).  Instincts, drives, needs and aims are all ways of speaking 
about motivating factors in life.  Some of the alternatives that have been 
proposed include a human instinct that is object-seeking (Fairbairn, 1952), the 
need for security and intimacy (Sullivan, 1953), the attachment instinct (Bowlby, 
1969), and human aims that strive for self-cohesion, self-esteem, self-
organization and vitality (Erikson, 1959, 1963; Kohut, 1977).  Lichtenberg has 
proposed thinking about organized systems of motivation as “based on a 
recognizable innate need and associated pattern of response” (2001).  His five 
systems respond to needs for: psychic regulation of physiological requirements, 
attachment/affiliation, exploration and assertion, aversive response through 
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antagonism or withdrawal, and sensual enjoyment/sexual excitement (1989).  
While Freud initially conceived of drives as preceding the conscious-unconscious 
distinction as he thought of them as lying on the border between what is somatic 
and what is mental, some of these subsequent alternative motivational schemes 
do not make such an assumption.  It may be more accurate to say that a general 
psychoanalytic approach looks for conscious and unconscious aspects of all 
motivations.        
As I will discuss shortly, the concept of a psychological object in 
psychoanalysis is an important one in considering love.  In his psychoanalytic 
dictionary, Rycroft defined an “object” as “that towards which action or desire is 
directed; that which the subject requires in order to achieve instinctual 
satisfaction; that to which the subject relates himself” (1968, p. 100).  An object 
usually refers to some aspect of the person, thought to be “the focus of one’s 
wishes and needs” on an internal, external, part and/or whole level (Zimmer et 
al., 2005).  Kernberg commented that because of the broad spectrum of 
psychoanalytic object relations theorizing, psychoanalysis, itself can be 
considered an object relations theory: “all psychoanalytic theorizing deals, after 
all, with the impact of early object relations on the genesis of unconscious 
conflict, the development of psychic structure, and the re-actualization of 
enactments of past pathogenic internalized object relations in transference 
developments…” (2004, p. 26). These brief definitions reflect how object relations 
then refers to both how one psychologically, consciously and unconsciously, 
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experiences and processes relationships with others, and the underpinnings of 
how one actually behaves and interacts with an other at an observable level. 
Fundamental to a psychoanalytic object relations perspective is the 
psychological realm of fantasy, which has conscious and unconscious 
dimensions and contributes to a person’s conception of self and other in 
relationship.  A person’s motivations have fantasy correlates of related wishes 
and fears of the future of these aims.  In other words, a psychoanalytic 
perspective emphasizes how people organize sets of motivational aims, conflicts 
and compromises through conscious and unconscious fantasies.  The conscious 
forms of these are reportable as daydreams and unbounded ideational activity 
during waking hours.  Unconscious fantasies are for obvious reasons more 
difficult to access and thus are realized and re-constructed in derivative form.   
For Freud, fantasies represented soothing responses to frustration, attempts 
to convert negative feelings into positive ones, and rehearsal functions  
(Friedman & Downey, 2002).  His focus on was in part his offering a way of 
accessing unconscious fantasy.  For Melanie Klein and followers, (Klein, 1948; 
Isaacs, 1948) from the earliest ages phantasy (spelled this way to connote a 
broadening of this concept) accompanies all forms of real experience and can 
function in the role of wish-fulfillment, to defend against anxiety, to inhibit 
instinctual urges, and to fundamentally interpret or transform reality.  Less 
conceived as only an escape from reality, phantasy works throughout life in 
concert with reality.  The two each bear upon each other equally, with phantasy 
also aiding in one’s adaptation to life.  Klein moved the psychoanalytic thinking of 
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phantasy in a way that considered how it functioned not just as a protection 
against the circumstances of external reality, but also as a defense against 
internal psychic reality (Segal, 1964).           
I have already alluded to another central concept for many schools of 
psychoanalytic thought—the opposition or conflict between opposing instincts, 
aims, motivation or mental agencies (id, ego).  The emphasis here is not that 
intrapsychic conflict can occur between a person’s basic motives or in relation to 
one’s needs versus those of an other.  Rather, the point to be made is that 
intrapsychic conflict is felt to be inherent to one’s basic psychology.  Klein pointed 
out that Freud attributed an inherent motivational force to drives that is 
“independent of objective circumstances and can take different forms in “seeking 
its satisfaction”” (1976, p. 168).  This sets the stage for certain inevitable conflicts 
to occur throughout one’s development.  The very nature of an individual’s 
psychological life, with its accompanying aims and motivations, is ripe for the 
varieties of conflictual opposition to occur as a person attempts to satisfy basic 
conscious and unconscious needs in society.  The way one resolves one’s 
inevitable conflicts determines aspects of personality and in some cases 
pathology.  In this scheme, the focus is equally on unavoidable conscious and 
unconscious conflict and the various ways a person manages them.   
Two ways of dealing with conflict are through the use of psychological 
defenses and compromises.  As early as 1894, Freud wrote of defenses in 
discussing the struggle against unpleasurable and intolerable ideas and affects.   
Defense mechanisms can be thought of as techniques, usually unconsciously 
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employed, used to avoid unendurable psychological pain by manipulating, 
distorting or denying aspects of reality (Erdelyi, 1985).  In this way a person is 
thought to actively keep something out of conscious awareness while it is 
registered unconsciously.  Its unconscious registration, bypassing conscious 
attention, is what allows for its active defensive repudiation.  Here, the motivation 
for defense can be thought of as avoiding unpleasure and maintaining or re-
establishing the integrity of the ego (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973).   
In the face of conflicting motivations and the defenses used to reduce anxiety 
and unpleasurable affect, certain compromises must be achieved.  As one can 
see the dynamic tension that characterizes psychoanalytic thought is the push 
and pull, the interplay and the eventual resolution of various co-existing aims, 
needs and processes.  Though originally used by Freud to describe the creation 
of such phenomena as symptoms and dreams, the concept of compromise 
formation can be thought to refer to “any mental phenomenon which is the 
product of conflict and which partially expresses both parties to the conflict” 
(Rycroft, 1969, p. 20).  Since in certain respects, a psychoanalytic model of the 
mind features the ubiquity of conflict (of one type or another), some have also 
asserted that all aspects of the mind and mental functioning can be designated 
as compromise formations (Brenner, 1994).   
In my view, psychoanalytic concepts such as conscious and unconscious 
motivational conflict, compromise formations, and defense mechanisms are 
integral to investigating romantic love relations.  I have spent the last few pages 
going over some of the vocabulary of the psychoanalytic perspective I believe 
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can be applied towards the problems presented in the empirical literature on 
love.  Using a psychoanalytic perspective allows one to view romantic love as 
involving compromise formations (some defensive and other not) among 
conscious and unconscious levels of motivations both for an individual and 
between relationship partners.  I will attempt to demonstrate a prospective 
research model of this in my last chapter.  Before that, however, let me review 
how psychoanalytic thinking has conceived of romantic love.   
 
Psychoanalytic views of romantic love 
 
The topic of romantic love has had many contributors from the field of 
psychoanalysis.  From Freud’s initial theorizing about romantic love in his “Three 
essays on the theory of sexuality” (1905b) through more recent offerings by 
Mitchell (2002) and Young-Bruehl (2003), psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians 
have described the dynamics of romantic relationships in various ways.  In an 
effort to limit the scope of my study, my focus here is to depict the approach 
psychoanalysis has taken in documenting the interaction of unconscious and 
conscious factors in an individual’s romantic life.  In the work of the following 
theorists there will be many implicit disagreements as well as complementary 
statements.  The multiplicity of perspectives however are united in their way of 
using a uniquely psychoanalytic concentration on the intrapsychic and 
interpersonal psychological compromises that are made in the realm of love. 
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In his “Three essays on the theory of sexuality” (1905b) Freud first suggested 
that the mother is the child’s first sexual-love object.  Even rooted in auto-
eroticism, the sexual instinct takes its first object (outside the body of the infant) 
in the form of the mother.  However, eventually “the shape of his mother’s breast” 
becomes lost as a sexual object for the infant due to the auto-erotic nature of this 
time of life.  It is then not until latency (roughly from age 6 to age 13) is 
completed that this original relation from child to mother is restored.  The sexual 
drive, which splits into its sensuous and tender components during latency, 
essentially sees itself reconstituted during puberty with a new object replacing 
the initial maternal one.  By this point, all earlier component instincts converge 
and all former erotogenic zones from infancy are superseded in importance by 
the genital zone.  A new sexual aim emerges in a process that increasingly 
distinguishes the role of males and females and their individual course of 
development.   
It is in this 1905 essay that Freud set down that “the finding of an object is in 
fact-the refinding of it.”  Though the affectionate tie to the mother is always 
available, the sexual tie (formerly to the opposite sex parent) undergoes 
repression during latency in parallel with the Oedipus complex.  In adolescence 
however the sexual current re-emerges, and in normal development, is not fixed 
towards incestuous aims.  To paraphrase, the Oedipus complex is Freud’s theory 
of children fearing the “same-sex parent’s retaliation for their hostile, competitive 
strivings, which are, in turn, fueled by the children’s sexual wishes for the other-
sex parent” (Bleiberg, 2005, p. 174).  Freud did write of the occurrence of 
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incestuous fantasies, both conscious and unconscious, in puberty.  This is due to 
increasing somatic pressure that must be negotiated and repudiated by the 
individual, who is also at this time feeling the influence of society’s incestuous 
prohibitions.  Towards the end of this essay, Freud delivered this caveat that 
reiterates the inescapable and enduring impact of early infantile sexuality on the 
later love relations: 
 
a person who has been fortunate enough to avoid an incestuous fixation of 
his libido does not entirely escape its influence.  It often happens that a young 
man falls in love seriously for the first time with a mature woman, or a girl with 
an elderly man in a position of authority; this is clearly an echo of the phase of 
development that we have been discussing, since these figures are able to 
reanimate pictures of their mother or father.  There can be no doubt that 
every object-choice whatever is based, though less closely, on these 
prototypes. ...  Jealousy in a lover is never without an infantile root or at least 
an infantile reinforcement.  If there are quarrels between the parents or if their 
marriage is unhappy, the ground will be prepared in their children for the 
severest predisposition to a disturbance of sexual development or to a 
neurotic illness.  (p. 228) 
 
The thrust of this quotation shows Freud’s early thinking on the role of both 
infantile and childhood development in serving as both the prototype for normal 
heterosexual love relations and the root of neurotic and more severe 
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disturbances in this realm.  It is thus in this essay that the regressive and 
backwards-looking thrust of psychoanalytic perspectives on love was born as 
Freud explicitly laid down even further in a footnote to the essay added in 1915: 
“The innumerable peculiarities of the erotic life of human beings as well as the 
compulsive character of the process of falling in love itself are quite unintelligible 
except by reference back to childhood and as being residual effects of childhood” 
(p. 229).  Though, as has been documented elsewhere this Freudian notion has 
its Platonic roots (Bergmann, 1987).   
Between 1910 and 1917 Freud wrote three papers, which he later assembled 
under the heading “Contributions to the Psychology of Love.”  In the first of these 
papers, “A Special Type of Choice of Object Made By Men,” (1910), Freud 
described a distinct type of pattern in men that he has observed clinically.  For 
these men the only characteristics of woman that are important are that she must 
be involved in some relationship already and “should be like a prostitute” (here 
the reference is to promiscuity, questionable reputation and unfaithfulness).  The 
lover is defined in this relationship by his impulse to rescue the beloved, by the 
high value placed upon the woman, and his experience of intense jealousy.  This 
type of male love, which can endure into a string of such relationships, can be 
understood by examining the pubescent unconscious fantasies of the boy.   
In short, the female love object of this type serves as a surrogate mother 
figure.  For Freud, this particular type of man still harbors grievances towards this 
mother, since as a boy under the sway of the Oedipus complex and its fantasy 
components he has viewed her sexual relations with his father as the ultimate act 
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of unfaithfulness.  Thus the persistent unconscious fantasies of this betrayal have 
dominated this man’s ability to form normal love relationships with women.  
Instead he is fixated on enacting not just the fantasy of finally replacing his father 
in union with his mother, but also rescuing this mother-like figure as a form of 
gratitude.  Also accomplished in this scenario is the man’s continued 
unconscious fantasy “to be his own father.”   
In the next paper included in this series, “On the universal tendency to 
debasement in the sphere of love” (1912), Freud reflected on the causes of 
“psychical impotence” as seen in the complaints of male patients.  This allows 
him to review his thinking of sexual development in regards to love relationships 
and expound on the two instinctual currents that must combine in normal adult 
sexuality.  Of the affectionate and the sensual current, Freud postulated that the 
former is the older of the two and “is formed on the basis of the interests of the 
self-preservative instinct and is directed to the members of the family and those 
who look after the child” (p. 180).  Though the sexual instincts are proposed to 
contribute to this more affectionate tie, at this point Freud thought that sexual 
objects are chosen (in a way that has enduring effects in later life) by virtue of 
their ability to provide satiation and serve self-preservative needs.  After the 
division of these two currents during latency, they are to next meet after puberty, 
though the sexual current takes a different form.  The new object to be chosen 
still follows infantile prototypes, but new obstacles like the incest taboo allow for a 
more realistic object choice.   
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However, there are certain instances when the energy of the sexual instinct 
(libido) turns away from reality and while respecting the incest barrier, the person 
is over-run by fantasies of the first sexual objects that normally remain 
unconscious.  Freud outlined how, in this case, the young man’s libidinal 
development is distorted and the original flavor of fantasy situations that led to 
infantile masturbatory pleasure becomes admissible to consciousness with only 
the maternal object concealed.  The incestuous tie remains actively strong in the 
unconscious, but in reality the anxiety from enacting such wishes force the 
affectionate current to be split from the sensual current in reality. 
Freud used this scenario to account for the range of difficulties related to 
impotence in men.  Sexual pleasure and object choice is restricted due to these 
constraints on full psychical freedom.  The sexual current then can only seek 
satisfaction in objects that are not reminiscent of incestuous figures.  Since the 
maternal figure is also the first affectionate object, the lover is compelled to keep 
sexual and affectionate aims apart.  As Freud succinctly surmised: “The whole 
sphere of love in such people remains divided in the two directions personified in 
art as sacred and profane (or animal) love.  Where they love they do not desire 
and where they desire they cannot love” (p. 183).  To aid the effort in keeping 
sensual intentions from objects of affection, these men have a love that is split 
with the sexual object debased and the maternal figure idealized and overvalued.  
The debasement of the sexual object becomes a prerequisite of sorts for 
satisfaction in this realm.  Freud noted that this process of the splitting of 
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sensuous and affectionate currents occurs in children normally as a way to again 
ease the anxiety of taking the parent as an incestuous object.   
Thus in this clinical example of impotence Freud illustrated how a later sexual 
fixation is related to normal psychical processes gone awry.  The final romantic 
love object is arrived at only in the fusing of two separate currents of mental and 
physical life.  Further, the sexual object of adulthood will always be a surrogate 
for the original root of both sexual and affectionate aims.  Freud concluded his 
essay by noting that the course of adult love can be viewed as an endless search 
for the experience of the original relation to the first wished-for parental object 
and a series of substitute figures that can never fully satisfy our archaic 
unconscious longings.  Aspects of our sexual instinct are thus doomed to remain 
unsatisfied and subordinated to the demands of civilization and survival of 
culture. 
Freud further developed his thinking on romantic relations in his essay “On 
narcissism: an introduction” (1914).  In theorizing how a primary form of ego-
libido gets transferred onto others as object-libido, he describes cases in which 
people use themselves as a model for love-objects instead of maternal figures.  
His assumption was that two sorts of object choice are available to people based 
on the fact that a person has originally two sexual sources of pleasure in 
infancy—oneself and “the woman who nurses him.”  The object choice just 
mentioned that refers back to oneself is termed “narcissistic,” and another type 
which is based on the satisfaction of ego-instincts is an “anaclitic type.”  This type 
of romantic object choice is associated to attachment experiences and those 
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original sources of “feeding, care, and protection,” and is usually based on one’s 
mother or a substitute caregiver.   
Freud understood that tendencies to overvalue the beloved initially are related 
to the prior experience of the transfer of a child’s original narcissism to a 
satisfying object.  He summarized the two paths to one choosing a person to 
love: 
 
the narcissistic type may love:  
1. what he himself  is 
2. what he himself was 
3. what he himself would like to be 
4. someone who was once part of himself     
 
the anaclitic (attachment) type   
1. woman who feeds him 
2. man who protects him 
*and the substitutes who take their place 
(p. 90) 
 
By this line of thinking, Freud expanded his view of love relations in a way that 
not only provided another route to ultimate object choice, but also completed a 
Platonic vision of love.  For by positing the narcissistic type, Freud not only had a 
model of love as a reunion with past experiences and forms (the anaclitic type’s 
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symbiosis with infantile attachment experiences), but now had a theory that 
explained how one sought to find some version of oneself in a love object (the 
narcissistic type’s search for the missing part (half) of himself found in the other).   
Further in this paper, when dealing with the establishment of the ego ideal as 
the heir to an individual’s primary narcissism, Freud related the process of 
idealization to love relations.  By idealization the object “is aggrandized and 
exalted in the subject’s mind.”  It must be said that in this 1914 view of romantic 
relations, being in love is an either-or process of exalting the other or raising 
one’s own self regard: 
 
Further, it is easy to observe that libidinal object-cathexis does not raise self-
regard.  The effect of dependence upon the loved object is to lower that 
feeling: a person in love is humble.  A person in loves has, so to speak, 
forfeited a part of his own narcissism, and it can only be replaced by his being 
loved.  In these respects self-regard seems to remain related to the 
narcissistic element in love.  (p. 98) 
 
Here, one can see that Freud linked even normal love relations to a 
consideration of narcissism, and more particularly primary narcissistic 
experiences.  This paper features a conception of an objectless state of primary 
narcissism with the libidinal investment of the ego positioned as developmentally 
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prior to the ability to cathect or invest in external objects. 14   Secondary 
narcissism, then, was to occur after such an investment of energy could be made 
to external objects, and then subsequently withdrawn and reinvested into the 
ego.  
Love here is a zero-sum transactional model of first lowering one’s self-regard 
in idealizing and transferring libidinal energies to the other that were formerly 
invested in oneself.  The lover then looks to have his self-regard replenished by a 
reciprocating love shown towards him, thus restoring self-regard and psychic 
equilibrium.  The love object then functions in relation to the ego almost in 
parallel to the role of the individual’s psychic ego ideal.  So in loving the other, 
the person invests the beloved through idealization with a high amount of regard 
and seeks to satisfy the other just as he has sought to fulfill his ego ideal.  The 
smiling face of the ego ideal and the loved object is pleasurable.  In both the 
anaclitic and the narcissistic types of loving, the object that is chosen must be 
suitable for one’s idealization along the lines of fitting attachment or narcissistic 
needs.  In more pathological cases, Freud described that in loving the other, the 
self experiences a depletion, and thus withdrawing one’s affection for the other is 
                                                 
14 Data derived from infant observation (e.g., Lichtenberg, 1983, Stern, 1985) has 
challenged Freud’s idea of primary narcissism.  However, for Freud, even 
reviewers (Pulver, 1970; Auerbach, 1990) who have noted the traces of some 
ambivalence in his earlier thinking, about positing a primary objectless state, do 
not dispute that his later writings carry a definitive statement on the subject.  On 
the topic of libido and in relation to states of being in love he wrote, “All we know 
about it relates to the ego, in which at first the whole available quota of libido is 
stored up.  We call this state absolute, primary narcissism.  It lasts until the ego 
begins to cathect the idea of objects with libido; to transform narcissistic libido 
into object libido.   . . . It is only when a person is completely in love that the main 
quota of libido is transferred onto the object and the object to some extent takes 
the place of the ego” (1940, p. 150).   
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the only route to restore psychic stability.  Towards the end of the paper he 
added an interesting note, almost in a passing sense, that: “it is also true that a 
real happy love corresponds to the primal condition in which object libido and ego 
libido cannot be distinguished” (p. 100).  By this it seems clear that for Freud, the 
ideal state of romantic affairs involves not just a return to former times but also a 
certain loosening of one’s boundaries and even a de-differentiation of the self 
that again harkens back to a Platonic vision of two halves separated who are 
eventually reunited in love.       
Freud’s next important statement on love came in his 1915 paper, “Instincts 
and their vicissitudes.”  In exploring the changes that can befall an instinct, he 
discussed the transformation into its opposite in the example of love and hate.  
He starts by offering that love has three opposites: hating, being loved in return, 
and indifference. Hate is related to experiences of unpleasure and springs from a 
different source than love.  It is derived from the ego repudiating the existence of 
stimuli from the outside and external world and is fundamentally related to the 
ego-instinct of self-preservation.  Love is originally derived from experiences of 
auto-erotic stimulation as the ego seeks to satisfy instinctual impulses.  
Narcissistic at first, love later gets attached to objects that also become sources 
of pleasure, as the ego attempts to incorporate them.  This tendency remains at 
the root of the experience in romantic love of dissolving boundaries of self and 
other through oral incorporation.  Love later gets joined with the sexual instinct in 
the complicated fashion that Freud laid out in previous papers, detailed earlier. 
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According to Freud, hate is always related to that which lies outside the self, 
while love is first oriented to the self.  At later stages of pre-genital development, 
hate and love become indistinguishable as the object that is sought after as a 
source of pleasure has an existence outside the self that must be mastered by 
the developing ego.  In later development ego-instincts may still predominate, 
and hate seems to characterize even the sexual instinct, as seen in sadistic love 
relationships (p. 139).  As later thinkers have commented the nature of these 
ego-instincts remained an undeveloped concept in Freud’s thinking (Young-
Bruehl, 2003).    
As for the second and third opposites of love, Freud thought of loving and 
being loved in return as an exact parallel to what happens to an instinct in its 
transformation into its opposite.  He used the pairs of sadism-masochism and 
scopophilia-exhibitionism as examples of the instinct changing its aim, as 
opposed to content.  They are fundamentally related to narcissistic fixations as 
the object used in both cases serves the narcissistic function of auto-erotic 
pleasure.  The third antithesis of love—indifference—receives only a slight 
treatment by Freud, as an instance of love and hate experienced together.  
Since, he will explain that hate predates love, it follows that indifference is the 
predecessor to both emotions and may reflect the ego’s relation to the external 
world (p. 136).  In exploring love’s relation to hate, what becomes clear is that 
love becomes removed from the realm of the instincts and is thought to belong to 
the entire individual.  He explained that the attitudes of loving and hating “cannot 
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be made use of for the relations of instincts to their objects, but are reserved for 
the relations of the total ego to objects” (p. 137).         
Freud’s next important statement on love came in a chapter of his “Group 
psychology and the analysis of the ego” (1921).  In chapter eight, “Being in love 
and hypnosis,” he turned his attention to the question of idealization.  Freud 
described this tendency in romantic relations, which he described as “sexual 
overvaluation,” by writing: “the love object enjoys a certain amount of freedom 
from criticism, and that all its characteristics are valued more highly than those of 
people who are not loved, or than its own were at a time when it itself was not 
loved” (p. 112).  Freud understood this process as the subject relating to the love 
object as if it were either its own ego or a substitute ego ideal.  Thinking in 
economic terms, “when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic 
libido overflows on to the subject” (p. 112).  He wrote that the danger of idealizing 
the object too much is that too little narcissistic libido may be left for the self.  
Again, Freud thought that, in love, either the self or the other can experience an 
increase narcissistic investment.  He found this process of idealization normal to 
a degree that when one falls in love there is a customary loss of critical judgment 
and greater susceptibility to narcissistic injury.  
On the extreme end the subject becomes devoted to the love object to a 
degree that the other seems to take the place of the lover’s ego ideal.  In this 
case, the object becomes the arbiter of what is right and just and can replace any 
form of conscience once intact.  Freud distinguished identifying with one’s love 
object in an enriching way versus “bondage” to it that leaves the subject’s ego 
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impoverished.  Thus, to Freud, extreme cases of being in love are quite 
comparable to states of hypnosis since both are based on similar aspects of 
subjection, compliance, and a sapping of initiative experienced by the subject in 
relation to an idealized other who is saved from criticism.  The hypnotist acts as 
the subject’s ego ideal, just as the beloved, in the way that both are given the 
final authority with regards to reality testing.   
Freud thought that idealization is driven more so by the sexual instinct and 
views its fate to be futile when its aims are uninhibited.  In general those sexual 
impulses that are not inhibited experience a grave reduction every time they are 
even momentarily achieved.  The lasting ties of love must be bound by sexual 
aims that are inhibited to some degree: “It is the fate of sensual love to become 
extinguished when it is satisfied; for it to be able to last, it must from the 
beginning be mixed with purely affectionate components—with such, that is as 
are inhibited in their aims—or it must itself undergo a transformation of this kind” 
(p. 115).  Freud will further develop this idea of sublimated sexual libido two 
years later in “The ego and the id” (1923).  I will end this review of Freud’s major 
thoughts on romantic love with his 1921 work, though as evidenced by a footnote 
in this section (see footnote 1), his thinking on love and its mysteries continued 
throughout his writings in various forms.   
Theodore Reik envisioned a theory of love based on complementarity based 
on literature, his clinical and general observations (1944, 1957).  He held an idea 
of love being ultimately a compensatory phenomenon: “ a substitute for another 
desire, for the struggle toward self fulfillment, for the vain urge to reach one’s 
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ego-ideal.  The nonrealization of this drive makes love possible, but it also makes 
love necessary . . .  (1957, p. 40).  Reik wrote that in romantic love, the ego ideal 
is exchanged for the loved person, in an unconscious process that involves the 
projection of one’s fantasized ideal image onto the other.  What is then central to 
Reik’s conception of romantic love is that the initial state of the lover, prior to 
falling in love is discontent, dissatisfaction, and ego-deficiency.  It is the inner 
tension that is experienced from this fundamental human condition that impels 
the person to go from within oneself to find the thing outside and external to the 
self that will ease this pain via identification processes.  Love is one way that the 
person is able to enrich and improve the ego.   
He detailed how an unconscious experience of envy, usually consciously felt 
as admiration, accompanies the beginning stages of love.  The lover meets the 
love-object and believes that she possesses, in the form of discrete qualities or 
intangible total essence, what he lacks.  Reik made a point that what is lacking is 
also a matter of perception that is subject to the person’s inner conflicts and 
unconscious fantasies.  Thus, what are often claimed consciously as admired 
attributes in the other rarely represent the total picture of one’s psychic needs 
and wishes.    
Reik’s theory included thoughts of a wished-for regressed union with the 
other, which is assumed to be mutual.  The lover wishes to be the love-object, 
and soon envy turns into love.  He eventually moves loves into the realm of the 
ego-instincts when he says: “Love is in its essential nature an emotional reaction-
formation to envy, possessiveness and hostility” (p. 66).  When one loves 
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romantically, he essentially has overturned his more domineering feelings and 
transformed them into tenderness.  At this point wanting to be loved is 
accompanied by the impulse to love and give to the other.  The violence first felt 
towards the other draws its intensity from one’s dislike of one’s own personality 
and wish to have what the beloved possesses.  The other is idealized in regards 
certain qualities that actually represent the other’s ability to free the lover from 
isolation and the anguish of one’s flaws.  Eventually the lover becomes 
disillusioned with the loved one and starts to de-idealize love’s capacity to heal 
oneself.  The person’s individual characteristics and conflicts determine whether 
this period of disillusionment is negotiated in healthy or harmful ways.      
In Primary Love and Psychoanalytic Technique (1952), Michael Balint 
challenged the then accepted view of adult love that emphasized the capacity to 
reach satisfaction through genital intercourse, minimizing pregenital concerns.  
What he instead contended was that genital love “is a fusion of disagreeable 
elements: of genital satisfaction and pregenital tenderness” (p. 117).  He sought 
to disentangle genital love from the notion of genital sexuality (or genitality), 
associating the latter with the capacity to achieve maximum pleasure in sexual 
relations.  In addition to genital satisfaction he described three components 
usually found in a “true love relation”: idealization, tenderness and a special form 
of identification.      
While Balint followed Freud and acknowledged the role of idealization in 
genital love, he did not consider it “absolutely necessary.”  He admitted 
agreement with Freud, who also described the dangers of idealization in the 
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development of romantic love.  Regarding tenderness, Balint preferred an 
understanding closely aligned to Freud’s description of the affectionate current 
involved in mature love in the paper discussed earlier, “On the universal 
tendency to debasement in the sphere of love” (1912).  Balint emphasized the 
regressive and even infantile nature of tenderness in love, and used this point to 
further characterize genital love as a mainly regressive phenomenon.  Balint 
wrote, “…the demand for prolonged, perpetual, regard and gratitude forces us to 
regress to, or even never to egress from, the archaic infantile form of tender love.  
Man can therefore be regarded as an animal which is retarded even in his 
‘mature’ age at an infantile form of love” (p. 114).   After tenderness, he identified 
a special form of identification that requires both partners to be able to 
understand and want to satisfy each other’s pleasurable needs.  This form of 
genital identification implies a balanced mutuality where each lover takes into 
account one’s own needs and balances them with an approximation of the loved 
one’s wishes. 
In Balint’s formulation of genital love there is an inherent tension between the 
regressive pull aimed towards the infantile pleasures of an ideal symbiosis with 
the mother, and a forward orientation towards the other that resolves issues of 
sameness and differences leading to an identification with the beloved who is 
cherished as important as oneself.  Though he discounted the ultimate necessity 
of idealization, Balint concluded that the “supreme happiness” that can 
accompany romantic love is in fact based on illusion and “regression to an 
infantile stage of reality testing.”  The fantasy in love is then that the other will be 
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able to bring me (back) to a state where all is right in the world and I am satisfied.  
Thus for Balint, love involved not just the fusion of genital satisfaction and 
pregenital tenderness, but the intermittent mixture of reality and regressive 
unreality or fantasy.    
In Erich Fromm’s The Art Of Loving (1956) he articulated an “active” form of 
loving that he wished to distinguish from passive metaphors of falling or receiving 
that usually accompany romantic relationships.  Along with being a form of giving 
of oneself, Fromm detailed love’s basic elements of: care, responsibility, respect, 
and knowledge.  He defined that “love is the active concern for the life and the 
growth of that which we love” (p. 24).  His view privileged a loving relationship 
that is typified by mutuality and reciprocity.  Knowledge of the other entails the 
throwing off of one’s illusions about the other and a quest for both partners to 
move towards an “objective” knowing of the other, free form irrational distortion.  
He conceded that while complete knowledge of the other is impossible, it is the 
acceptance of the limitations there are in grasping the loved person that is 
required in love.   
In a way that would be influential for future research into romantic love, 
Fromm conceived of love as an “attitude” or an “orientation of character,” rather 
than a relationship to a person.  He concentrated on the craving for fusion and 
union in erotic love.  Its function, like all forms of love, is to overcome an 
individual’s feeling of aloneness and separateness.  Erotic love carries with it the 
illusion that “the new love will be different from earlier ones” (p. 49).  Sexual 
desire, which strongly tries to distinguish from erotic love, aims at fusion and can 
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create the illusion of union.  Ideally, for Fromm, sexual desire must be coupled 
with brotherly love, in other words tenderness, to serve the authentic goals of 
erotic love.  For him, erotic love (which I am equating with romantic love), 
transcends conceptions attached to feelings, and must include an idea of lasting 
commitment—“it is a decision, it is a judgment, it is a promise” (p. 51).   
Fromm was suspicious about idealization in love, and identified its frequent 
occurrence in idolatrous love.  He felt it is the result of a person not having a 
firmly rooted or mature identity.  The person then worships the beloved other, 
who he projects all of his own attributes and powers that he is “alienated” from.  
He then loses himself in an other who cannot live up to such expectations of 
perfection.  The intensity of such a love, specifically in the beginning stages, 
“demonstrates the hunger and despair of the idolater” (p. 90).  Fromm 
understood idolatrous love to be often confused with real love, though cautions 
against making such an error.  Ultimately, Fromm criticized idolatrous and 
sentimental forms of love as being neurotically tinged, relying on mechanism of 
projection in a way that obscures the other and precludes a more authentic 
meeting between romantic partners communicating “from the center of their 
existence” (p. 93).  The way one achieves this kind of love is by overcoming 
one’s narcissistic orientation and moving towards an objectivity that allows one’s 
perception and judgment not be exceedingly swayed by desires and fears.  
Ultimately the art of loving involves developing the humility, objectivity and 
reason needed to be able to “see” the other “person’s reality as it exists 
regardless of my interests, needs and fears” (p. 109).       
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Henry Dicks published a comprehensive offering of the conceptualization and 
treatment of marital dysfunction from a Kleinian-influenced object relations 
perspective (1967).  He endorsed a view that object choice was predicated on an 
unconscious search by individuals to find archaic aspects of themselves in the 
other.  Thus through romantic love, the subject seeks to undo what has been 
done via repression and denial, and the other is recruited unconsciously as a 
complementary part of the person.  Often this wish is expressed in a regressive 
fantasy that the other will either correct past offenses incurred in childhood or will 
restore what was relinquished through the course of development (i.e. 
omnipotence, bliss, dependency).  Aspects of control can be understood to be 
implicated on this as a person may restrict the loved other to abide by fantasized 
demands, unconscious and conscious, that are not explicitly stated or realized. 
In this book, modern marriage was described to contain many inherent 
tensions that had to be negotiated both on unconscious and conscious levels.  
The struggle between dependency and autonomy is highlighted as one that can 
easily spark old unresolved conflicts around aggression.  Dicks found that marital 
partners were often denying this ambivalence and hostility, using idealization and 
projective identification to manage such intolerable feelings.  Unfortunately these 
defensive mechanisms may only serve to exacerbate strife and discord between 
the couple.  In his study, Dicks showed how idealization, while healthy at certain 
times in development and within love relations, can ultimately be destructive to 
married couples when it is used in the service of reaction formation and used to 
deny aggressive feelings towards the other.  In these cases, one’s partner is not 
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allowed to behave in ways that will challenge the subject’s idealization of them.  
Deviation from such controlled behavior leads to intolerable anxieties, which are 
avoided at the expense of allowing a more enduring love and relationship to 
evolve.   
A further innovation to psychoanalytic thinking and understanding human 
relationships came in the writings of Heinz Kohut.  His work primarily dealt with 
how dependent one’s psychological self is on others throughout one’s life.   His 
self psychology (1971, 1977) has a foundation built on an understanding of the 
development, maintenance and rehabilitation of the self, thought of both as a 
psychological structure organizing experience and as representative of the 
person’s agentic core (1977, p. 310-311).  Originally conceived of as an 
outgrowth of classical Freudian theory to treat certain types of disturbed patients, 
his re-envisioning of psychoanalysis involved a de-emphasis of both the sexual 
and aggressive drives in favor of the self’s need for cohesion, vitality and what 
can be thought of as harmony or fulfillment.  Though his starting point was Freud 
and autoeroticism, Kohut eventually departed from classical thinking on 
narcissism by separating the developmental lines of narcissism and object love.   
Kohut hypothesized that for the child, the normal emergence from primary 
narcissism eventually brought with it the inevitable failure of his parents to 
completely satisfy all of his needs.  Aware of his vulnerability, the child manages 
this disruption by building up the two independent structures of normal 
narcissistic investment, the grandiose self and the idealized parental imago.  The 
parent is then imbued with absolute power and perfection and serves as a 
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potential merger object for the child in his attempts to regain or retain narcissistic 
equilibrium.  In the context of these two narcissistic constellations the parent then 
serves the dual function of “mirroring” the child’s need for admiration and 
approval (facilitating the establishment of the grandiose self) and being available 
as an object of idealization (facilitating the formation of the idealized parental 
imago).  The developmental line of the grandiose self was thought of as a source 
of the ego’s ambitions and as contributing to establishment of ego structure and 
functions.   Normatively the idealization of the parental imago combined with the 
gradual disappointments by the parent would lead to the internalization of this 
structure and the subsequent idealization of the superego and ego ideal. 
His writings and case illustrations emphasize the use of others (as self-
objects) to perform mental regulating functions that the person is not equipped to 
perform for himself.  In his theory, during early development and throughout life, 
self-objects function not as independent subjects for people, but as part of the 
individual’s self.  Early in one’s life, self-object needs that are intense and 
absolute must be satisfied to facilitate self-cohesion and the development of the 
child’s own self-regulatory mechanisms.  Eventually, in proper development, the 
person becomes able to regulate self-esteem instead of exclusively requiring the 
help of others.  For Kohut, the character of some of these early self-object needs 
are revealed in the course of spontaneously developing transference 
relationships with patients in analytic treatment.  His clinical experience led him 
to identify three major transference constellations: the mirror transference, 
idealizing transference, and the twinship/alter-ego transference.  The mirror 
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transference involves the reawakening of patient’s childhood needs for a “source 
of accepting-confirming ‘mirroring,’” the idealizing transference refers to “a need 
for merger with a source of ‘idealized’ strength and calmness,” and the 
twinship/alter-ego transference is one in which the patient yearns for similarity 
and kinship in a way that “will confirm their belonging to the human community 
from which they have remained alienated” (Kohut and Wolf, 1978; Ornstein, 
1998).  These transference relationships serve as ways for the self to preserve 
its original narcissism as well as to restore the image of destroyed parental 
omnipotence.    
Despite one’s reliance on some forms of self-object relationships throughout 
life, Kohut did propose that healthy psychological functioning required mature 
romantic love as necessarily one of its goals (1984).  Moreover, in his last 
writings it seemed clear that he assigned a general importance to the role that 
love can have in bolstering the self and maintaining self-cohesion.   While he did 
envision the individual as having a psychological developmental task to mature 
away from the exclusive reliance on self-objects, he also argues that self-objects 
are not to be completely outgrown.  As one review of Kohut’s work put it: 
 
In adulthood, the spouse, friends, and careers may be self-objects.  In 
addition to broadening who or what may serve as self-objects, the 
healthy individual develops reliable consistent, and endopsychic 
structures which assume many of the functions that were previously 
required of external self-objects.  The person becomes more internally 
 154
competent, less externally needy, and more flexible in meeting 
remaining self-object needs.  (Baker & Baker, 1987) 
 
Thus for Kohut, it is fundamentally human to continue to need self-objects 
throughout life, as the quality of these relationships move from being 
characterized by archaic demands to “empathic resonance” (Kohut, 1984).  Even 
earlier in his writings, Kohut viewed even “healthy” love relationships as self-
object ones: “I have no hesitation in claiming that there is no mature love in which 
the love is not also a self-object.  Or to put this depth-psychological formulation 
into a psychosocial context: there is no love relationship without mutual (self-
esteem enhancing) mirroring and idealization” (1977, p. 122).  So then a normal 
love relationship in adulthood may inherently be specific kind of object 
relationship within which one would be able to decipher traces of one’s earliest 
unmet fundamental needs or grandiosity, idealization and connectedness (in 
Kohut’s scheme).   He understood the idealization that occurs in love 
relationships as being one in which the individual fantasizes about an ideal love 
object that unconsciously would serve to correct developmental tasks left 
incomplete since childhood.  One can see the theme here being one of mature 
love not only being regressive, but also corrective in relation to the early 
caregiver-child relationship.   
Jacob Arlow contributed significantly to psychoanalytic thinking, specifically in 
the areas of perceiving reality (1969a, 1969b, 1996), issues around technique 
(1977, 1987) and metapsychology (1975, 1982).  I will discuss his work here on 
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the role of unconscious fantasy in romantic relations.  Arlow wrote that 
unconscious fantasy is a “constant feature of mental life” that accompanies 
conscious experience (1969a).  He made a strong case for understanding the 
role of ego functions in relation to fantasy, particularly focusing on defensive 
processes.  He thought it fundamental that a psychoanalytic treatment focuses 
on facilitating the patient’s ability to distinguish fantasy from reality.  In other 
writings, Arlow’s understanding of how unconscious fantasy intermingles with the 
perception of reality led him to cast doubt on the reliability of memory (1969b): 
 
What we think was real, or what we think really happened, is a 
combination or intermingling of fantasy with perception of reality.  When 
memory or perception offer material which is in consonance with fantasy 
thinking, the data are selectively perceived and the memories are 
selectively recalled and used as material to serve as vehicle for the 
unconscious fantasy. 
 
For Arlow, fantasy mechanisms were not inherently problematic or exclusively 
defensive, but rather were universal on both conscious (which has a quasi-visual 
nature) and unconscious levels.  His works elaborated the complex relationship 
between unconscious wishes, ego defenses, compromise formation, multiple 
function, and perceptive abilities.   
     In “Object concept and object choice” (1980) Arlow attempted to clear up 
many of confusions in the field regarding the use of the concept of an “object.”  
As is the case with many terms in the psychoanalytic literature, he pointed to the 
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divergent meanings that the concept of an object had when being used by 
differing theorists.  He reminded readers of the initial usage of object by Freud 
and its development through the decades following its original conception.  To 
Arlow, what was not to be lost was that as originally defined, the object is a 
mental representation that “grows out of a mnemic image, a recollected set of 
sensory impressions accompanied by a pleasurable feeling tone which, 
according to the dominant pleasure principle, one wishfully attempts to 
reconstitute as a sensory impression.”  In early development, an object may be a 
part of one’s anatomy or even an inanimate object felt to be part of the child, and 
later it can represent another person or an inanimate object considered separate 
from the self.  Arlow emphasized that, according to libido theory, an object is a 
mental representation of something cathected in a process of instinctual 
discharge.   
He highlighted the confusion around discussing part or whole objects by 
bringing the discussion to the level of unconscious fantasy.  For Arlow, it was “the 
type of unconscious fantasy” that determines how a part of a body or a whole 
person is regarded.  More important than understanding whether an individual 
relates to an other as a part or whole object is the nature of one’s unconscious 
fantasy.  As he said: “in such fantasies the mental representation of a breast may 
be foisted upon the image of a real external person or, conversely, one’s whole 
body in an unconscious fantasy may be conceived as a representation of one’s 
own or someone else’s penis, breast or feces.”   By appreciating that objects are 
confined to the realm of inner psychic reality, Arlow pinpointed the tendency to 
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confuse discussions of one’s object relations with that of an individual’s 
interpersonal relations.  Not identical, one’s quality of forming objects is shaped 
by unconscious fantasy, which then affects a person’s ability to relate to others 
(i.e. interpersonal functioning).  Psychoanalytically, objects are not people, and 
Arlow demonstrated this by describing the occurrence of transference in which 
“the person in the real world is confused with a mental representation of a 
childhood object, a mental representation of what once was either a person or a 
thing.”  He argued that it is not wise to infer directly from observations of one’s 
interpersonal interactions about one’s object relations.  As with the example of 
early caregiving history, it is how one manages, remembers, draws on and 
defends against his experiences with objects that influences future development.  
He maintained that this issue of objects versus persons is not one of semantics, 
and rather is crucial to how one views development, pathology and love.   
For Arlow, object seeking and choice involved the earliest infantile memory 
traces of pleasurable or painful sensations connected to an external person.  As 
cognition develops, the child is eventually able to fuse “seemingly disparate 
mental representations of objects having identical sensory impression” and relate 
this to a person.    However, Arlow did not reduce patterns of romantic love to a 
universal wished-for regression to infantile times of symbiotic fusion.  He also 
cautioned against views of loving that privilege and idealized the role of “mature” 
object relations in romantic love.  He instead made a case of the divergent 
patterns individuals may take in the course of seeking out and attaining love, 
citing that all romantic love involves aspects of both primitive and mature object 
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relations.  Drawing on his analytic experience, he accented the influence of one’s 
unique person history and sets of unconscious fantasies on whom and how one 
is able to love.  The nature of love, then, involves the interplay of “identification, 
defense, object relations, and instinctual gratification” both in the context of the 
person’s history and their present.  The past as well as the present affects object 
relations as the individual interacts and adapts to his given environment.   He 
stated: 
Love relations integrate complex needs of individuals who come together in 
keeping with conditions operative at various phases of their lives.  These 
needs may change in time for many reasons, altering the relationships 
between the partners, and this is what leads to instability or rupture of the 
relationship or to the search for a new love.  In finding a new object, the 
individual may or may not repeat the old pattern.  To a large extent what 
happens is determined by the nature of the unconscious conflict which the 
individual is trying to resolve at that particular time of life.   (1980) 
 
Arlow elevated the individual’s unique path to love in this paper.  Cautioning 
against generalizations about optimal forms and patterns of romantic love, he 
disputed models of loving, like those involving an idealization of the loved object, 
that suggest one standard form.  Instead he espoused a view of psychoanalytic 
inquiry that respects divergent histories, routes and possible cultural influences 
regarding how one loves.   
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Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel has understood one’s relation to a loved other in 
terms of its intrapsychic correlation to the ego’s relation to its ego ideal.  For her, 
the ego ideal is less a model the individual tries to emulate but a temporal 
representative of a lost narcissistic time when the ego was its own ideal (1985).  
She attributed an origin to the ego ideal that is linked to primary narcissism, and 
thus is independent from and prior to the formation of the superego from Oedipus 
complex.  One’s ideal can take many ephemeral forms, but these are secondary 
in nature to the fact that one’s ideal represents one’s lost narcissism that is 
forever missing to the individual both in terms of time and space.  The search for 
the ego ideal is ultimately futile, as it is less of a thing to be possessed or a time 
regained, but more a spatial-temporal amount to be reduced.  Through the 
mechanism of idealization the person embellishes some object (or instinct, in 
regards to perversions) with exalted attributes that are not inherently of its nature 
in hopes of bringing oneself closer in relation to one’s own ideal.   
In regards to normal love relations, Chasseguet-Smirgel used Freud’s 
thinking of love involving the projection of the ego ideal onto the object as a 
starting point to offer her model.  Instead of the lover’s ego being depleted in the 
instance of loving the other, the very act of loving itself exalts the lover, no matter 
what the response of the intended is.  She wrote: “It seems to me that in love—
from, indeed, the very first instants, from the moment of choice—subject and 
object represent the objectivization of the relationship between the ego (the 
subject) and the ego ideal (the object)” (1985, p. 55).  It is then through the very 
anticipation of bringing oneself closer to one’s ego ideal (as symbolized by the 
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future relationship with the other) that the individual experiences the joy of ego 
expansion.  Understood this way, the decrease in self-esteem that is concurrent 
with the other being invested with heightened idealized properties may be more 
reflective of reactivated unconscious Oedipal insecurities and guilt.    
For Chasseguet-Smirgel, in the process of romantic love, we can see the 
internal dynamics of the mind externalized in the interplay between lover and 
beloved.  Like Freud thought, the loved other stands in for the ego ideal.  Her 
thinking is contrary to Freud’s in cases of normal love when the subject’s ego is 
not consumed in an all-encompassing sort of way.   She wrote that in this 
merging of the ego with one’s ego ideal “it is indeed the radiance of the object (of 
the ego ideal) that falls on the ego” (p. 55).  There is a difference between an 
immature kind of romantic love that seeks to project one’s ego ideal onto the 
other only in hopes of merging regressively in a primary narcissistic fusion.  It is 
only in pathological cases that loving diminishes the subject’s ego.  In mature 
forms of loving, the longing for one’s ego ideal in the form of the beloved must 
take into account the psycho-sexual developmental gains of post puberty sensual 
desires.   
According to Chasseguet-Smirgel, in mature loving the individual’s narcissism 
must seek reunion with the sexual instincts in the pursuit of the love object.  All 
forms of genital love must bear the imprint of Oedipal times, and the wounds of 
disappointment.  Importantly, post-puberty, the individual resolves to find a love 
object that is reminiscent of both primary object and Oedipal object.  
Chasseguet-Smirgel followed Freud in acknowledging the futility involved in 
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attempting to satisfy one’s unconscious wishes and instincts in relationship with 
one’s love object.  For no matter what level of happiness is reached and can 
endure in a love relationship, “the oedipal injury will not be removed . . . any more 
than the gap between ego and ideal will be filled” (p. 70).  There is an 
acceptance of the uncrossable gap that exists between one’s wishes and 
satisfactions, and includes as illustrative of this the distance between ego and its 
ideal, synthesis of instincts, and complete attainment of its pre or post oedipal 
primary object.  However, still compelled to reach these unreachable destinations 
and accepting fleeting contentment as reward, people are to some degree 
unconsciously governed by a certain level of illusion in their day-to-day pursuits.   
Chasseguet-Smirgel envisioned an ego ideal that is sought after in love 
relationships with a tolerance of an imperfect solution.  By the time of adulthood, 
the individual should have then sufficiently adapted the mental capacities to allow 
the pursuit of the ideal in love to give way to reality considerations.   As she 
summarized: the attempt to rediscover the primary sense of “at-oneness” will not 
be dependent on incestuous unconscious fantasy, sexual satisfaction will 
strengthen the ego and by this diminishes the ego ideal, “the partner will be loved 
with his or her limitations and vulnerabilities and not for an illusory perfection,” 
and attachment to the new love object will provide the main way of gratifying 
primitive wishes linked to the pre-oedipal and oedipal object of memory (pp. 72-
73).  Thus in mature forms of love, idealization and the projection of one’s ego 
ideal are toned down as reality considerations guide one’s relationships with 
others and attempts to enhance oneself by way of the other.      
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Otto Kernberg, writing from an object-relations perspective, heavily influenced 
Melanie Klein and American ego psychology, has proposed a view of mature 
sexual love (1974, 1995).  He described it as a complex emotional disposition 
that integrates: 
 
1) Sexual excitement transformed into erotic desire for another person 
2) Tenderness that derives from the integration of libidinally and aggressively 
invested self and object representations, with a predominance of love over 
aggression and tolerance of the normal ambivalence that characterizes all 
human relations 
3) An identification with the other that includes both a reciprocal genital 
identification and deep empathy with the other’s gender identity 
4) A mature form of idealization along with deep commitment to the other and 
to the relationship 
5) The passionate character of the love relation in all three aspects: the 
sexual relationship, the object relationship and the superego investment of 
the couple                 (1974) 
 
Kernberg has accentuated the enduring presence of unconscious fantasies of an 
Oedipal nature within a couple’s relationship (1976).  These fantasies feature the 
individual experiencing himself as part of two concurrent triangles.  One is a 
recapitulation of his childhood Oedipal dynamics with mother and father, and the 
other is a vengeful recast of this.  In this scheme, the fantasy of Oedipal defeat is 
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at the root of the fears (and the fantasies) of the death one’s self and one’s 
partner, and the abandonment by one’s lover.  Interestingly, the reactivation of 
Oedipal fantasies within one’s current love relation may heighten passion and 
excitement due to intrapsychic sources of danger.  Often this danger is related to 
both the feared attack of or aggression towards one’s fantasized Oedipal rival.  
Though there is a spectrum on which triangulation fantasies may occur (from 
more pathological to more healthy), for Kernberg they are ubiquitous in romantic 
relationships and indicative of the centrality of managing aggression within the 
couple.   
Also universal to normal love relations is the capacity to link idealization with 
erotic desire on the road to the establishment of an intimate relationship with a 
romantic partner filled of depth.  Kernberg wrote about the essential idealization 
of one’s partner’s anatomy or surface of the body in erotic desire:  
 
I am suggesting that in both genders, and despite the differences related to 
the different history of their sexual development, idealization of body surfaces, 
a central aspect of erotic desire, is a function of the availability of primitive 
internalized object relations.  And the personal history of a love relation 
becomes symbolically inscribed in aspects of the loved object’s anatomy. 
(1995, p. 27)   
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In support of this idea, he cited the work of Meltzer and Williams (1988) on the 
infant’s idealization of the mother’s body and the infant’s internalization of the 
mother’s reciprocating idealization of her baby.  They linked this to the 
development of one’s earliest sense of aesthetic vale and beauty.  The infant’s 
idealization of the mother’s body is also a defense against the aggression feared 
to be coming from the mother.  Under the sway of primitive splitting, it also 
serves to protect sexual attitudes towards the mother from being overcome by 
the child’s inherent aggression.   
Later, idealization helps the child navigate through the Oedipal crisis and 
even serves to help separate the affectionate and sexual current during latency 
by enforcing the prohibition against sensual longing for the idealized Oedipal 
object.  It is as if the use of idealization in early development serves as a model 
for integrating sexual and tender feelings in mature romantic relationships.  
Modifying Chasseguet-Smirgel’s work, Kernberg wrote that in romantic love 
relations “it is not the ego ideal that is projected but ideals that stem from 
structural developments within the superego (including the ego ideal)” (p. 39).  
He also pointed out that these projected ideals must correspond to a fully 
differentiated and integrated ego and superego structures.  Throughout 
Kernberg’s theorizing on love, one finds the link between romantic love, the 
superego, society and morality concerns.   
The beloved is idealized for values, which are first perceived through a 
process of identification.  What the lover identifies with is mainly a projected 
sense of his own ego ideal.  The attachment to the love object includes an 
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attachment to this part of the self, invested in the other.  This unconscious ego 
ideal is reflective of the intersection of the individual’s own goals and the 
internalized principles of the culture that the person accepts.  The other is 
idealized as being symbolic of these cherished ideals; in other words “the coming 
alive in external reality of a desirable, profoundly longed-for ideal” (p. 98).  Thus 
the love relationship transcends itself in referring to the dominant modes of 
morality and ethics in society.  Through idealization and fantasy the boundaries 
between self and other are loosened on an unconscious level that contributes to 
the experience of self-loss and the ecstatic quality of being on love. 
For Kernberg, successful romantic relationships must use idealization in ways 
that facilitate growth, commitment and depth.  The joint idealization of each other 
and of the couple as a unit indicates the ascendance of superego functions that 
ensures a level of protection against infantile regression and the capacity for 
mutual concern and care: “the importance of this joint superego structure resides 
in its implicit function as a “court of appeal,” a kind of last resort when one partner 
has inflicted a grave lesion in their jointly established value system” (pp. 98-99).  
The projection of one’s ego ideal onto one’s partner and the shared unconscious 
idea of themselves involved in a dyadic ego ideal implies a standard that each 
must live up to and a promise of the commitment to live up to such principles.  
Transgression against such implicit values then is experienced as a signal 
danger to the couple’s stability. 
Idealization is also important to the emotion of gratitude that is experienced 
within a romantic couple.  Continuing a note first sung by Klein (1957), Kernberg 
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has described that guilt not only reinforces gratitude but it increases idealization.  
Specifically, the mature superego of the individual and the couple is capable of 
stimulating idealization processes as a reaction formation against guilt.  
However, as Kernberg has drawn from Dicks’ work (1967), this type of 
idealization that results in gratitude also runs in contrast to further tasks involved 
in the maintenance of a romantic relationship.  The reemerging adolescent task 
of the couple to integrate eroticism and tenderness usually is accompanied by 
formerly dissociated past internalized object relations.  These conflicts (some 
oedipal in nature) not only present a challenge to the developing couple’s 
stability, but also bring an end to the reliance on idealization to stimulate 
gratitude and care, as the capacity for forgiveness becomes more important. 
Kernberg extended his work to realm of psychopathological love relations.  In 
his thinking, dysfunction in romantic couples can also be linked to difficulties 
regarding idealization.  Central to this psychoanalytic model of object relations 
and their role in pathology is his emphasis on the importance of integrating good 
and bad object representations of the other in relation to the self.  The radical 
splitting of all-good and all-bad internalized object relations indicates a person’s 
reliance on primitive idealization as a defense mechanism.  This quality of 
idealization does not facilitate mutuality within the relationship and is vulnerable 
to the normal conflict and aggression is inherent in loving relations.   
As mentioned above unhealthy forms of idealization can be operative in many 
forms of couple dysfunction.  In the case where one member of the couple has 
narcissistic pathology there is a danger of idealization being restricted to the 
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physical and sexual realm, prohibiting a fuller idealization of the partner as a 
whole person.  For the narcissist, this shaky form of intense idealization may be 
quickly followed by a severe denigration of the other for not living up to one’s 
fantasized ideal.  Gratitude and concern do not develop in these cases, and the 
love object becomes viewed as a conquest.  To understand the root of 
relationship problems, Kernberg has theorized about the unconscious fantasies 
are underlying many forms of romantic difficulties.   He cited the work of Anzieu 
(1989) on the “skin” of a couple’s relationship, referring to the demand for 
complete intimacy and continuity between both partners.  Such phenomena may 
signify the existence of the unconscious fantasy to choose a love object that can 
be used to complete oneself either homosexually or heterosexually.  
Equally important are the unconscious fantasies that accompany triangulation 
patterns.  Direct triangulation occurs when one or both members of the couple 
unconsciously fantasize about an idealized excluded third person that is of the 
same sex as the subject.  This essentially repeats the Oedipal configuration and 
ushers in feelings of insecurity in the relationship.  These fantasies occur during 
sexual intercourse quite often in the context of masochistic pathology.   Reverse 
triangulations also repeat Oedipal dynamics but in this case the fantasized third 
party takes the form of an idealized person of the same gender as the subject’s 
partner.  Here, the unconscious fantasies involves repairing the Oedipal wound 
by situating oneself as the sought after object.  Triangulation fantasies, for 
Kernberg, are on the one hand universal enough that he even proposed, “there 
are potentially, in fantasy, always six persons in bed together: the couple, their 
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respective unconscious oedipal rivals, and their respective unconscious oedipal 
ideals” (1995, p. 88).  However, they can also be destructive when there is either 
the conscious or unconscious collusion by the dyad to recruit this third party in 
reality.  These relationships become rife with jealousy and insecurity and 
eventually may lead to “desperate efforts to destroy or devalue the partner who 
has become totally identified with the oedipal parental image” (1988, p. 74).          
Rather than staying on the conscious level of experience and stated worries 
and needs in relationships, Kernberg’s work operates in a way that expands 
one’s critical lens.  By investigating a range of unconscious fantasies and 
patterns, Kernberg not only grants fantasy a level of primacy that is needed to 
understand complex intimate relations, but he also paints a picture of the mutual 
interaction that takes place on this plain of functioning.  His model of love 
relations is one that involves the delicate tension between what one consciously 
and unconsciously dreads and desires and the delicate interplay between two 
people’s conflicting and complementary ideals, identifications and histories. 
Ethel Person has written extensively on the subject of romantic love and its 
fantasy components (1988, 1991, 1995).  She has challenged biases in 
academic and popular culture that implicitly or explicitly privileged the exclusive 
role of reason in one’s life.  Rather than taking the side of irrationality, she has 
argued that fantasy and imagination dominates and shapes human life just as 
much as our reasoning capabilities.  Though one’s fantasy life may not be out in 
public display, she has understood it to be omnipresent in mental life.   Although 
there is a degree to which one appreciates and indulges one’s fantasy life, there 
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is a built in opacity that an individual will not be able to fully penetrate.  Whether 
obscured by the inconsistencies of consciousness or the force of repression, our 
fantasies and their meanings are rarely as transparent as they seem.  They have 
an ability to frighten and excite us to an extent that is often outside of awareness.  
Person’s work helps in understanding their function and how they directly may 
influence our interpersonal relations.  Specifically, it is clear to Person that 
conscious and unconscious fantasies play an integral role in close love 
relationships, whether on the cultural or individual level.   
In By Force of Fantasy (1995) she described that the surface content of a 
fantasy is “always a compromise between wishes and the prohibitions against 
them” and to get at their meaning they must be translated back into our native 
“language of desire.”  The unadulterated form of fantasies, mixing images and 
memories from different levels of the mind, are often too anxiety provoking partly 
because they are governed by the unfamiliar logic confined to our unconscious 
system.  In Person’s view, they act to provide pleasure, safety or control via 
covert means.  Since often what we desire may have a distressing component, 
fantasy must work in a way that deceives our mind: “it acts to prevent one part of 
the self from knowing what another part wants.  Through disguises one fools the 
repressive part of the personality into overlooking the hungry, desiring part” 
(p.17).  Because of these innate mechanisms of protective self-deception, 
Person described how so much of fantasy remains unrealized but operative in 
the unconscious.  Due to the nature of the unconscious, its contents may only be 
glimpsed in bits and cannot be directly observed.   However, since our earliest 
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and most powerful memories, experiences and sensations shape our 
unconscious fantasies, they in turn profoundly exert influence throughout our 
lives, in a way that our conscious fantasies can only hint at.  Person offered a 
definition conscious fantasy: 
 
It is a daydream that surfaces in the stream of consciousness, a narrative 
compounded of emotion, thought, internal dialogue, and (predominantly 
visual) sensory impressions.  Sometimes highly schematic and abbreviated, 
sometimes minutely articulated and detailed, it is shaped by the imagination 
to coalesce ultimately around wish-fulfillment, emotional regulation, 
assurance of safety, containment of unpleasant emotions, working through of 
trauma, crystallization of perception, or aspirations for the future.  The goal of 
fantasy is to achieve an overall change in state—a change in how one feels.  
(p. 38) 
 
Waking fantasies draw on our memories, unconscious wishes and feelings, and 
our current life situations, wants, displeasures and conflicts.  According to 
Person, fantasies can take on a pleasurable or dysphoric quality, can be fleeting 
or repeating, be substitutive or preparatory, and have content related to securing 
self-esteem and narcissistic gratification.       
She also explored the function and origin of sexual fantasies, which are 
commonly discussed in relation to romantic love relationships.  Person has used 
the term sexprint to refer to the “specific sexual fantasies we invoke as a means 
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to arousal in masturbation and often as an ancillary or obligatory aid to 
intercourse and other kinds of interpersonal sex” (p. 75).  Our sexprint is a 
condensation of our historical information, fantasies and desires.  The specific 
repeating erotic fantasy of our adult lives, a retread of early childhood 
masturbatory sources, crystallizes into a final form by adolescence (Laufer, 
1976).  Sexual fantasies are fed by the totality of all of an individual’s 
developmental experiences, incorporating the earliest experiences of erotic and 
sensual life.  While individual characteristics may contribute to our central erotic 
fantasy, what is of dominating importance is how one comes to resolve the 
Oedipal crisis.  I will return to this subject shortly.  In short, because of their ability 
to draw on an individual’s first moments of life, sexual fantasies have an ability to 
represent a diverse set of wishes and serve various functions (from management 
of anxiety to restoring self-esteem).  Once ideas of sublimation are considered, 
one can also understand how sexual fantasies are able to influence seemingly 
nonsexual parts of the personality.     
Person’s approach fantasy demonstrates a psychoanalytic method of 
unpacking multiple levels of human experience and relationships.  Historically 
Person places our current conception of romantic love within the Western culture 
dating back to eleventh-century Provence.  With an appreciation of the equal 
contributions of the cultural and personal unconscious, she defined romantic 
love: “Not a primary affect, then, but a powerful compound passion in which 
emotions and thoughts are intertwined, romantic love is an act of the imagination, 
a creative synthesis in which many diverse fantasies, wishes, feelings and 
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impulses crystallize to focus on one person alone, the idealized beloved” (1995, 
p. 209).  She has distinguished passionate romantic love (which is her focus) 
from its strictly carnal form or attachment-driven affectionate bonding cousin.   
She has described love on the phenomenological level as experienced by 
lovers (1988).  Consciously, lovers, at first, feel swept away as they are 
obsessively consumed with thoughts of the loved object.  There is a uniqueness 
that is felt about the other, the lover himself, and their relationship.  The lovers 
experience a certain kind of timelessness as both seek to transcend realities and 
boundaries in their union with the other.  Often, one feels vulnerable as the 
dangers involved in depending on and exposing oneself to the other are realized.  
If romantic love progresses, an eventual mutuality brings the reciprocated urge 
both lovers feel to please the other and have their love felt.  Each tries to validate 
the other, but also a new creation that is born as the couple more fully identify as 
a joint entity, a “we.”  The excitement, happiness and urgency that lovers feel are 
also accompanied by what can be never-felt-before conscious desires for merger 
and transcendence.   
For Person, imagination and reality are not contrary but play out a divine 
tension in the course of romantic love.  At romantic love’s core “is the lover’s 
idealization of an yearning for an Other, as revealed through the urgency to be 
with the beloved” (1991).  Since its aim is to quench the need for an idealized 
other by way of union, in one way it is both driven by idealization and seeks its 
end.  Its birthplace is early childhood, and in its present form it harkens back to 
archaic wishes of a perfect and unceasing love and devotion from one’s mother.  
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Happiness is not love’s goal, but rather the idealized other whose function is to 
restore and maintain one’s perfect self-esteem.  Love is fundamentally object-
related, as it is through the other that the lover hopes to gain that sense of 
perfection never realized since infancy.  Thus, for Person, love is backwards 
seeking in its unconscious attempt to repair the narcissistic wounds incurred 
throughout normal development.  However, romantic love is equally forward 
seeking in its unconscious hope for function to deliver the lover to a state of 
permanent bliss.   
Inclined to look beyond the surface of reported experience and feelings, 
Person has tried to understand the underlying mechanisms and first causes of 
love.  As she writes, romantic love is simultaneously experienced on multiple 
conscious and unconscious levels (1988).  Presently occurring, it seeks to bring 
what was into what is now, to ensure what will be.  She praises Freud for 
recognizing the continuities of the human emotional life, and how our most 
intimate adult relationship must be an expression of our most intimate first 
relationship: “it was his genius to understand that all the lover’s unfulfilled 
yearnings, dating from earliest life, are carried over to the beloved, who is, by 
virtue of this transference, experienced as the source of all good—hence the 
enormous importance of the beloved for the lover” (1991).  Person strongly 
argues that mutual passionate romantic love’s aim is transcendent union with the 
other, and its tools are fantasy and imagination.  She distinguishes the blurry 
lines that separate romantic love from the short-lived passion of sexual carnality, 
the reliable safety and warmth of affectionate bonding, the one-sided self-
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aggrandizement of vanity love, the conventionality and sympathy of mannered 
love, and the dependency-fuelled neediness of neurotic love.   
Person looked to Freud to account for the urgency and priority given to 
romantic love.  Following his work on narcissism (1914), and the subsequent 
contributions of Reik (1944) and Chasseguet-Smirgel (1984, 1985), she cited 
narcissistic restitution and its component of idealization as a primary nonsexual 
source of our sense of love’s emergency.  Using Chasseguet-Smirgel’s 
reinterpretation of oedipal dynamics in light of the ego ideal, Person has written 
that in romantic love: “the ego ideal finally achieves satisfaction through the 
granting of the incestuous wish (itself the product of a wish for narcissistic unity) 
by way of union with the beloved (a displacement of the original incestuous 
object)” (1991).  Then working both on a conscious and an unconscious level, 
romantic love serves as a way to make things right, reversing disappointments, 
and gratifying wishes that have been experienced throughout the lifespan.   
Along one specific line, what romantic love allows is the fulfillment of the 
wished-for Oedipal victory to be realized in fantasy.  The consummation of a 
romantic love relation can be experienced in fantasy as the reversal of the 
Oedipal humiliation, as the lover now is able to fully identify with the parental 
childhood rival and victor.  While oedipal fulfillment is not the ultimate goal in 
normal love relations, Person is definite that romantic love must truly tap into the 
individual’s earliest yearnings and infantile cravings though on an unconscious 
level: “for only when love’s humble origins are obscured from consciousness by 
that mysterious creative process that makes the very old seem entirely new, can 
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one overcome the old taboos and give in to love’s power” (1988, p. 113).  In the 
loved object, the lover identifies with “his best self,” but within the present 
romantic couple he simultaneously identifies with his re-working of his role in two 
additional dyads—the mother-child and the parental.  Thus as she will also show 
in her thinking about the mutuality in love, there is an inherent role-shifting that 
each lover take in the romantic dyad.  It is through a new romantic love relation 
that the lover is able to unconsciously rework, make sense of and enact 
understandings of the earliest forms of love he has experienced, has been 
excluded from and has wished for.  
In the love relationship, the lover imagines that his wishes will be gratified and 
he will be delivered to a place of fulfillment.  Person’s writings, like Balint’s, stress 
the importance of a reciprocal identificatory process within loving couples.  Just 
as the lover believes he will be gratified, so too does he wish to gratify his 
partner.  She roots this in the origins of the sought-after bliss of the mother-infant 
experience.  The lover’s image of the beloved draws on an internalized 
representation of the actual or imagined “good” mother.  Such an identification 
with an internalized image of a bountiful good mother figure insures that the 
capacity and desire to take an active, and not just a passive role in love.   
Importantly, while this image of “the good mother” may be one of only fantasy, it 
is nonetheless operative in the unconscious.  In fact the image of such a figure 
may be stronger because of its imaginary nature—the lover will more intensely 
seek to find what has always evaded him.  Once found, both lovers will seek to 
sustain such a relation.  In this mutuality of love there is a cyclical dynamic with 
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both partners wishing to ensure their own gratification and fulfillment by gratifying 
and fulfilling the other. 
Aside from the fantasies of merger based on past infantile prototypes, wishes 
for narcissistic restitution, and loving reciprocity what is also inherent to Person’s 
view of romantic love are its forward-seeking creative elements.  Romantic 
passionate love empowers the lover to become a new self in a way that almost 
resembles a new developmental level.  Contained within every merging 
experience in love is the promise of an eventual separation that the lover is 
emboldened to endeavor towards.  In this way, Person links romantic love to 
issues of self’s assertion, power and will: “love propels the lover’s move to new 
commitments, and away from old ones” (1988, p. 131).  Romantic love can be 
seen as recapitulating separation-individuation drama in favor of higher 
organization and differentiation.       
In Person’s broad view of love, it is essentially transformative as it works both 
on the past and in the future through fantasy to restore wounded narcissism and 
retake lost sense of one’s omnipotence.  Though the heightened effects of a new 
love relationship may be fleeting, Person is very clear to underline the lasting 
changes (even structural) that romantic love can initiate.  She articulately 
expressed this in a long passage: 
 
Successful love is not only a re-edition of the past but, often, a permanent 
renunciation of the past ….  Love has the power to break old ties to family 
and friends, alter religious and ethnic affiliation, change social class and 
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political preference, and in the case of those lovers who discover by the way 
of their beloved their life’s work or mission bring new purpose and meaning to 
life.  At the most minimal level love may simply result in an expansion of 
interest; she may discover basketball, he ballet; he may instruct her on the 
intricacies of politics while learning something of the joys of literature from 
her, and new interests may survive the departure of the one who introduced 
them.  But regardless of whether any of the external interests or 
circumstances of one’s life undergo alteration’ love even transient, 
unsuccessful love, can cause profound inner change.   (1991) 
   
Through the other and the mechanisms of fantasy and imagination the individual 
is able to break free of the boundaried constraints and limitations of the self.     
Though the content and structure of the fantasies that guide romantic love 
may change its aim towards transformation and growth do not.  Idealization may 
not be as intense as in the beginning of love, but this does not necessarily mean 
that the other, the couple’s love or new identity as a “we” are radically de-
idealized.   Though particular aspects, qualities and features (even physical) may 
be articulated by the lover as idealized parts of his beloved, what is truly 
idealized is the other as a representative of love’s power.  Enduring passionate 
love though uncommon finds ways to make use of imagination and idealization.  
Just as love serves different functions and can mature into different 
transformations so can its corresponding fantasies in the minds of the lovers it 
hold.     
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In detailing the sustained function of idealization throughout the course of 
romantic love, Person discusses its changing form and role in the breakdown of a 
couple’s relationship.  For her, the capacity for idealization is not only a 
prerequisite for falling in love can be used to fuel passion can be sustained 
beyond the “falling in love period” (1988, p. 185).  She contended that 
idealization comes about equally as a function of the imagination and “authentic 
appraisals and perceptions.”  However the sustained coupling of romantic love’s 
passion and heights of idealization may not be the norm in most relationships.  
Drawing on her clinical experience and popular culture examples from novels 
and film, Person describes the process of de-idealization and the often 
accompanying unraveling of one’s loving feelings. 
Contrary to popular opinion, idealization is not subject to definite diminution as 
reality grips a hold of a person.  Rather it has multiple fates and may be 
“preserved, modulated, diminished or utterly shattered” (1988, p. 187).  She 
opposes static conceptions of idealization that have the lover thinking absolute 
positive thoughts about his lover at all point of the day.  She instead describes 
the ebb and flow of idealization in the most successful of love relationships: 
 
The lover feels waves of hostility towards the beloved, sometimes entirely 
irrational, sometimes in response to the most insignificant of transgressions.  
These usually take the form of fleeting de-idealizations, flashes of negative, 
possibly even degrading feelings and thoughts about the beloved.  In happy 
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love, these thoughts, though momentarily unsettling, are usually quickly 
dismissed.                 (p. 187) 
 
The nature of de-idealizations lies in the very nature of love and the mechanism 
of idealization itself.  According to Person, de-idealization may serve as a form of 
natural defensive protest against the enthrallment and engulfment of love.  
Common to all love relationships, by moments of de-idealization the lover is able 
to reassert his own existence apart form the other in service of balancing reality 
testing, and also is able to express the latent aggression in all intimate 
relationships.   
Idealization is based in fantasy and the imaginative capacities of the 
individual.  One’s idealization of one’s partner may only go as far as his 
imagination will carry him.  Person explains that it is because of this that the 
substance of a person’s idealizing is very specific to the person and his 
personality organization.  For those that can be generally described as neurotic, 
idealization is usually notably exaggerated in the beginning of a relationship, thus 
leaving it subject to rapid decline by the slightest provocations.  The ambivalence 
that is underlying this pattern of oscillating affections can be linked to anger 
towards earlier love objects or to a shakiness of narcissism that is invested in the 
other.  Somewhat related to this latter point is the common scenario of one’s own 
self-devaluation influencing both his choice of a love object and in his 
subsequent denigration of lovers who must be truly deficient if their own right to 
chance their love on him.  Those of a narcissistic type may have also established 
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weak idealizations in the beginning of relationships that are telling of their 
underlying narcissistic motivations in the sphere of love.  For these individuals, 
idealization is sure to be extremely vulnerable to any frustration to the lover’s 
ability to feel admired, sustained and nurtured within the relationship.  
On the other side of the more pathological circumstances, Person appreciates 
the “real changes” that may occur in ones life that would render partners who 
were formerly targets of idealization less worthy of such exaggerated splendor.  
She offers examples of developmental changes in young adults who see their 
lovers differently as they mature in age and change in values, over-arching 
cultural changes such as the women’s movement, or even increased a person’s 
insight (achieved perhaps though therapy or psychoanalysis) that results in an 
ability to see through the motives of past idealizations.  Other “real life” influences 
on the stability of the couple’s status as an idealized “we” unit are cases of 
illness, changes in the social regard of the couple, having children, economic 
stress, and unequal or incompatible professional development.  Again, these 
factors are not seen as ushering in idealization’s or love’s doom, but rather 
having some effect on the course of these matters.        
Returning to a topic that was discussed in regards to Kernberg, Person has 
also written on the role of fantasy and triangulation patterns in love relationships.  
Though with relatively the same structure of Kernberg in describing the forms of 
direct and reverse triangulations, she added a different perspective that is 
important.  The rivalrous triangle recasts Oedipal elements and is accompanied 
by feelings of jealousy, anger and even increased intensity of overall affect 
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charge within the relationship.  Person described that what may be a rivalrous 
triangle for one party is experienced by the other partner as a split-object one at 
the same time.  The primary feeling here may be guilt as the latter party feels 
torn between two love objects.  Often this split-object triangle, with the subject 
being the recipient of the affection of two people, may have a motivated purpose 
and then can be considered the reverse triangle that Kernberg described.  Again, 
here the underlying dynamic is to undo the humiliation of the Oedipal defeat and 
enact revenge on two other parties in the present.     
Person described how rivalrous triangles originate in fantasy and take the 
form of obsessive preoccupation with the rival and the relationship one finds 
oneself excluded from.  Here one can see primal scene residues that are often at 
the core of sexual conflicts.  This serves as a reminder that one’s sexual life is 
often shaped by these unresolved primal scene fantasies from early life, in which 
the child feels excluded from parental sex that is imagined to be occurring behind 
closed doors.  Anxiety and sadness are experienced, though anger is sometimes 
quickly recruited to defend against such feelings.  Jealousy and envy follow, with 
the betrayed wishing for some retaliation usually on the rival.  Person, however, 
also warned that hostility may not only be directed towards one’s rival, and may 
also be experienced towards the object of one’s affection.  These triangles then 
are hardly ever what they appear to be.  She described that even when victory is 
achieved and Oedipal honor reclaimed, the exhilaration of feeling may be short-
lived.  Specifically when Oedipal conflicts are persistent in adults, rivalrous 
triangulations may be frequent, with victory resulting in self-defeating or self-
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destructive behavior due to unconscious guilt.  Rivalrous triangles may also 
serve an unconscious purpose to stave off forbidden impulses.  One’s attraction 
and affection gets directed towards a safe unavailable object, thus protecting the 
lover from actually entering into a passionate love affair, which can be feared to 
be overwhelming.   
Person also explored the underlying motivations and fantasies of split-object 
triangles.  Here, both in fantasy and reality, the lover splits affections between 
two relationships.  Usually found in the form of adulterous extra-marital affairs, 
the new affair is sought after and idealized while the old relationship is denigrated 
in some form.  Specifically interesting is her description of imaginative split-
triangles, where the monogamous person already in a relationship holds on the 
“belief (sometimes articulated, sometimes not) that they are still deeply in love 
with someone with whom they once shared a great love” (1988, p. 231).  Though 
different in nature most of these split-object triangles reflect a certain degree 
deep ambivalence and self-protected vulnerability on the part of the subject.  In 
regards to reverse triangles, unconscious aggression and anger towards former 
love objects seems to be a motivating factor.   
Drawing on her clinical experience, Person detailed the frequency by which 
men come to therapy with a specific kind of split-object triangle.  In these cases, 
there is a marked absence of guilt and the fantastic transformation of formerly 
beloved wife into demonic “ogre.”  This variant of triangle is different from the 
“Madonna-whore” split, since, here, the once loved is a devouring, demanding, 
all-powerful mother-figure.  To the man’s dismay, even upon breaking free from 
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the tyrannical partner and committing to his mistress, he finds a similar 
transformation taking place.  Despite the awareness of this pattern, the man is 
unable to effect change in his life, ignorant to the underlying psychological need 
“to idealize and ultimately betray his lover.”  She elaborated on this tendency: 
 
Usually, such a person has felt betrayed himself (whether actually or in mere 
fantasy, recently or in early life), identifies with the aggressor, and is prepared 
to disrupt the lives of successive lovers in order to seek reparation for past 
wrongs.  (The original betrayal that later converts the person into a betrayer is 
most often a legacy of childhood.) (1988, p. 232) 
 
The apparent solution of the split-object triangle is usually short lived and 
unfulfilling as the lover often suffers eventual debilitating guilt or dissatisfaction 
that ruins the enjoyment of subsequent love affairs.   
Another unhappy course of love that Person discussed is that of unrequited 
love.  Even Person finds that in this instance imagination oversteps its bounds.  
Always the advocate for the healthy tension between fantasy and reality in the 
course of romantic love, for this misled lover there is too great a proportion of 
one: 
 
The lover distorts reality in order to preserve his dreams.  He infers nuances 
and finds ambiguities, small omissions, or quirks in communication that allow 
him to hold on to the fantasy that mutual love will be restored.  He prolongs 
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his agony by tormenting himself with false hopes.  Even after rejection is 
made explicit, he mishears and misconstrues, inferring promises where none 
were intended.  (1988, p. 300) 
 
For the rejected lover, mourning awaits.  His self-esteem plummets and his 
fantasies are now filled with confirmations of his abject baseness and 
inadequacy.  Imagination may even work to distort memories of the past with 
one’s rejecting partner, turning once prized memories into vacant ash.   
When romantic love has run it course, it ends in a fashion that is a mirror of its 
beginning.  Fantasy runs wild with flourishes of positive and negative thoughts, 
wishes and memories.  The intensity of affect and vulnerability once positively 
experienced with excitement and exalted danger may be replaced by equally 
intense feelings, now of the dysphoric type.  Just as there are hopes as to what 
will be at the outset, there are rueful wonderings of what might have been at the 
close.  The self, once whole, now feels in pieces and exposed.  Though the lover 
may have chosen to end the relationship, he will still mourn such an outcome and 
have doubts about it correctness.  In most cases, love will be mourned and 
nostalgically remembered until the lover is once again able to love again.          
Consistent in Person’s thinking about romantic love is the thought of love as 
progressive and expansive.  Though it may be intermittently filled with and end in 
pain, she ultimately views romantic love as transformative.  It is as if love looks at 
the past only to then be able to leap forward into the future.  One foot in reality, 
love also glides in fantasy.  Though filled with its paradoxes, love serves a kind of 
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individual evolution as it seeks to help the person adapt for better future.  The 
fantasies, identifications, projections and idealizations inherent to romantic love 
relations serve the self in making it better equipped for life. 
Stephen Mitchell’s Can Love Last?: The Fate of Romance Over Time (2002), 
represents a relational view of psychoanalysis.  Written in a way that speaks to 
both those within the field of psychology and the layperson, Mitchell’s last book 
was “about romance and its degradation.”  One of Mitchell’s main premises was 
that despite the irreducible fact that human nature and experience is “in flux” and 
in “perpetual motion and change,” people gravitate towards and preserve 
illusions of safety facilitated through acts of imagination.  He wrote of the human 
tendency towards the predictable and the known, and how this can be seen as 
running antithetically to the novelty and excitement that fuels desire.  Love 
entices by its promise of future security, however love is always changing and 
the equilibrium between desire and love we seek (and fleetingly imaginatively 
attain) is never permanent. 
Romantic relationships, of the long-term kind, then, contain this inherent 
tension between love’s attachment, safety and security concerns, with passion, 
excitement and adventure being on the other side of desire.  However, the 
human capacity for imagination and subjectivity contribute to the fact that danger 
and safety are relative to the position of the person, and thus can each be 
illusory.  Thus to some degree even what are held to be personal certainties are 
illusory.  Romantic love embodies the paradoxical tension of human life that 
Mitchell tried to describe: 
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romance is filled with longing; intense desire always generates a sense of 
deprivation.  The precondition of romantic passion is lack, desire for what one 
does not have.  Yet romantic promise entices us with the security it seems to 
promise: if only the lovers could find each other, be together, live happily ever 
after, then they would be safe and happy.  So it is in the very nature of 
romantic passion to strive to overcome the lack it generates, to seek a 
wholeness that is rent by desire…. (p. 56) 
 
Mitchell’s three dimensions of romantic passion are sexuality, idealization and 
aggression.  Each aspect contributes in its own way to the destabilizing nature of 
love.  In dissecting the implicit realms of romantic love, Mitchell concurrently tried 
to expose the more unconscious levels of human experience, including the fuzzy 
distinction between sameness and otherness.  This fundamental connection 
between sameness and otherness is implicated in an understanding of how 
notions of opposition are rarely as opposing as they seem, specifically within the 
context of romantic love: “much of the futility so prevalent in romance derives 
from the way sameness often masquerades as otherness.  We believe we are 
escaping ourselves, redressing our pasts, but the partners we choose as 
accomplices in these would-be acts of freedom, announcing themselves as 
different and new, are often, in fact, not so different, not so new” (p. 82).  By this, 
Mitchell recapitulated the oldest psychoanalytic challenges to conceptions of 
conscious motivation, and questioned an individual’s ability to understand the 
nature of partner selection completely.   
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In a chapter entitled, “Idealization, fantasy, and illusions,” Mitchell posited that 
sexuality generates the energy that drives romantic passion, and idealization 
provides its directionality in pointing to the object of that desire.  He held that the 
popular notion of idealization, originating with Freud, is of something regressive 
and childlike, and it would follow that if romance is based on idealization then it 
too must be something only meant to be fleeting and built on illusion.  However 
for Mitchell, Freud’s notions of idealization contain his overall Enlightenment view 
of rationality that looks for “objective value,” with the concept denoting a literal 
overvaluation.  Mitchell critiqued what he believes is the logical extension of 
Freud’s theories that imply that “the other person” as someone to be objectively 
and “really” perceived.  Only if this Enlightenment view is held, then must one 
believe that fantasy is negatively valenced and should fade.   
Though Mitchell’s model of romance referred more to falling in love than being 
in love, he emphasized the enduring quality of all of romantic love’s components.  
In this way he interrogated the conventional view that love cannot last over time 
reflects the natural state of affairs.  He instead attributed the erosion of love to 
processes of fear and anger that are born out of the tension one feels in relation 
to the intense insecurity of romance.  Sexuality is at the heart of much of the 
destabilizing nature of romantic love, as it drives one towards the other and to the 
limits of the boundaries of self and other.  Mitchell continued the psychoanalytic 
concentration on the centrality of sexuality in discussing the human personality.  
He described that human sexuality can get coupled with feelings of indecency 
and shame for many reasons, but argued that it fundamentally is defended 
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against because it represents the risk of exposing not one’s basest most carnal 
self, but possibly one’s truest self.  The varieties of ways that long-term love can 
degrade can then be understood as compromises people use in order to protect 
themselves from the more anxiety-provoking unstable aspects of love.   
Not only should the more intense components of love endure, but Mitchell also 
attributed an enduring role to the fantasy.  While consistent with many 
psychoanalytic views (like Freud’s, Person’s, etc.) this runs contrary to models 
that propose a diminishing function to fantasy, as reality is assumed to take a 
firmer hold on both lovers.  While this may be in accordance with many couples’ 
experience, Mitchell reasoned that the diminishment of fantasy in favor of reality 
is in part defensive.  According to this, love’s fantastical aspects not only have a 
purpose but also should not subside as reality takes hold.  A core piece of 
romantic love that is fantasy-fueled is the belief that the beloved other is unique, 
and what fosters this is the process of idealization.   Mitchell offered a contrasting 
view to the traditional thinking on this topic which held “for someone to become 
an object of desire requires an imaginative transformation, in which perception is 
spiced by the illusions of fantasy to create a sweeter offering” (p. 104).  He took 
issue with the connotation attached to idealization as an artificial form of 
perception in relationships.  Further he identified a bias in psychoanalysis 
towards a passive form of perception in which reality is a thing to be taken in and 
received.  As evidence, he cited the centrality of “reality-testing” in psychoanalytic 
thought and its accompanying notion that fantasy and imagination mainly serve 
to contaminate the individual’s “direct perception of how things really are” (p. 
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105).  Mitchell applauded the opposition to such a view of fantasy as solely 
based in wish-fulfillment and illusory, and cited Hans Loewald’s work (1980) as 
championing this cause in his description of the potential of reality to 
interpenetrate with one’s fantasy life in a normal, healthy fashion.   
Mitchell questioned the certainty one may feel in perceiving daily life, in 
knowing oneself, and within loving relationships with others.  Rather than 
espousing an ultimately relativistic approach to knowledge, Mitchell seemed to 
support a shift in the importance one places in seeking ultimate static truth.  If 
humans construct their perception of reality actively rather than passively 
receiving it, and knowledge of oneself is multi-leveled, then “the conviction that 
we really know the other, in a dependable, predictable, certain fashion, is a 
dangerous illusion” (p. 110).  Our knowledge of the other in romantic love is 
driven by a desire that may obscure aspects about the beloved or may mislead 
the subject about the nature of his longing.   
In contrast to opposing fantasy and reality, Mitchell inched towards regarding 
idealization as a form of accurate perception and asks: “might we regard 
idealization as, sometimes, a process of bringing alive features of the other that 
are hidden and masked in ordinary, everyday interactions?” (p. 112).  Since 
idealization is motivated by one’s desire, Mitchell positioned it as a destabilizing 
mechanism.  In a certain way it provides the individual with too open an access 
to his desires, which can be overwhelming.  The human proclivity towards 
stability and safety would then run in opposition to the idealizing thrust of 
imagination.  The failure of idealization is not that it does not pass the test of 
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reality, but rather the risk and danger it presents in exposing one’s wishes and 
hopes to an other who may not accept and reciprocate.  
Mitchell did make a somewhat ambiguous distinction between ideals and 
pseudo-ideals, saying that some idealizations may be closer to their targets than 
others.  Trying to provide some way to evaluate the “health” of idealizations he 
says, “It matters a great deal whether the source of idealization is at least 
partially in the other… or purely a figment of the fantasy life of the lover” (p. 113).  
He viewed the latter as being the result of projecting one’s needs in actively 
creating a representation of the other that is fundamentally exploitive.  In this 
attempt to sort out useful and harmful idealizations, he said “a lover’s idealization 
tends to be more fertile when the qualities chosen correspond to ways in which 
the beloved enjoys idealizing herself” (p. 113).  Despite the felt dangers involved, 
Mitchell advocated mutually idealization within the romantic dyad. What seems 
clear, but is not articulated by Mitchell, is that despite his stated attempts to 
explore the implicit realms of human experience, his treatment of idealization and 
fantasy (while having functions that are outside awareness) mainly applies to 
conscious and accessible forms of fantasy, as opposed to unconscious ones. 
Mitchell’s view of fantasy and idealization in relationships, was that they do not 
always dissipate in relationships.  Instead, new information about the other and 
self in relation to the other is learned, changing the nature of the relationship so 
that the romance becomes “riskier.”  As opposed to fantasy eventually being 
undercut by the heavy weight of reality, he proposed that romantic idealization 
may ultimately dissipate, not naturally, but due to the human demands for 
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security and predictability.  By investing in the illusion of certainty, people are 
able to protect themselves against the emotional vulnerabilities involved in being 
intimately related to others, such as the fears of loss, the fears of attack, 
depression and unreciprocated feelings.  He described that couples may come in 
to treatment because they inhibit their mutual excitement and appreciation for the 
other: 
 
They tell themselves they know the other better now.  What they know now is 
that the features they once idealized in the other are not all there is to the 
other, that the other is also disappointing, and therefore that their passion 
cannot be a steady state.  So they use what they know of the other as a 
defense against the surrender of idealization.  The adored features of the other 
may not have been illusory at all; what was illusory was the guarantee they 
sought against disappointment and perpetually regenerated solitude.  (p. 115)  
 
In the course or deepening romantic love, the other becomes someone that 
needs to be depended upon.  The entrance of dependency and disappointment 
jeopardizes the ability one has in resting in total idealization of the other.  Mitchell 
contended that one cannot always live in the surrendered position of desiring 
fantasy, specifically in present relation to another person, so instead it becomes 
safer to fantasize about what one lacks.  Fantasies of sex with strangers or 
outside one’s relationship serves the purpose of banishing fantasy out of “actual” 
lived life into a form that one can control.  The degradation of idealization and 
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fantasy in love relationships, for Mitchell, is just another ironic form of this drive 
towards illusioned control, safety and security.   
Mitchell used Can Love Last? to explore the paradox of human psychology 
that what is craved is also often feared and what is loved is also easily hated as 
the individual seeks to preserve itself.  Mitchell was able to describe this tension 
in love relationships by illustrating that just as the sexual component of romantic 
passion requires the other, it is “the very otherness of the other that defines the 
limits to one’s own omnipotence and creates the vulnerability, often the 
experience of helplessness, that accompanies desire” (p. 141). 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl has contributed to psychoanalysis on a variety of 
topics from prejudice, child abuse, and feminism.  Elaborating and extending her 
ideas of a growth principle, articulated in her book Cherishment: a Psychology of 
the Heart (Young-Bruehl & Bethelard, 2000), Where Do We Fall When We Fall in 
Love (2003) reinvestigated and continued a modern Freudian formulation of 
Freud’s deserted efforts on understanding conceptualizing the ego instincts.  
While it is mainly her opening chapter that I will discuss here, it is important to 
contextualize her argument.   
Young-Bruehl describes in her preface to this book that though Freud initially 
posited two groups of human instincts—the self-preservative ego instincts and 
the species-preservative sexual instincts—he failed to sufficiently elaborate the 
nature of the former.  In fact, he tended to subjugate them to the latter form, even 
describing them as being derived from one’s sexual aims.  Though Freud at one 
point posited that object choice is first predicated on self-preservative aims, he 
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did not further explore the nature of these ego instincts, also described by him as 
the individual’s affectionate current (1912).  By the time of “Beyond the pleasure 
principle”(1920) and the inception of the dual instinct theory, the ego instincts 
were a thing of the past, subsumed under the sexual instincts in the form of  
“self-preservative sexual instincts” (p. 55).  Affection became thought of as aim-
inhibited sexuality, according to Young-Bruehl.  In “Civilization and its 
discontents” (1930), one could see the change in Freud’s thinking as he replaced 
affectionate love, whose prototype was formerly the mother-child relationships, 
with erotic love as the common manifestation of human happiness.  Affectionate 
love was then thought to be a rarely attained form of aim-inhibited sensual erotic 
love.  
Young-Bruehl’s argues for a reconsideration of the ego-instincts, and offers 
one that draws on the work of the Japanese psychoanalyst Takeo Doi (1971).  
He proposed a universal primary state during infancy of ego-instinctual 
relatedness one’s environment.  Young-Bruehl incorporates his idea of the child’s 
primary “expectation to be indulgently loved,” which is a rough translation of the 
Japanese amae.  The ego-instinct can then be thought of as “the instinct aiming 
for provision of elementary food and shelter and safety or security needs . . .  an 
instinct for provision of a need to be loved” (p. 33).  The ego-instincts are then 
both constitutional and ultimately relational; they refer to the ego’s aims of 
maturation and development, and tie to the objects of nourishment.  This need to 
be loved, or cherishment in Young-Bruehl’s terms, is related to her understanding 
of the ego being defined by a fundamental growth principle.  In her promotion of 
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an amae or cherishment core she lays the groundwork for an understanding of 
human receptivity that guides all other human endeavors (p. 35). 
Young-Bruehl criticized approaches like those of evolutionary psychologists, 
touched on in the previous section, that tend to reduce the experience of love to 
its hard-wired biochemical ebbing and flowing.  According to her, these and other 
sociobiological explanations for love, obscure the very nature of sexual passion 
and romantic emotions as they are experienced in all their humanly tragic and 
glorious forms.  Her understanding of love is placed within a Freudian 
metapsychology, though with some revisions.   
For Young-Bruehl, the sexual instincts are primarily narcissistic in their self-
reproductive nature: “the sexual instincts can eventually have as their object 
another, but only after the fall, or beyond the fall, does that other become more 
than just a mirror or a means” (p. 8).  What the ego-instincts can do, in part, is 
bring the individual beyond narcissism and into the world of others, who are 
established as outside the self.  The conflict between the ego and sexual 
instincts is determined by their opposing natures.  Sexual instincts are less 
related to an other, than they are to the self and its reproduction, defined broadly.  
Ego instincts aim to preserve the self, though with the help on an object outside 
the self.  The ego-instincts are related to that which is beyond the self, other 
people and the environment.   
The two can work in harmony though with attachment preparing the way for 
the sexuality and vice versa.  For Young-Bruehl, both instincts can oscillate in 
dominance throughout an individual’s life.  The two combine to form an 
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individual’s romantic ideal, which is sometimes an uneven admixture of “sex and 
love, passion and attachment, pleasure and security, upheaval and serenity, the 
pull to repeat past excitement and the pull of the future” (p. 12).  A romantic ideal 
reflects the ongoing interplay of the instincts’ struggle for sexual objects and ego 
interests.  Healthy romantic love would then aim towards “promoting growth 
beyond narcissism” and be “founded on acknowledgment or recognition of the 
expectation to be loved and of the loved and loving other as a person with his or 
her own wishes” (p. 12).  Romantic love is an updating of the ego-instinctual 
infant-caregiver bond that rests on mature adult principles of mutuality and 
reciprocity.  
Mental health in relation to romantic relationships can then be understood as 
the ability to manage the ongoing oscillation of the two instincts without 
remaining being subject to the object choice of either dominant pole.  When the 
sexual instinct predominates one may be limited, unconsciously, to seeking 
narcissistically-enclosed relationships with others, in which the beloved is 
invented in regards to one’s owns needs, wishes and fantasies.  On the other 
hand, the full weight of the ego-instincts may be too intolerable and anxiety 
provoking, leading the person to defend against expectations to be loved.   
In her writing it is suggested that the aims of the sexual instinct result in the 
formation of the superego, while the ego-instincts lead to the establishment of the 
ego ideal.  An important psychic mechanism involved in both is idealization.  She 
described its two different functions in romantic love that reflect the different 
legacies she proposes the instincts have: 
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There is, on the one hand, narcissistic idealization, which I presented as 
rooted in the sexual instincts and which, I would now like to suggest, chiefly 
functions to assuage the superego’s guilt for oedipal trespass or oedipal 
triumph.  On the other hand, there is idealization stemming from the 
expectation to be loved, the essential ego instinctual manifestation, which 
functions to protect us from the frustrations and disappointments of 
attachment.  This idealization regulates our good feeling about ourselves, our 




The initial states of falling in love reflect the ecstasies of narcissistic idealization, 
as the other is idealized, as Freud suggested, for being a more perfect version of 
ourselves.  This beginning form of idealization also reawakens memory traces of 
the Oedipal defeat, but now the new loved object represents an attainable union 
with the other that is not prohibited by the superego.  Young-Bruehl 
communicated the message of this narcissistic exhilaration experienced in 
meeting the loved object: “this is not your mother, your father, and not your 
siblings whom you love—it is you” (p. 20).       
The other form of idealization stems from the ego-instincts and does not 
concern the regulation of guilt that is involved with narcissistic superego 
idealizations.  In love, this idealizing tendency responds to feelings of shame 
related to fears of being unlovable.  What is of importance here is one’s relation 
to their ego ideal, which in this scheme can be thought of as an “internal vision of 
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how they might be cherished” (p. 21).  This is a view of the ego ideal as not 
merely a projection of one’s ideal state of being, but more so as the 
remembrance of a lost relational condition of being-loved.  For Young-Bruehl, the 
ego ideal is not a transformation of primary narcissism, as it was for Chasseguet-
Smirgel, but of “primary love.”  The ego ideal is then an agency that attempts to 
restore one’s primary state of being-loved in relation to an other, rather than 
one’s state of omnipotence.  The shame at falling short of one’s ego ideal is then 
related to one’s experience of inadequacy regarding being worthy of love.  The 
superego and ego ideal have different but equally important functions in romantic 
love relationships.  The former regulates sexual instincts, while the latter agency 
is in charge of the ego-instincts.  In love, individuals idealize the beloved other’s 
potential to help the self fulfill each instinct’s aim.     
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Bridging the gap between psychoanalytic theory and empirical research 
 
It was important for me to review the psychoanalytic literature on love in order 
to demonstrate a way of understanding romantic relations in the context of 
developmental issues, sexuality (thought of in terms of pleasure), the role of 
fantasy, and a dynamic model of the mind that manages intrapsychic conflict.  
These are aspects of love that are not given much attention in the research 
literature presented in Chapter One.  Consequently, these psychoanalytic 
writings on romantic relationships serve as a counterpoint approach for the 
empirical literature I detailed in Chapter One.  I will not try to comprehensively 
synthesize these two distinct literatures.  For example, my goal is not to try to 
make Sternberg’s Triangular Theory of love (intimacy, passion, and commitment) 
fit with a psychoanalytic understanding of Oedipal dynamics.  Nor will I try to 
square Kernberg’s thinking about aggression in love relations with Gottman’s 
observational work on marital conflict.  My approach is one of stepping back to 
explore the possibilities of finding meeting points of integration, complement and 
overlap (and contradiction). 
While I have been advocating that psychoanalytic ideas inform empirical 
approaches to love, I am not blind to the deficiencies of psychoanalytic 
perspectives.  Some of these problems go beyond the lack of empirical support 
and models of psychological processes that have not been thoroughly updated to 
reflect the findings of psychological research (e.g. ideas of primary narcissism, 
psychosexual stages, etc.).  Psychoanalysis’ estrangement from psychology 
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disciplines has led to theorizing that is not always bound appropriately enough by 
what empirical investigation has proved about cognitive-affective capacities at 
various stages of life.  Importantly, psychoanalysis has been slow to appreciate 
the influence of diversity (whether it pertain to sexual orientation, ethnicity, 
gender, etc.) and the multiple identities that people assume.  Future 
investigations on love must begin by questioning the value of the romantic 
relationship perspectives represented by different disciplines.  These inquiries 
require a suitable framework to pose and answer these questions.  My aim is to 
present recommendations for this kind of interdisciplinary framework. 
Since I believe that the romantic relationship theoretical and empirical 
perspectives, I have reviewed, conflict to some degree, I would like to suggest 
ways for compromise.  I have grounded my suggestions in previous 
psychoanalytic attempts to address both inconsistencies and contradictions 
within psychoanalysis, as well as with other scientific disciplines.  Some of these 
ideas target the substantial gap existing between an empirical approach of 
investigating love (academic psychology) versus one that relies on clinical 
observation and is primarily theoretical in nature (psychoanalysis).  The 
psychoanalytic research literature is still in an early stage of finding ways to 
systematically demonstrate some basic foundational concepts (like those 
described earlier in this chapter). The fact that this research is still in its infancy 
reflects a traditional, but still present, ambivalence from within about positioning 
psychoanalysis as a science (see Kernberg, 2004, on “resistances to research in 
psychoanalysis”).  However, the last few decades have seen an increase in 
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psychoanalytically informed research (though little specifically on romantic 
relationships).15   While some have attempted to demonstrate methods of 
compromise by research examples, others have tackled the interdisciplinary 
conflicts conceptually.  My present effort joins this latter grouping.  I will now 
discuss some of the writings that have informed my own approach to the 
psychoanalysis-empirical psychology conflict.   
The psychoanalyst G.S. Klein carried out empirical research on such topics 
as perception (1942) and cognitive control (Klein, et al., 1962).  A feature of his 
posthumously published writings (1976) concerned the questioning of various 
inconsistencies and incompatibilities in psychoanalytic metapsychological and 
clinical theory.  Klein’s reworking of psychoanalytic theory involved a focus on 
incompatibilities in human experience.  As he wrote, “what makes 
psychoanalysis a dynamic theory is the attempt to establish and specify the 
terms of incompatibility, its genetic context, its structured representations that 
constitute a “psychical reality,” the strength of its components, and the forms of 
its resolutions” (p. 165).  As I will discuss in the following chapter, understanding 
human behavior in Klein’s way as reflecting “efforts to synthesize and resolve 
incompatible tendencies that produce crises of integration” (p. 165) may be a 
fruitful way of researching romantic love.   
Klein emphasized Freud’s early focus on the etiology of physical symptoms 
(in hysteria) as a resolution unconsciously wrought through the compromise 
solution of incompatibilities.  When the compromise achieved is maladaptive it 
                                                 
15 In Chapter Four, I will reference some of these studies as they serve as 
models for integrating the existing psychoanalytic and empirical research on love. 
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can produce symptomatic behavior.  Klein reiterated Freud’s idea that though the 
location of conflict is psychical, attempts at resolution can encompass all forms of 
thought, feeling and behavior.  In the way Klein read Freud, the resolution of 
incompatible wishes, motives, social prohibitions, etc., becomes a “general 
principle of human development” (p. 167).  All conflict can be understood then as 
involving incompatible aims.  For example, the Oedipus complex can be 
understood as “a series of propositions concerning the dynamic interplay of such 
persistent wishes and counterwishes in relation to fantasied consequences, and 
concerning the manifestations of this interplay in motives” (p. 170).        
For Klein, what was uniquely valuable in psychoanalysis was its overt study of 
the complex layers of human intentionality.  He was critical of psychoanalytic 
theories that move away from focusing on “the aims, motives, and goal of 
behavior, their conscious and unconscious aspects, their epigenesis in a lifetime, 
in connection with life’s tasks, problems, conflicts and crises, and their 
consequences in psychopathology” (p. 158).  Klein supported thinking of 
motivations as not inherently conflictual, but rather viewed conflict as being the 
result of the fulfillment of an aim or goal being linked to a perceived threat to 
one’s psychological integrity or security.  As Eagle has suggested (1984), Klein’s 
views rightfully belong along side those models that emphasize the importance of 
an experiential self (e.g., Kohut).  Rather than conceiving of conflict as occurring 
between the aims of various proposed mental agencies inherently oppositional 
drives, Klein changed the terms of the discussion to that of ego organization.  He 
elevated to super-ordinate status the ego’s integrative and synthesizing functions 
 202
and self-protective motives.  He understood psychic conflict in the context of 
incompatibilities in relation to a self-structure: “the person always strives to 
function as a unit; that is, action proceeds from a sense of identity which signals 
compatibility or incompatibility.  The possibility of inner conflict is therefore ever-
present” (p. 176).  This suggests a basic psychological motivation towards 
resolving incompatibilities of the self that are consciously and unconsciously 
experienced in varying degrees of anxiety and distress. 
Some have raised concerns about the scientific status of psychoanalysis in 
trying to grapple with the empirical applications of psychoanalytic theory.  For 
instance, Erdelyi has written about the “overburdened” nature of the 
psychoanalytic unconscious (1985).  He endorsed the position, taken by many in 
academic psychology, of equating what is psychologically unconscious to what is 
psychologically inaccessible.  In this way, in empirically documenting the 
psychologically unconscious one does not have to grapple with the issue of why 
something becomes or is unconscious.  For Erdelyi, the issue becomes 
problematic when one has to consider distinguishing unconscious inaccessible 
from unconscious repressed/defended against.  Aside from broadening the 
concept of unconscious to allow for clarity and empirical investigation, Erdelyi 
has also discussed widening the concept of defense to denote a kind of 
unconscious “biased processing” done in the service of avoiding or reducing 
mental pain.  On this important point, I take the position that one must be 
cautious in accepting the losses that accompany defining unconscious as simply 
consciously inaccessible.  What I think is called for is reserving the ability to 
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designate what is unconscious in at least two ways—a larger descriptive sense 
and a dynamic one.  In this way, there is a broader more inclusive definition of 
descriptive unconscious (with degrees of accessibility), and under this category a 
more restrictive sense of a dynamic unconscious, which relies on psychoanalytic 
notions of defensive processing.          
Both through theoretical argument and empirical research, Westen has 
offered consistently thought-provoking appraisals of psychoanalytic thinking, with 
an eye specifically towards integration with academic empirical psychology.  I will 
mainly focus on some of his theoretical points here, as they have informed my 
own way of applying psychoanalytic thinking to researching love.  In a pair of 
collaborations with Gabbard  (2002a, 2002b), he explored how advances in 
cognitive neuroscience could impact aspects of psychoanalytic theory and 
practice.  For Westen (and Gabbard), psychoanalytic observation and cognitive 
research can be thought of as having complementary strengths and weaknesses 
(2002a).  The psychoanalytic concern with affect, conflict and motivation can be 
coupled with the systematic investigation of perception, memory and cognition 
from the cognitive science fields.  While a psychoanalytic framework can lead to 
hypothesis-generation regarding observed phenomena, hypothesis-testing must 
adhere to the rigors of the scientific method.  
In his collaborations with Gabbard, Westen has joined the cognitive science 
use of connectionist or parallel distributed processing models (Kunda & Thagard, 
1996; Olds 1994) with psychoanalytic ideas of motivation, conflict, affect 
regulation and compromise formation.  Connectionist models assert that: 
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information-processing occurs in a parallel and simultaneous fashion, 
representations are distributed throughout the brain, “knowledge lies in the 
connections among nodes in a network,” a node in a network acts like a 
hypothesis about reality that is either supported or not by incoming perceptual 
data, frequency of patterned activation creates attractor sites, and that the brain 
works under a property of constraint satisfaction.  I will not elaborate much on 
these points that Westen and Gabbard reviewed.  However, an important 
bridging point to psychoanalysis is how unconscious compromises underlie even 
the simplest forms of information-processing.  For instance, the mechanism of 
perception also involves an unconscious process in which the brain perceives the 
various features of a simultaneously and reaches a tentative conclusion as a 
matter of “best fit” compromise.  In connectionist models the majority of all of this 
information-processing occurs unconsciously, in the descriptive sense.  Westen 
and Gabbard’s suggestion is that psychoanalytic thinking can extend the 
framework provided by connectionist models to incorporate the notion of a 
dynamic unconscious.  They clearly explain the possible convergence of both 
ways of thinking in a passage I will quote at length due to its relevance to what I 
will propose about romantic love: 
 
Both assume that multiple psychological events occur simultaneously, in 
parallel, and that processes active below the threshold of consciousness can 
conflict and combine to produce compromise solutions.  Whereas 
connectionist models emphasize the cognitive constraints that influence these 
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equilibrated solutions—that is, the data that ultimately leads to one conclusion 
rather than another—psychoanalytic models of conflict and compromise 
emphasize affective constraints—wishes, fears, and emotional reactions—
that similarly influence thoughts, feelings, symptoms, and actions.  An 
integrated model suggests that the “decisions” people implicitly make…are 
constrained not only by the data but by the constraints imposed by the 
emotional significance of different “choices.”  This is simply another way of 
saying that a compromise formation reflects multiple affective and 
motivational pulls activated outside of awareness, tempered by the 
constraints imposed by reality that prevent us from believing whatever we 
want (Freud’s hypothesized wish fulfillment).    
 
A variety of empirical studies, some by Westen himself, have demonstrated the 
usefulness of understanding many forms of information-processing as 
compromise formations involving degrees of cognitive and affective constraints 
(John & Robins, 1994; Westen et al.,1999;; Westen et al., 2006).  Westen’s 
recent studies of this kind, have looked at how political reasoning involves a 
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compromise of affective and cognitive components.16  Further his research has 
shown how a person’s politics can be driven by an unconscious motivation to 
regulate negative and positive affect states related to one’s implicit interests.  In 
other words, despite the cognitively based explanations people may give for 
certain political attitudes and decisions (including voting), many of these are 
determined by strong affective dispositions; “where affects are strong cognitions 
will typically follow” (Westen & Gabbard, 2002a).   
Related to his bridging of psychoanalytic and cognitive science views of 
psychological compromise formation under constraints, Westen has also 
addressed the topic of motivation (1999).  On this subject, he has revised 
classical psychoanalytic conceptions of motivation that focus on two contrasting 
forces (eros/thanatos, self-preservation/sex, etc.).  In his thinking, theorizing 
about a couple of master motives that influence all types of behavior limits the 
complexity of human functioning and does not accord with a century’s worth of 
research.  Instead of placing various motivational systems under the umbrella of 
one or two superordinate motives, Westen has proposed understanding systems 
                                                 
16 Drew Westen (2006) investigated how political partisans resolve 
incompatibilities of conflicting information, on the level of brain function.  When 
faced with a contradictory information, distress circuits show activation.  The 
orbital frontal cortex (emotional processing) as well as memory retrieval systems 
are activated in attempts to resolve contradication.  What isn’t active is the part of 
the brain involved with cognitive reasoning. Reward centers are activated after 
subjects use personalized, emotion-driven reasoning to resolve the conflict 
before them.  Westen suggests that since this occurs on an unconscious level, 
people will report reasoning through political positions, without the awareness 
that they have arrived at a compromise resolution most likely not based on the 
reasoning they suppose.  This research shows that ideas and mental states are 
approched and avoided ideas just like external stimuli.  
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of motivations that are not inherently contrasting, but get activated under specific 
conditions.  
In his thinking about motivation, Westen has connected the work of 
psychoanalytic affect theorists, like Kernberg (1992) and Sandler (1989), to 
evolutionary biology in positioning affects centrally.  In his model, affects are 
evolutionarily useful for selecting from behaviors (in aggregate) that were used 
by ancestral generations.  An affect is defined as an “evaluative response that 
typically includes physiological arousal, subjective experience, and behavioral or 
emotional expression” (2002, p. 370).  Affects, which begin very basically as 
experiences of pleasure and pain, develop and become more varied and 
complex.  They become linked to associative representations of self, other and 
the environment and stored in memory.  People learn to regulate affective 
responses on the basis of subjective experiencing of pleasure and displeasure.  
This can be understood both psychoanalytically in terms of defense mechanisms 
that ward off various forms of unpleasant affect, or through an intuitive 
conception of operant conditioning applied to reinforcement of on a mental level 
(Westen, 2002). 
Bringing the discussion back to motivations, Westen’s model involves a 
person’s comparison of actual, wished-for or feared states.  The discrepancies 
between a person’s perception of reality, his desire and fear leads to an 
emotional response that activates various mental and behavioral responses to 
again regulate the pleasant and unpleasant feelings.  What a person desires and 
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fears has to be understood in terms of biologically, environmentally, evolutionarily 
and culturally influenced “goal-states.”  As Westen wrote: 
 
People can respond to the affects entailed by these discrepancies with 
behaviors aimed at changing reality (and hence minimizing the discrepancy 
between reality and a desired state or maximizing the discrepancy between 
reality and a feared state).  Alternatively, they can use defenses or conscious 
coping strategies whose function is either to alter the perception of reality so 
that it matches more closely the goal state, or to ameliorate the emotion 
directly (as is the case with isolation of affect).  (1999) 
 
Thus affect regulation can include the management of discrepancies of feared, 
desired and states.  In a certain sense, a person is always attempting a 
compromise solution between various motivational systems and the affects 
associated with the perceived distance from what one fears and desires.  An 
important point to be stressed is that desires, fears, affects and motivations have 
to be thought about in multiplicity.  In relation to romantic love, one may need to 
find a compromise between a sexual attraction towards another person, which 
may represent a desired state and the other desired state represented by this 
same person’s marriage.  This is complicated by the possibility of simultaneously 
activated feared states, such as not acting on one’s sexual attraction or ruining 
one’s marriage.  In this case a person will be moved to pursue or not pursue his 
sexual attraction based on the (often unconscious) compromise reached 
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between these different affectively-charged representations of wished for and 
feared states. 
For Westen, people are always driven to satisfy various motivations as best 
they can in a way that regulates the discrepancy between actual, desired and 
feared states.  This idea has been empirically demonstrated in the cognitive 
literature, for example in research on the emotional and physical health 
consequences resulting from the perception of discrepancies between actual, 
ideal and ought selves (Higgins, 1987, 1999; Strauman et al., 1993).  This 
should, however, not be understood as implying that all motivations are aimed at 
discrepancy reduction.  Not only are there times when a person may be 
motivated to increase the difference between certain self-representations, but 
people also are motivated towards variety and novelty in self-experiences in 
terms of sensation-seeking (Zuckerman, 1990).  Asked and answered in 
Westen’s discussion is the issue of whether the “regulation of affect states 
(seeking pleasure and avoiding pain) is an underlying mechanism involved in all 
motivation” or an entirely independent motivation in its own right. 
In his paper on motivation, Westen argued for the first position.  He made the 
case that affects can direct certain types of behavior not rigidly controlled at the 
subcortical level.  Since they can be used to select for the retention of certain 
mental and behavioral responses, affects act as motivators that serve 
evolutionary adaptive goals.  However, through experience, affects become 
associated with representations of various self and other states, and can be 
flexibly used to shape other human motivations both at a conscious and 
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conscious level.  Research has suggested that conscious and unconscious 
motives are not just expressed differently but may develop along different paths.  
McClelland and colleagues (1989) showed that unconscious motivations are 
more predictive of long-term outcomes, as opposed to those available to 
consciousness, which are more related to immediate, short-term events.  Since 
affective responses (and subsequently aspects of motivational structures) are 
stored along associative networks, they are connected to and can be triggered 
symbolically by cognitive representations.  For Westen, the activation of a 
network of associations (including wishes and fears) can both be inhibited and 
facilitated by affects (Westen & Gabbard, 2002a).  Thus one’s motivation to 
propose marriage and enter into a more committed status of relationship may be 
inhibited by a stronger affective motivation that is associated with a terror of 
engulfment fears.  Both may be operative at an unconscious level and result, 
along with other factors, to a compromise solution of one’s involvement in long-
term romantic relationships that never lead to the feared state of engulfment in 
marriage.  This example, while simple, illustrates Westen’s argument that the 
“driving” force in human motivation is the regulation of affect, in the service of 
minimizing unpleasant feelings and maximizing pleasant ones (1999).  Westen’s 
work creates a very usable framework for understanding and researching 
romantic love in the context of mental processes that a dynamically rendered 
unconscious in the service of affective regulation. 
Another example of the intersection of psychoanalytic theory and empirical 
research (specifically cognitive science) is the work of Bucci, who has carved out 
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an area of study she has termed referential activity (1997, 2000, 2005).  The 
referential process concerns the cognitive function of “organizing nonverbal 
experience and connecting it to words” (1997, p. 185).  Referential process is 
studied by assessing discourse samples for the degree to which the language 
reflects an integration of nonverbal experience, which includes imagery, bodily 
and emotional experience.  Bucci has recast seminal concepts in psychoanalysis 
in the context of her multiple code theory.  Her information-processing model can 
be understood as “addressing the central question of how disparate 
representational systems are connected in an integrated, goal-directed self, 
functioning in an interpersonal world” (1997, p. 264).  By updating aspects of 
psychoanalytic theory to meet the advances of psychological research she has 
been able to argue for the reciprocally informative relationship of cognitive 
science and psychoanalysis.      
One such modification is her re-conceptualization of psychological 
organization in terms of three types of information-processing systems: 
subsymbolic nonverbal, symbolic verbal and symbolic nonverbal.  This is meant 
to replace ideas of primary and secondary categories of mental processes, of 
which the former is lacking a distinction between subsymbolic and symbolic 
nonverbal forms.  As opposed from the symbolic, the subsymbolic mode 
describes an implicit level of sensory, motoric and somatic processing (1997, 
2000).   Emotional information processing, which occurs primarily on an 
unconscious level, relies on subsymbolic mechanisms.  In this scheme, part of 
the work of psychoanalytic treatment targets the integration of systems of 
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thought, which “requires repairing disconnections and building new 
connections—between subsymbolic and symbolic elements within the nonverbal 
system, and between symbolic nonverbal representations and words” (1997, p. 
269).  The threat of painful emotions at the subsymbolic level is what leads to the 
turning away from and warding off of symbolization.  This form of defensive 
dissociation and desymbolization, for Bucci, allows for a modern understanding 
of a dynamic unconscious.  Painful affective memory traces are denied symbolic 
registration and are avoided in consciousness, though they continue to operate 
at a subsymbolic level (without comprehensible emotional meaning and capacity 
for symbolic regulation).   
Bucci’s model of the normally functioning mind is one that stresses the 
integration of disparate mental processes and representational formats.  All 
defensive mechanisms, like repression, refer to the disconnection or dissociation 
of referential links between subsymbolic and symbolic components.  As she 
wrote: “The distinct formats must be interconnected to allow integration of 
functions, organization of goal-directed behavior, and establishment of a unified 
sense of self.  On the most obvious level, there must be integration of systems to 
enable us to talk about what we experience and to connect the words of others to 
what we know and feel” (p. 178).  The referential mechanism involves the 
transformation of information from the subsymbolic mode to the nonverbal and 
then to verbal.  By integrating psychoanalytic thinking into a cognitive science 
framework, Bucci has been able to design a research program that can identify 
each stage of the referential process by linguistic indicators.  She has viewed her 
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efforts as an attempt to establish a discipline of psychoanalytic psychology 
“whose domain of investigation includes the integration of processing systems as 
these operate in adaptive functioning, as well as their dissociation in pathology” 
(2000).                 
As a final point, Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002) have explored a 
framework that can aid in conceptualizing how motivations are guided by 
processes of affect regulation and maintaining the integrity and continuity of the 
self.  For these authors, affects, experienced both subjectively and 
unconsciously, can be regulated at different levels.  Affect regulation can occur at 
a basic largely unreflective level in regards to biological homeostasis and 
equilibrium, as well as at another symbolic level that hinges on the capacity to 
consciously experience as well as attend to (and act upon) one’s emotions.  As a 
child experiences mental states (which include affect states) being read, 
modulated and reflected back by primary caregivers healthy and robust 
mentalization capacities develop.  Mentalization, first accomplished through the 
interpretation of others’ minds, facilitates one’s introspective abilities.  Affectivity 
plays a crucial role in mentalization as in its basic forms it means naming and 
modulating affective experience, and at a more complex level distinguishing and 
refining the meaning of affects.  Affectivity is not merely the exercising of 
cognitive control over affective states, but an inward and outward exploratory 
process of “how current (and future) affects are experienced through the lens of 
past experiences, both real and imagined” (Jurist, 2005).  Mentalized affectivity 
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denotes a process of mind that contributes to the differentiation, integration, 
regulation and understanding of one’s of mental life.      
In their model, since affect-regulation is crucially linked to the development 
and maintenance of one’s self-concept, “self-regulation can be considered as a 
higher kind of affect regulation,” though self-regulation does not necessarily have 
to concern affects (p. 95).  Mentalized affectivity represents an empirically 
testable developmentally-based method of understanding a process of self-
regulation through reflecting on and reevaluating internal states.   Fonagy and 
colleagues have designed a measure of Reflective Function through the coding 
of attachment transcripts (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998).  Applied to 
romantic love, the internal self-mediation they describe is crucial for thinking 
about the possibilities of identifying, distinguishing, modulating and refining the 
range of affects experienced in relationships.  For my purposes, Fonagy and 
colleagues’ work is important for establishing a framework for understanding how 
one’s self-reflexive representational activities can impact one’s emotions, self-
experience and motivations in romantic love.     
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My view of love    
 
My canvassing of these distinct literatures has led to my own integrative 
psychoanalytic psychological approach to studying romantic love.  Though 
informed by psychoanalysis, my perspective differs from traditional Freudian 
views of inherently contrasting drives, sex and aggression, and is more in line 
with the psychoanalytic psychological motivational views (e.g., Lichtenberg, 
1989).17  Allowing for a range of various discontinuous and continuous 
motivations, both innate and learned, occurring on different levels of 
consciousness and are relatively flexible (i.e., are displaceable and malleable), 
enables a greater chance of integration of psychoanalytic and scientific 
perspectives.  Further, allowing for some malleability among the multiple 
motivational systems allows room for conceiving of the impact of culture and 
learning. It best serves integrative purposes to adopt a conception of human 
functioning that is not constrained by too narrow a view or by too few basic 
motivations.     
Psychoanalytic writers have slowly come to realize the importance of 
conceptualizing motivational structures in a framework other than that which 
                                                 
17 I will not try to distinguish, here, the differences between biological and 
psychological needs, or between psychoanalytic conceptions of instincts and 
drives.  I am aware of the arguments devoted to exploring this terrain (for a 
recent discussion, see Kernberg, 2004, Chapter 3).  I have already discussed my 
approach for focusing research on how needs get psychologically represented.  I 
will say that it seems scientifically impossible to categorize motivations in such a 
dichotomous fashion between biological instinct and biological-psychological 
drive, especially if one believes in a multiple function principle. 
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corresponds to a dual drive theory (Lichtenberg, 1989; Westen, 1999).  More 
recently, Pine (2005) has identified multiple motivations within such areas as 
object relations, ego functioning, self-experience, drives, agency and 
developmental needs.  Conceptualizing motivations in a broad manner allows for 
points of overlap and juncture with the primary motivations fundamental to other 
psychological perspectives.  These perspectives include motivations for survival, 
reproduction and maximal inclusive fitness (evolutionary; see Buss, 1999 and 
Hamilton, 1964), innate and learned drive reduction (behaviorist; Hull, 1943, 
1952), competency, autonomy and relatedness to others (cognitive self-
determination theories, Ryan & Deci, 2000), existence, relatedness and growth 
(adopted from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 1962, 1970).  As opposed to thinking 
of motivational systems as inherently conflictual, I am assuming the view that 
conflict develops from experiences of incompatibility of co-occurring aims.  
People develop conscious and unconscious compromise solutions to decrease 
psychological conflict (Brenner, 1982).  Thought of in this way, compromise 
formations occur on a range of adaptive health based on the durability of the 
solution forged.   
One can argue that the conscious and unconscious compromises I am 
referring to reflect attempts to maintain the ego’s integrity, the self’s temporal 
continuity (including constituent self and object representations) and one’s 
subjective sense of agency.  This emphasis is rooted in psychoanalytic theories 
that identify conscious and unconscious needs of self-coherency, self-continuity 
and agency as constituting forms of motivation (e.g., Kohut, G.S. Klein).  Aside 
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from psychoanalytic origins, it is also a basic evolutionary idea that demonstrates 
a survival instinct in psychological life.  Thought of in this way, one can posit a 
self-preservational motivation as underlying the unconscious and conscious 
striving towards a consistent, patterned, predictable and stable subjective sense 
of self.  Variants of this form of thinking appear in empirical psychological 
research efforts documenting self-consistency motives (Pinel & Swann, 2000; 
Swann, 1990).  
Though one may argue that psychological life is motivated by aims towards 
coherency and continuity, it seems wrong-headed to think of these as 
constituting a master motivational system.  There is no question that one’s ability 
to function, not to mention thrive, is dependent on a certain basic sense of one’s 
biological-psychological-social continuity and cohesiveness.  The degree to 
which one does not feel (physically, mentally, socially) stable, real, safe, strong, 
active, continuous, authentic and integrated affects one’s ability to engage in life, 
work and relationships.  However, as noted by others (Eagle, 1984; Westen, 
1997), the elevation of self-integrity motivations to superordinate status commits 
the same errors as those theories, psychoanalytic or otherwise, which try to 
reduce all psychological phenomenon down to one or two basic causes.  Errors 
of this type reduce the complexity of human psychology by viewing all sorts of 
diverse behaviors and motivations as simpler disguised forms of narrow sources.   
An investigative aim for psychological research then involves understanding 
how a person manages simultaneous aims and motives that are not inherently 
oppositional, but rather can become conflictual on various levels (intrapsychic, 
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interpersonal, cultural, etc.).  To a certain extent, I am suggesting moving or at 
least expanding the focus of inquiry from the level of content to process.  This 
follows in the spirit of what Eagle wrote on the subject of superordinate or 
underlying motivations:  
 
We are, so to speak, stuck with the more complex situation of a multiplicity of 
specific motives and aims interacting with each other in various ways.  The 
uniformity underlying the surface diversity will be found, not at the same level 
as the very surface phenomena to be explained (that is, at the level of 
motives and aims), but at another level of discourse (at the level of processes 
and mechanisms).  (1984, p. 202) 
 
I am endorsing a psychological research view to study romantic love in terms of 
how conflict between motivational aims arise, and further how one forms 
compromises and resolves incompatibility between motivations occurring on 
different levels of awareness.  Using this framework allows for understanding 
love in relation to how romantic partners negotiate compromises and 
incompatibilities that are both intrapsychic and interpersonal, unconscious and 
conscious.   
Since I do not take the view that motivational aims are inherently conflictual, I 
understand inner conflicts as resulting from the unpleasurable affect (e.g., 
anxiety) caused by incompatibilities of simultaneously occurring motivational 
aims or derivatives of these.  Psychological research needs to study the self-
organizing and self-regulating processes of intrapsychic and interpersonal 
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compromise that occurs consciously and unconsciously.  I am using 
“unconscious” less in an inaccessible sense, but more importantly in a dynamic 
sense—i.e., something that is affectively intolerable that gets rendered 
unconscious and denied attentional access.  In a certain sense, psychological 
compromises can be considered as adaptive or defensive solutions in the service 
of affect regulation.    
At the end of Part One, I introduced that a potentially useful way of 
understanding the disparate strands of the empirical literature was to view the 
models in terms of the motivational aims they emphasize.  My proposal for 
investigating love will focus on what contributes to the tension between 
motivations, the varieties of compromise solutions available and employed by 
people, and the intersubjective interplay, which serves as the setting for these 
conscious and unconscious negotiations.  I am suggesting that relationship 
research move beyond just empirically demonstrating the consciously rational 
dimensions of love and towards designing methods of documenting what gets 
rendered unconscious, how this happens and why— that is, exploring the role of 
a dynamic unconscious in romantic life.  This will expand how the field conceives 
of romantic relationship reasoning by studying the factors that lead to a bounded 
rationality, constricted by limits to self-knowledge of simultaneous aims. 
Psychoanalytic perspectives can contribute a way of thinking about what 
aspects of romantic life may be kept out of awareness and why this is so.  
However, academic research psychology approaches offer expertise in 
operationalizing and measuring the process by which one is able to access 
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romantic mental states.  Psychological empirical research and psychoanalysis 
should inform each other by using the unique perspectives included within each 
discipline.  The psychoanalytic research perspectives, exemplified by Bucci, 
Fonagy and colleagues, and Westen, provide guiding models for understanding a 
dynamic unconscious in a way that bridges psychoanalysis with empirical 
psychology.  
My present effort to integrate psychoanalytic thinking with a more general 
psychological empirical approach to studying love would be lacking if I did not 
spend some moments discussing the most important form of research in 
psychoanalysis.  Since Freud’s early work on hysteria (1905a), an in-depth case 
study has historically been the means by which psychoanalytic writers have 
shared their observations about conscious and unconscious dimensions of 
psychological functioning.  Since these observations are derived from a 
therapeutic setting, single-case reports have served as a method for examining 
processes of psychological change and the nuanced complexities of mental life.  
Apropos the argument I have been making for understanding romantic love 
complexly, the in-depth analysis of a small number of cases provides, quite 
possibly, the best venue for the steady demonstration of the derivatives of 
conscious and unconscious mental functioning that are not easily reproduced 
experimentally.   
To be sure, the main advantages of case studies (whether based on therapy 
sessions or in-depth interviews and observations) center on the freedom and 
flexibility that a one-to-one encounter allows for in opening up the avenues for 
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expression of an individual’s unique life story.  Even a relatively structured 
interview session allows for greater range of interaction and interpretive 
possibilities than methods based solely on self–report questionnaires.  However, 
though the loosening of methodological restrictions allows additional space for 
unconscious psychological functions to be observed, these benefits are 
countered by the limitations of this approach.  Case studies are subject to “the 
vagaries of memory, repression, motive” that affect what one is “capable of 
noticing and willing to report” (Bornstein & Masling, 1998, p. xxii).  Aside from the 
participant-observer perspective bias, case studies are limited by the inability to 
replicate findings based on the particularities of a researcher/therapist-subject 
dyad.  Unless one systematizes an in-depth case study, thus losing some of the 
advantages of its loosened explorative structure, it is difficult to ensure the 
conditions that would allow for the replication of findings.  In other words, while 
providing potentially useful information about the manifestations of unconscious 
thought in love, one would not be able to confidently make claims about the 
generalizability of such observed phenomena.   
Let me not get further into the debate that has occurred between those 
psychoanalysts disregarding the need for scientific exploration of the 
unconscious mind via controlled studies and those discarding the usefulness of 
insights about mental processes gained from the clinical encounter (recorded in 
case study fashion).  Instead let me begin to offer a kind of middle position, as 
has been articulated by Kriegman (1998).  He wrote about the use of clinical 
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case material and quantitative experimentation as methods of learning about the 
mind’s workings:  
 
… they are both forms of empirical evidence each with enormous problems. 
The former is plagued by subjective, individual interpretation with enormous 
bias and self-deception while it retains the power of the ability to perceive 
complex mental states in the context of intimate relationships using our highly 
evolved empathic accuracy…. The latter is plagued by the fact that much of 
the complexity and meaning of human experience is lost in the attempt to 
operationalize and atomize human experience while it retains a much greater 
degree of control (but certainly not complete) over the human tendency to 
bias and distort experience.  Both are empirical approaches, each with 
tremendous advantages and disadvantages. (p. 198)  
 
I am in favor of incorporating the unique advantages of as many different 
research methodologies to serve in concert to demonstrate how the mind 
consciously and unconsciously negotiates love.  As I will describe further in 
Chapter Four, I am advocating a multi-method research approach that would 
support the inclusion of case studies to aid both with hypothesis-generation as 
well as confirmation of findings from a large sample.   
Up to this point I have mentioned various types or categorical versions of 
unconscious mental processes.  I described the cognitive unconscious, which 
refers to certain forms of information-processing (e.g., implicit or procedural 
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memory).  Kandel (1999) recently distinguished a related form of unconscious 
mental life, the procedural unconscious, which was a marriage of psychoanalytic 
thought and neuroscience.  For Kandel, the procedural unconscious is the 
“unconscious part of the ego that is not conflicted or repressed” and corresponds 
to brain functions grouped under the heading of procedural memory” (2005, p. 
72).  As I have described, what distinguishes psychoanalytic models of 
unconscious mental life is the notion that people may be motivated at times to 
transform and maintain aspects of their psychological life unconsciously.  This 
represents the psychoanalytic dynamic unconscious, which can be thought of as 
a radical extension to the cognitive and procedural forms of unconscious mental 
processing.  In the next chapter I will set out a framework for both 
conceptualizing and researching the psychology of love that focuses on this 
dynamic aspect of what I will term the romantic unconscious.     
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CHAPTER FOUR: Future directions towards a romantic unconscious 
 
Love consists in this, that two solitudes protect and touch and greet each 
other. 
Rainer Maria Rilke from Letters to a Young Poet  
 
My aim in this chapter is to offer suggestions towards a more comprehensive 
way of studying love.  As I have stressed, there are currently too many models of 
love that exist in relative isolation from each other, whether within the differing 
schools of academic psychology, the related brain science fields and 
psychoanalysis, or between these disciplines.  In this chapter, I would like to 
articulate some ideas towards building a framework to understand the existing 
literature, as well as recommend future methods of future study.  In this 
undertaking, I espouse the spirit of intellectual integration in the service of 
providing a complex way to research romantic love.  Studying the minds, 
behaviors, mental processes and inner lives of those in love requires a way of 
employing the unique strengths of disparate disciplines.  In this pursuit, a 
mutually informing dialogue needs to be established between the parties that 
have contributed to the psychology of love.  Romantic love has to be defined 
broadly as a starting point, to allow for a range of inquired study that might 
capture its complexities.  I now offer my definition of romantic love.  Romantic 
love is a culturally conceived construct used to encompass and describe the 
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various components (sexual, attachment and otherwise) of an intimate 
relationship between persons.  
In this study, I have restricted my focus on the division between academic 
psychological (and the related brain sciences) and psychoanalytic approaches to 
romantic love.  To a certain degree, my explanation of the underlying 
assumptions of the various approaches to love reflects the more general 
assumptions within these fields of study.  Some of these larger epistemological 
and methodological differences have roots and manifestations that are beyond 
my scope to discuss (see Barron, Eagle & Wolitzky, 1992 for a treatment of this 
subject).  These differences have persisted for far too long, across too many 
generations of psychologists and psychoanalysts, that both sides, at best, appear 
to be reluctant interlocutors.  As with the example of romantic relationship 
research, this gulf is unfortunate because it has prevented a potentially mutually 
informing relationship. 
As I have articulated, the body of literature on the psychology of romantic love 
contains serious flaws, partly due to assumptions about the accessibility and 
accurate reporting of mental states related to love.  By advocating a model of the 
mind privileging conscious and rational thought processes, these flaws have 
limited the usefulness of the contributions of the literature as a whole.  This 
version of mental processing and reasoning does not accord with advances in 
psychological and brain research that have emphasized the importance of forms 
of unconscious information processing.  That the diversity of empirical romantic 
love models does not reflect a more complex version of reasoning, integrating 
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cognitive-affective conscious and unconscious processes, allows for only a 
partial rendering of romantic love’s psychology.  This severely limits the 
explanatory breadth and depth of empirically derived romantic relationship 
investigations.   
It has been my contention that the psychoanalytic literature can provide useful 
ways of thinking about mental processes and romantic love.  Psychoanalytic 
ideas that focus on the interplay of conscious and unconscious mental life can be 
used to link aspects of the existing empirical literature and guide future 
investigations.  With its clinical foundations, based primarily in consulting room 
observations and theoretical scholarship, psychoanalysis has long lacked the 
rigorous empirical methodological standards of psychological science.  Rather 
than simply viewing psychoanalysis as a solution to the problems of the 
academic psychology research into love, I am endorsing a more mutually 
beneficial relationship between the two sides.  In this chapter, I will propose 
guiding points to foster such a rapprochement in the psychoanalytic 
psychological approach to romantic love.   
The romantic unconscious is my way of describing the various unconscious 
aspects of mental life that contribute to the nature and course of one’s love 
relations.  In Part One (Chapters One and Two), I reviewed the empirical 
literature and identified limitations in the research, including an overreliance on 
conscious experience.  Despite the diversity of methods and explanations in the 
literature of studying romantic love, this research body does not offer a cohesive 
way of understanding its many parts.  Each romantic love model does not easily 
 227
connect to another; at times, the theories contradict, envelop or talk past each 
other explicitly or implicitly.  One way I proposed to link these models was to view 
each in terms of the motivational components they refer to. In Chapter Three, I 
introduced the value of utilizing psychoanalytic ideas about mental functioning 
and love relationships for the purpose of more comprehensively investigating 
love.  Among the central psychoanalytic ideas I highlighted that are without 
counterpart in romantic love research are: a dynamic unconscious; intrapsychic 
conflict amongst motivations; defensive functions that serve self regulating 
purposes; the management of self and other representations infused with 
degrees of fantasy; the role of sexuality; and the importance of contextualizing 
one’s developmental history.   
My ideas for conceptualizing and guiding romantic relationship research will 
focus on the interplay between conscious and unconscious factors across 
intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions.  Central to this is considering how 
romantic love involves a person’s compromise solutions to simultaneously 
occurring, at times conflicting, motivations. 18  I place particular focus on mental 
processes that serve self-regulating functions.  While I do not assume a 
superordinate motivational hierarchy, nor an inherent antagonism of aims, an 
investigation of underlying self organizing processes (including affect regulation) 
                                                 
18 I am aware of the psychoanalytic literature on compromise formation, most 
prominently used in Brenner’s work (1982).  Coming from a perspective that is 
informed by psychoanalytic thinking but not adherent to specific models of drive 
theory or ego psychology, I am using a broader definition of compromise 
formation and compromise solution, akin to Westen’s: “the solutions people 
develop to maximize fulfillment of conflicting motives simultaneously” (2002, p. 
406).    
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can serve as a unifying framework for understanding conflict and compromise in 
romantic love.  Instead of researching the antagonisms between motivational 
systems, I would recommend a process focus of understanding how motivational 
aims are negotiated.  
In a set of four guiding points, I will outline conceptual propositions that can 
guide the future thinking and researching of romantic relationships.  Since the 
subject of my study is the empirical investigation of love, my theoretical 
recommendations will be accompanied by methodological suggestions.  My 
framework is integrative by nature in its attempt to pull together strands of 
psychology and psychoanalysis (as well as individual perspectives within each).  
I seek to expand the current understanding of how and what kind of reasoning 
occurs in relationships.  After outlining my four interlocking propositions, I will 
conclude this dissertation with suggestion as to how to approach the rationality of 
romantic relationships.   
The reasoning used in romantic love involves conscious and unconscious 
information processing of both emotional and cognitive factors.  However, this 
reasoning does not follow formal rules of logic, but rather is bounded by limits to 
one’s self-knowledge and the existence of simultaneously occurring multiple 
motivations.  In other words, I am arguing that a person in love does not have 
one identifiable goal that he, through rational analysis, finds the most effective 
means to achieve.  The nature of love is too multifaceted to allow for such a 
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static linear reasoning process to be of use.19  In this way, my thinking about 
romantic love runs contrary to academic psychological models that privilege 
conscious experience and imply formal rationality and logic in relationships.  The 
process of forming compromise solutions to the problem of conflicting aims in 
love is constrained by various conditions such as a person’s subjective 
experience and life history, personality, constitutional and cognitive factors, 
intrapsychic and interpersonal motivational concerns, and cultural and 
environmental situations.   
While departing from the academic mainstream view, my framework attempts 
to integrate the various research and theoretical perspectives currently in the 
romantic love psychological literature.  It is broad enough to understand the 
different points of emphasis represented in the literature’s evolutionary, 
attachment, social cognitive, systemic, personality accounts of love as standing 
for potentially distinct dimensions of relationship aims and motivations.  My 
recommendations are meant to guide conceptual and empirical research by 
supplementing existing models.  In other words, my model is not meant to 
replace recent investigations, but rather to aid them by expanding or sharpening 
their focus.  In a truly integrative spirit, these points are broad enough to meld 
with theoretical claims and methods of particular branches of psychology as long 
as boundary lines are relaxed to allow for learning from different perspectives.  
                                                 
19 Though I will not explore it here, I am aware of the similarities, at least in spirit, 
between certain aspects of my view and work on applying non-linear dynamic 




These propositions for a psychoanalytic psychological (Bucci, 2000) framework 
for investigating romantic love serve as individual recommendations for further 
research.  However, taken together, these four points contribute to a theoretical 
and empirical approach to relationship rationality that focuses on the interplay 
between conflict and compromise in intrapsychic and interpersonal processes 
occurring on conscious and unconscious levels. 
One of the challenges faced in this type of study is posed by the requirements 
of the task.  An integrative project requires something beyond just an 
understanding of each of the many perspectives included.  One needs a kind of 
intellectual empathy in order to reconcile these multiple viewpoints without 
endangering the integrity of the original set of ideas.  At the same time, one must 
seek points of meeting in order to open up possibilities for integration.  The task 
involves the dangerous attempt to soften some of the conceptual edges without 
dulling them to such an extent that the distinct characters of the original models 
are lost.  To create the bridge towards a psychoanalytic psychological study of 
romantic love, dialogue must occur between different perspectives allowing for 
certain points of view to be debated, verified, rejected, accepted and 
compromised.  Just as my way of viewing romantic love centers on compromise 
solutions of conflict, so too must the same occur between psychology and 
psychoanalysis.  This represents my attempt at such a compromise.
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Recommendations for the psychoanalytic psychological research of romantic 
love 
 
1. Object relations  
 
In psychoanalytic theorizing, object relations can correspond to the 
intrapsychic management of potential objects of instinctual gratification.  
Kernberg emphasized that object relations refers to the internalization of the 
relationship between self and other, “in the form of a self-image or self-
representation interacting with an image or object representation” (2004, p. 27).  
Westen (2002) has defined object relations as the “behavioral patterns in intimate 
relationships and the motivational, cognitive, and affective processes that 
produce them” (G-11).  I would like to propose the usefulness of this framework 
for studying romantic relationship psychology.  Part of the utility of an object 
relations perspective is its ability to serve as a bridging concept to empirical 
research.  Masling and Bornstein (1994), in their edited volume of object relations 
research, described the relative ease of operationalizing and quantifying this way 
of thinking.  They attribute its ability to connect psychoanalysis and psychology to 
the focus object relations theories pay to ego development and the construction 
of one’s self-concept.  
Despite the connotation and Freudian origin of the term object, I do not mean 
to suggest that romantic partners conceive of each other as just serving as 
means to a motivational end.  Nevertheless I do believe that all close 
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relationships involve some processes of using the other, and that this ability to 
serve a loved other is an end in itself.  Rather than for its gratification 
associations, the term object is important in a psychological sense that is not 
captured in other terminology.  To think of romantic partner aspects and 
components in terms of psychological objects suggests the mental work involved 
and done on one’s representation of self, other and relationships.  This much 
needed object concept that accounts for the psychological work and processes 
involved in managing representations related to interpersonal life cuts across all 
disciplines. 
My use of an object relations paradigm is not restricted to the narrow 
motivational boundaries posited in specific psychoanalytic object relations 
theories. 20  Framed in a simple way that allows for interdisciplinary integration 
and research, object relations are the underlying cognitive-affective-motivational 
psychological correlates that guide interpersonal functioning.  The make up of 
one’s object relations has conscious and unconscious dimensions, though can 
be best thought of as dynamically operating at an intrapsychic level.  Object 
relations can be thought of as underlying such interpersonal constructs as social 
cognition, relationship schemas and social skills/intelligence.  I am proposing that 
                                                 
20 I am not going to focus on the theoretical assumptions that separate object 
relations thinking from other schools of psychoanalysis.  This is a discussion that 
involves a movement from the primacy of drives and a motivation towards 
tension reduction to theories that minimize the role of drives (for the most part) 
and elevate an inherent motivation towards contact with a psychological object.  
This subject has received much attention in such publications by Greenberg and 
Mitchell (1983) and Summers (1994).     
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researchers can address current deficits in the empirical literature of romantic 
relationships through the study of object relations. 
Commonly, empirical researchers ask subjects to rate the degree to which 
they are able to depend on, share with, get close to, commit to partners, etc.  
They are also asked to evaluate partners for commitment, passion, personality 
attributes, frequency of relationship behaviors, etc.  Aside from not reaching what 
is rendered and kept outside one’s conscious awareness, investigations of this 
sort do not try to understand the various psychological paths that lead to a 
response.  The current empirical literature does not provide a useful framework 
of understanding the pathway that leads to one’s ability to take someone as a 
love object.  It does not answer questions such as: What about my unique 
psychology allows me to respond to certain characteristics of this other person in 
a romantic way?  What about this person, the way I see him and the way we 
relate to each other, contributes to the passion I experience in our relationship?  
What prevents this long-time friend of mine from becoming more attractive 
emotionally in my embodied mind’s eye?  What in my psychology makes me see 
him as novel and exciting and thus contributes to my ability to relate to him as a 
sexual partner?  What makes this person an unsuitable attachment in my eyes?  
What allows me to see this person as someone to commit to, when I had 
previously not valued commitment in relationships?  In other words, one’s rating 
or accounting of a loved other (on these measures) does not give information 
about how this response is formed and what it means for the responding person. 
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A framework that integrates conscious and unconscious aspects of cognitive-
affective motivational dynamics is needed to provide a more comprehensive 
description of the way one psychologically understands self and other in 
relationship.  Romantic love research studies the psychology of interpersonal 
relations as a collection of static constructs of schemas, attitudes and appraisal 
patterns.  However, romantic relationships are anything but static and require an 
approach that does not treat romantic representations of loved others as readily-
accessible and accurately apprehended and attended to.  A person’s responses 
on an average research questionnaire should not be treated as accurate 
representations of events (relationship behaviors), mental states (thoughts, 
feelings, etc.) and processes related to romantic love.  Such responses are, at 
best, approximations of a person’s feelings, thoughts, and behaviors in romantic 
relationships.  They are best conceived as likely indicators of a person’s 
perceptual, interpretive and evaluative process in love.  
A research balance needs to be struck between partners’ self-reported 
perceptions of romantic experience, the actual observable correlates of this 
experience (which can be accomplished by observational methods such as 
videotaped interactions) and the psychological process that underlies both.  It is 
this third area, of psychological process, that is shockingly lacking in the research 
literature.  The advances in the study of romantic love’s psychological 
mechanisms have come primarily from attachment and social cognition studies, 
which study the processes and internal working models that influence people’s 
romantic perceptions.  However, these fields do not adequately deal with 
 235
dynamically unconscious factors, which I will address in a later point.  They 
operate from a model of the mind and reasoning that relies too heavily on 
conscious introspection and awareness of one’s psychology.   
According to research findings from attachment and social cognition research, 
a person’s anxiety of relationship intimacy, use of one’s partner to regulate self-
esteem, idealization of one’s partner and insecurities around partner’s availability 
are all readily accessible through direct questioning.  There is no doubt that 
people can be aware of some degree to which they experience such relationship 
states, but this awareness is hardly complete.  This research does not reflect the 
incorporation of kinds of mental processes involved in the registration and 
management of interpersonal motivational concerns.  I am particularly talking 
about the mental mechanisms (i.e., defenses) that are aimed at obscuring 
aspects of relationship motivations and experiences as a function of affect 
regulation.  These processes occur on an intrapsychic level and require a 
conceptual framework specifically able to account for dynamically unconscious 
functions. 
An object relations framework provides a way of conceptualizing how 
motivations within romantic relationships are managed in a dynamic way 
involving a person’s negotiation of intrapsychic conflict and compromise.  Across 
all object relations theories is a central notion is that the psychological self is 
formed from the vicissitudes of object relationships (Summer, 1994).  In this light, 
one can understand intrapsychic conflict and compromise as related to the 
anxiety of a threat posed to the psychological self (or self-representation).  Since 
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the building blocks of the self are object and self-representational units, 
perceived danger to these can result in intrapsychic conflict.  Differentiating this 
object relations take on conflict from a traditional drive-ego model, Kernberg 
wrote,  “unconscious intrapsychic conflicts are never simply between impulse and 
defense; rather, both impulse and defense find expression through certain 
internalized object relations” (2004, p. 45).  The object relations focus on how a 
person consciously and unconsciously manages relationship motivational 
experiences may be the most important point that psychoanalysis has to offer the 
romantic love conversation.  It adds a possible window for viewing what and how 
aspects of a person’s motivational history in relationships impact the way 
romantic love is felt and lived.  
Examining one’s intrapsychic world of object relations can reveal how one 
manages motivational aims.  In an object relations model a person’s motivations 
take on a historical quality, in which continuity and discontinuity of development 
are considered.  A person’s salient motivations in a romantic relationship evolve 
through a process of psychological conflict and compromise throughout one’s 
life, dating back through one’s earliest object relationships.  A person forms an 
object relationship with an other through an active psychological process.  From 
a young age, one consciously and unconsciously internalizes aspects of the 
other which function for the person in needed ways.  A principle important to 
object relations theories is the way that a psychological self structure forms 
through the internalization of early relationships which serve care-giving and 
attachment functions (Summers, 1994).  Through the average expectable 
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maturational process, given the availability of appropriate emotional supplies 
needed to survive and thrive, the person is eventually able to relate to an other 
on a level that is not restricted to the other serving only as an object or function 
for the person.  The person is then related to as more of a whole object, though 
is still psychologically construed with degrees of fantasy driven by a person’s 
motivational orientations (including related fears and wishes). A person does not 
lose this dependence on important others to structure, regulate and maintain 
one’s psychological self, but becomes less reliant on external sources in 
managing such functions for oneself.  This is an aspect of human psychology 
and relationships that features more prominently for some object relations 
theories (e.g., self psychology) than others.  Applied to romantic love research, 
this object relations level of viewing interpersonal relations can further explain the 
intrapsychic dimension underlying other models of close relationships.            
As described in Chapter One, the attachment literature has provided evidence 
for the connection between a person’s attachment to early caregivers and 
romantic partners.  This indicates the continuity of attachment motivations, not to 
mention conflicts and compromises involved—not to mention the repetition of 
attachment behaviors.  However, the attachment literature deals with a person’s 
conscious (or, at most, preconscious) experience of attachment.  An object 
relations paradigm includes ways of thinking about one’s states of mind in 
relation to attachment that are defensively rendered dynamically unconscious.   
A broadly-conceived object relations paradigm can add a method of inquiry 
about the processes, both conscious and unconscious, that one undertakes in 
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psychologically registering and managing attachment-related relationship 
experiences.  An object relations framework emphasizes the role individuals’ 
unique psychology in interpreting and then internalizing the experiences of 
motivational satisfaction and frustration in relationships.  A person’s history of 
motivational satisfaction and frustration creates conditions for repetition in 
relationships as people continue to seek out relationship experiences to meet 
motivational needs.  In an object relations framework, one can consider a 
person’s romantic relationship strivings, experiences, and behaviors as not 
necessarily aimed towards achieving optimal relationships satisfaction. The very 
ideas of what is optimal and what is satisfying take on a different sense than in, 
say, social exchange theories that adopt rational economic principles of optimal 
outcomes. 
An object relations paradigm explores how people seek to stabilize self and 
other (and self-with-other) representations.  Based on people’s unique 
motivational histories in relationships, which lead a series of conflicts and 
compromises, they learn basic ways of operating and negotiating their 
interpersonal worlds.  They learn ways of thinking about, ignoring, transforming 
and achieving needs in relationships.  In romantic love this involves a learning of 
ways to manage self-other representations that are subject to degrees of intense 
affective investment.  A person consciously and unconsciously finds 
psychological methods to regulate the amount of affect associated to potential 
romantic love objects.  This may include a degree of fantasy and defensive 
distortion, by which, for example one unconsciously sets the terms that such 
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attachment-related memories and states can be activated.  Repetition patterns in 
a person’s romantic relationship history indicate self-regulatory processes used 
to manage the affective quality of object relations.  
Bowlby, at least in part, worked on attachment theories to act as a corrective 
to the psychoanalytic privileging of intrapsychic experience at the expense of 
“real” and “actual” events.  As reflected in the current state of the empirical study 
of love, the pendulum has swung the other way and it is now imperative that a 
model for thinking about the role of dynamically unconscious psychological 
processes be re-introduced.  One must take into account a person’s reported 
experience of “real” romantic relationship events.  However, one must not neglect 
the role of intrapsychic and unconscious factors, centered on motivational conflict 
and compromise, in the registration, maintenance and recalling of such events. 
The study of romantic love’s psychology should concern itself with how 
relationship experiences are psychologically manipulated and preserved, and 
under what conditions.      
This raises another point to emphasize for object relations theories, namely, 
that this process of psychologically internalizing important aspects of 
relationships with others is an active one that involves a person’s interpretation of 
the other as opposed to a passive taking in or reception.  Applied to a study of 
romantic love, an object relations perspective offers a window to view what a 
person psychologically “does” with relationships.  An object relation is not a ready 
made link between people but involves construction through personality, 
constitutional attributes and, of course, motivational history in relationships.  A 
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person forms object relationships based on their motivational configuration at a 
given time.  This is a different picture of romantic relationships than one would 
find in the empirical literature, where researchers treat subjects as passive 
recorders of relationship experiences.  One would be hard pressed to find much 
attention paid to the influence that motivational, defensive and adaptational 
needs have on subject responses (aside from the attachment and social 
cognition literature, the limitations of which I have discussed).    
Romantic partners’ interpretative and evaluative engagement occurs on a 
conscious and unconscious psychological level.  Involved in this interpretive 
process is a determination of sorts, informed by cognitive-affective reasoning and 
subsymbolic states of mind that loved objects can be related to in a way that 
allows for a romantic relationship.  Romantic love, when requited, is a process by 
which both partners interpret that the other can be related to in a way that is 
mutually benefiting, though not always in ways that are similar for both persons.  
An object relations concept is necessary for capturing partially unconscious 
psychological interactional patterns.  For example, one may think of Sandler’s 
ideas about “role responsiveness,” in which one externalizes fantasized aspects 
of self-object relations in interpersonal relationships (1976).  In other words, one 
can understand romantic partner’s behavior as directed towards inducing the 
other to act or respond in ways that fulfill fantasized object relationship 
motivations.  A research application of this could lead to focusing on what some 
psychoanalytic writers have discussed as the capacity to be open to the 
transference of the romantic other.  This includes the ability to tolerate the 
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fantasy projections of a loved other, as well as identifying with aspects of one’s 
partner.  This speaks to a capacity of consciously and unconsciously loosening 
one’s psychological boundaries (Fonagy, 2006). 
Including and aside from the work I reviewed in Chapter Three, there is a 
psychoanalytic literature outlining the role of fantasy in romantic love that fits into 
an object relations perspective (Bergmann, 1987; Kremen & Kremen, 1971).  
Some of these writings focus on ideas of transference and idealization.  In clinical 
psychoanalysis, transference refers to “the patient’s emotional experience of and 
fantasies about the analyst, which, though they may be based in part on actual 
perceptions of the analyst, recapitulate experiences and fantasies about 
important objects in the patient’s childhood” (Zimmer et al., 2005, p. 561).  
Westen defined transference as a more general psychological phenomena 
occurring in everyday life: “the process whereby people experience similar 
thoughts, feelings, fears, wishes and conflicts in new relationships as they did in 
past relationships” (2002, p. 562).   
Involved in the transferring of feelings and thoughts about a person’s past to a 
present romantic partner are the mechanisms of idealization (discussed in 
Chapter Three).  In an object relations perspective, an idealizing transference in 
one’s romantic relationships is focused not only on a transfer of attributes but on 
a transfer of a past object’s function into a present object relationship.  In other 
words, what is central is not the attributes of the other, but how the object 
relationship was experienced, how it functioned and what motivations the person 
has to continue seeking out (or avoiding) similar ones.  As Freud posited 
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(described in Chapter Three), in a new love object a person may be 
unconsciously seeking to re-find or avoid re-finding a version of an older one.            
More recently, social cognitive researchers have researched not only 
transferential processes, but also interpersonal mechanisms used by people to 
actualize an ideal representation of themselves in romantic relationships.  Some 
of this literature was covered in Part One, in regards to Andersen’s social 
cognitive study of everyday transference (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Andersen & 
Glassman, 1996) and the Michelangelo Phenomenon (Drigotas, 2002; et al. 
1999), and further research on ideals exists (Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas, & 
Giles, 1999; Knee et al., 2001).  While these represent a valuable incorporation 
of such concepts into empirical research, these perspectives could benefit from a 
conceptual object relations framework (both to guide hypothesis generation and 
data explanation).  This would allow for investigating how romantic partners may 
attend to or recruit aspects of each other to invest with fantasy in accordance 
with motivational needs within a relationship.  One can again think of Sandler’s 
role responsiveness, discussed earlier.  Current research offerings lack ways of 
explaining the dynamic function of transferential and idealizing mechanisms and 
treat them as occurring as preconscious, or at most, implicit processes.21  As a 
result, there are few intellectually satisfying ways of making psychological sense 
of the inaccuracies people demonstrate in their perceptions of romantic partners 
                                                 
21 Without a conception of dynamically unconscious processes, one cannot even 
approach more sophisticated psychoanalytic constructs such as the role of 
triangulation and Oedipal dynamics in romantic love.  I will develop this further in 




and aspects of relationships.  The existing literature understands these as 
deficits in psychological perception in relationships.  However, this way of 
understanding the situation neglects any conflictual and dynamic roots to the 
gaps in awareness in how people psychologically attend to and manage self and 
object representations in romantic love. 
A place of future investigative interest for the field is exploring what is entailed 
in the way romantic partners transform each other and become desired objects of 
love.  By researching how loved others are psychologically represented by and 
function for each other, one is able to further ascertain the aspects about the 
members of a romantic couple that allow them to serve as psychological love 
objects. An object relations perspective searches for this information in lovers’ 
historical pasts.  By historical, I mean that an object relations viewpoint 
emphasizes the roots of one’s motivational history in relationships, including past 
ways of dealing with conflicts and compromises.  Further, it opens up additional 
avenues for thinking of repetitive dynamic conscious and unconscious 
motivational configurations in romantic relationships.  Missing from current 
research treatments of love is the discussion of why people search for certain 
kinds of relationships (whether defined by attachment styles, love styles, etc.).   
Empirically speaking, the attachment research has done the best job in 
explaining why certain relationships are repeatedly sought after and entered into 
instead of others.  It has yielded evidence to show how people seek the stability 
of object representational patterns that reflect familiar ways of regulating the 
intense affect of romantic relationships.  Excluded from this conversation, 
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however, is the complex range of psychological processes that people use to 
mentally comprehend and manage the necessary aspects of love relationships.  
Research questions guided by object relations hypotheses can attend to the 
range of psychological compromises people establish to handle intrapsychic 
conflict.   
Finally, an object relations perspective, as I have broadly conceived of it, can 
offer a way of thinking about both continuous and discontinuous motivations in 
romantic relationships.  Put another way, allowing for a range of simultaneously 
operative conscious and unconscious motivations requires a way of 
understanding why certain aims persist while others seem less salient.  I will 
develop these ideas in the guiding points that follow.  However, for now, it is 
important to say that an object relations perspective opens up avenues of 
thinking about and researching the fate of motivational aims originating early in 
life, and those which are learned later in life.  Specifically, motivations related to 
intimacy, care-giving and attachment security have correlates in early 
relationships with parental caregivers.  How one’s early object relationships 
satisfied or frustrated these aims, contributes to an individual’s psychological 
structure for object relations.  The way these experiences are psychologically 
registered and managed will influence how these motivations function in current 
romantic relationships.  There is a way of thinking of idealization as 
unconsciously carrying out the function of elevating the importance of the 
romantic object, in terms of how they could potentially fulfill a much sought after 
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object relationship (related to a perceived continuous need, deficit or motivational 
aim) (Reik, 1957).   
The role of research is in investigating what aspects of potential romantic 
others allow them to be unconsciously and consciously perceived as able to fulfill 
certain object relationship functions.  This could translate to a study of what 
conditions allow for a romantic relationship to form between two prospective 
partners.  One could come away from the empirical literature thinking that there 
are certain absolute variables that would lead any two people to become lovers.  
My contention is that this is not the case and that the necessary conditions that 
would allow a romantic relationship to occur have to be understood at an object 
relations level.  Further, as demonstrated in couples observational research on 
conflict management, it will be a fruitful endeavor to study how romantic partners’ 
object relations motivations interact in manifest behavioral form.  As I will suggest 
shortly, this involves studying simultaneously occurring interactional patterns of 
fantasy, transference, idealization and projection.  Studying romantic love at the 
object relations level involves recognizing the mutuality of such ubiquitous 
processes that occurs at least partially outside of awareness. 
 
Implications for Research Design  
• Object relations concepts have provided psychoanalytically-informed 
researchers a method of empirically studying the way a person represents 
close relationships.  Descriptions of self and significant others get scored 
via the Object Relations Inventory/ Object Representations Inventory 
method, which assess representations across dimensions of qualitative-
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thematic content, cognitive-structural conceptual level of organization, and 
differentiation-relatedness (Blatt, 1974; et al. 1979; 1988; Diamond, Blatt, 
Stayner, & Kazlow, 1991).  It is particularly this last way of scoring that is 
useful in its ability to provide a gauge of how a person’s representations of 
loved others can range from being characterized by boundary confusion 
and idealization/denigration to a more nuanced intersubjective quality.  
This method does not just allow a glimpse into the quality and structure of 
a person’s romantic object representational world, but also a person’s 
representations of parental figures.  This research by itself can provide a 
way of gauging how subjects’ representations of romantic self and other 
relate to a larger constellation of past important objects.  In other words, 
researchers may be able to get a sense of the continuity of object relations 
themes by eliciting descriptions of important past romantic partners, 
parental figures, as well as people’s representations of themselves (both 
presently and in past relation to these objects).  The utility in a research 
method like the ORI is in it being an indirect measure of object relations, 
as researchers score a person’s descriptions based on content , as well 
as structural organization.  In other words, this is not just a measure driven 
by affective tone or coloring; scoring is based on quality not just content.  
One can infer from ORI ratings the degree to which one’s interpersonal 
relationships are characterized by fantasy-fueled distortion and projection 
that remain detached from reality.  The ORI method would ideally be 
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combined with other relationship measures, including those currently 
existing or the kinds as I have suggested above.22   
• Research needs to move beyond the traditional psychoanalytically-
informed measures, like ORI and projective measures (like the Thematic 
Apperception Test and Rorschach).  Andersen’s research (Andersen & 
Chen, 2002; Andersen & Glassman, 1996), described in Chapter Two, on 
everyday transference, while from a social cognition perspective, 
represents a model of research where experimental manipulation can 
demonstrate repetition of object relations patterns from past significant 
other to strangers.  This style of research allows for investigators, within a 
laboratory setting, to witness the unconscious importance of object 
relations organizing themes for people in the way they perceive and 
process otherwise neutral interpersonal situations.  I would advocate the 
use of other methodological tools, such as adapted versions of California 
Q-set (Block, 1961), which could be used to have romantic partners 
assess each other and past loves across various personality attributes. Q-
sort methodology is generally underutilized in romantic love investigations, 
and if adapted to also reflect object relations concerns could be an 
empirically viable way of accessing unconscious romantic organizing 
                                                 
22 In one known dissertation example of this method (Ebenstein, 2005), the ORI 
was used along with various attachment measures with married couples.  
Results indicated that husbands and wives within each couple had a similar level 
of differentiation-relatedness.  However, there was no significant relationship 
between mental representations and attachment status, nor was a significant 
relationship found between satisfaction with intimacy and the capacity for 
differentiation and relatedness. 
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configurations that are operative in a person’s life.  This then could be 
used in an Andersen-like experimental setting to demonstrate how people 
interact with strangers who resemble consciously and unconsciously 
familiar others. 
• I would also advocate the development of semi-structured interviews 
whereby a researcher would be able to investigate representational 
tendencies, relationship aims and experiences over the course of a 
person’s romantic life, and outside of romantic relationships (parents, 
siblings, friends).  In this way, one could qualitatively look for consistency 
and discrepancy across romantic relationships and between other 
relationships and romantic ones—persistence of needs, relationship 
themes and patterns, etc.  Conducting these interviews with romantic 
partners would be specifically informative in providing data about what sort 
of patterns frequently occur, and to what degree of awareness.  Having 
couples speak about their relationships experiences both together and 
about past loves, in private and then possibly together can lead to 
opportunities for confirmatory and contradictory data.  A design could be 
created that would have partners attempt to answer various questions 
about each others’ relationship psychology (this would include inquiries 
about motivations, ways of managing affective conflict, issues of 
compromise, development of patterns, etc.). Then a videotaped session 
can be arranged where partners then have to reveal answers.  This would 
allow an interesting multi-method forum for understanding how partners 
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psychologically make sense of their lovers (as opposed to just a static 
representation).  Further, the feedback session would not only provide a 
videotaped observation of couples interacting in a relationship task (which 
then can be coded for nonverbal behavior and Gottman’s behavioral 
analysis of conflict management), but also serve as a way of assessing 
gaps in one’s knowledge about oneself.  One could extend this and add a 
second videotaped session, where couples are then asked to reflect and 
comment on both of their experiences of the first videotaped task while 
watching it.  This could provide useful data concerning how they 
understand their interactions upon review and their capacity for using 
feedback from researchers.  Wilson has suggested (2002) that inferring 
behavior indirectly from the reports of others is a viable route to increasing 
self-knowledge and indicating unconscious defensive processes. 
• The purpose in the kind of research I am proposing here is not assuming a 
similarity or complementarity hypothesis of couples object relations 
profiles.  This kind of view to relationships, I believe, is a far too simplistic 
guiding hypothesis to apply to romantic love that has lingered in the 
research literature for far too long.  Research investigations into love, 
while not devoid of hypotheses, should approach the investigation of 
romantic object relations allowing for various kinds of relationships 
between partners’ object relations histories and current relation to each 
other as romantic objects.  If one is to take seriously the role of 
dynamically unconscious processes as serving self-organization, then one 
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would have to allow for various kinds of ways in which romantic partners 
internalize, manage and maintain cognitive-affective representations of the 
other.  Apropos some of what the psychoanalytic literature teaches,  
object relations research open up an avenue to understanding the multiple 
ways people, consciously and unconsciously, represent romantic others in 
their minds.  A main area of inquiry that may prove related to relationship 
satisfaction is the openness someone has to being represented in all sorts 
of shifting ways for a romantic partner.  Researchers can assess this 
through interviews that elicit descriptions of relationship mental states and 
behavior.  This would include the capacity for people to be able to reflect 
on being a potential object of use, adoration, aggression, tenderness, 
mutual care, etc. in the mind of their loved other.  It is unclear to what 
degree this relationship aspect is related to such empirically tested 
constructs as psychological mindedness or Reflective Function (RF) 
(Fonagy, et al., 1998). One could imagine a connection that then can be 
investigated by correlating relationship quality factors with reflective 
function scores on romantic attachment interviews.  At this point, RF has 
mainly been used as a research tool in the realm of parent-child 
attachment.  I would recommend that this scoring system would have to 
be adapted particularly to assess the kind of mentalized affectivity 
involved in romantic relationships. 
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2. A dynamically unconscious psychology 
 
As I have discussed earlier, what has been sorely undervalued in the 
empirical literature of romantic love is a consideration of unconscious mental life.  
Though there has been a gradual movement in academic psychology to research 
the existence of processes, occurring outside of awareness, that influence 
behavior, thought and emotions, this area of study has not satisfactorily made 
inroads into romantic relationship investigation.  I would like to broaden this 
research to include an understanding of the dynamic processes by which aspects 
of mental life are rendered unconscious as serving the function of self-regulation. 
In terms of research, a move of this sort means going beyond just 
demonstrating that aspects of mental life occur outside of one’s awareness but 
still remain influential.  In the current academic research way of thinking, what 
occurs outside of one’s awareness is functionally unconscious for a variety of 
reasons.  One reason involves the role of brain regions (e.g., limbic) or functions 
(e.g., procedural, implicit memory) that are not directly accessible or cannot be 
translated into consciousness.  Some, like Wilson (2002), have argued that 
unconscious processes developed evolutionarily for adaptive efficiency reasons.  
While this contention was made in reference to a descriptively unconscious mind, 
dynamically unconscious processes can also be thought of as serving 
evolutionary adaptive purposes in a broad sense.  
I am suggesting that there are functions of the mind that occur outside of 
one’s awareness both due to the nature of certain processes and also in the 
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service of self organizing purposes such, as affect regulation.  Further, similar to 
the way that certain processes (like the “how to” skills of procedural memory) 
become unconscious for adaptively efficiency reasons, other psychological 
functions may become unconscious for affective regulatory reasons (which may 
also be adaptively efficient).  In other words, because of some affective quality 
(intensity or otherwise) that is to some degree intolerable, aspects of one’s 
mental life may be pushed outside of conscious reach and rendered 
unconscious.  A psychoanalytic conception about dynamically unconscious 
processes can be a useful framework of understanding how this aspect of human 
psychology exists on a continuum of adaptiveness.  This kind of thinking, 
however, is under-researched and undervalued in the empirical literature on love.  
This current state exists even despite some of the empirical evidence, outside of 
the romantic love field, described in Chapter Two, that showed how aspects of 
reasoning are informed by affective processes that are excluded from awareness 
due to their intolerable nature to a person. 
I think it serves the purposes of cross-discipline integration better to extend 
not only the academic view of unconscious as inaccessible, but even to re-
characterize the psychoanalytic dynamic unconscious as defined by repression.  
Repression can get bogged down in psychoanalytic metapsychology that is not 
only difficult to research but also appeals to narrow motivational systems that I 
have argued are not as useful for interdisciplinary endeavors.  As I discussed last 
chapter, while there is not a satisfying way to create a master motivational 
hierarchy, it is probably most agreeable (as suggested by Eagle, 1984) to adopt 
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a framework of linking all motives by underlying self-regulatory and self-
organizing processes.  This can potentially transform the idea of a dynamic 
unconscious into a more translatable construct for other disciplines of psychology 
to empirically explore with applications to romantic love.   
One may argue that understanding a dynamic unconscious as a way of 
understanding self-regulatory processes (and more specifically affect-regulatory) 
may be diluting the conceptual strengths of its psychoanalytic roots.  However, 
not only is it necessary to broaden its scope and re-interpret a characterization of 
the dynamic unconscious as the product of repression, but this follows certain 
trends in psychoanalysis as well.  Aside from the focus on growing centrality in 
psychoanalysis on affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 2002; Jurist, 2005; Schore, 
2003a, 2003b; Sugarman, 2006), this move joins earlier attempts to reformulate 
dynamically unconscious mental contents and properties.  These efforts 
attempted to reformulate what was traditionally thought of as dynamically 
repressed to: not-me experiences dissociated from the self-system (Sullivan, 
1953, 1956); incompatible split-off cognitive affective aspects of the self (Klein, 
1976); disavowed, disclaimed and disowned wishes and aims (Eagle, 1984); 
broken or blocked referential links between subsymbolic and symbolic systems 
(Bucci, 1997); and unformulated experiences (Stern, 1997).  Thinking of 
dynamically unconscious mental life in the context of self-regulation opens up 
avenues of viewing such regulatory processes by tracking the course 
symbolizing and desymbolizing processes.  The latter can be conceived as 
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movements towards inhibited insightfulness in order to manage associated 
aversive affective states.   
Understanding repression and associated defensive processes in the context 
of affect-regulation and then self-organization may also help to correct what 
Eagle has identified as the traditional conception of the unconscious as a 
“seething cauldron” (1984).   He relates this to the coupling of unconscious realm 
of mental life with an id that is the source of primitive, unadulterated libidinal and 
aggressive instincts.  This is certainly evidenced in versions of unconscious 
mental life used by psychologists as a starting point to reject in a reformulation of 
the unconscious as being characterized by those cognitive processes that by 
nature are already inaccessible (Kandel, 1999; LeDoux 1996; Wilson 2002).  The 
departure from an id-ego model, where the former is associated with 
unconscious instinctual content and repressed impulses and the latter is seen as 
the agency of control, will allow for a broader conception of the regulatory 
processes.     
This movement would help change the inadequate spatial metaphor of a 
singular kind of unconscious mental life and replace it with a more active process 
model with various functions and properties.  One must realize that thinking 
about the unconscious as a place originated within psychoanalysis with Freud’s 
early ideas of the unconscious system being governed by the pleasure principle 
and primary process.  Though his ideas eventually changed to extend the 
unconscious throughout the mental apparatus including portions of the superego 
and ego, the id retained many of the most primitive characteristics of the 
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unconscious system.  The hard dichotomizing of primary and secondary 
processing across lines of conscious and unconscious mental functioning is an 
idea that is not well supported by research (Meissner, 2005).  I am in general 
agreement with the academic psychological view that conceives of unconscious 
mental processes as being different, but not necessarily more primitive and 
archaic than conscious thought (Wilson, 2002).  These differences cannot just be 
speculated about and observed in clinical consultation, but must be further 
explored and demonstrated through empirical observation.   
Let me be clear, there is little value in thinking of an unconscious as a region 
of the mind (or brain) that is separate, more primitive, cruder, and malevolent 
from a conscious more rational one.  The research I canvassed in Chapter Two 
not only mandates a rethinking of the rational processes privileged in the 
romantic relationship research, but also a psychoanalytic departure from rigid 
ego-id, conscious-unconscious, primary-secondary process divisions.  Not only 
must we get away from spatial metaphors of unconscious and conscious mental 
life, but we must also move to understanding qualities of information processing 
as occurring on a continuum.  Freud changed his views to extend the 
unconscious across his different agencies of the mind.  In the same way, 
researchers must come to acknowledge that there is not one unconscious, but a 
range of unconscious processes (ranging across all aspects of mental functions) 
that cannot be singly characterized by a primitive quality.   
Westen (1997) has argued that unconscious be used adjectivally rather than 
nominally in order to properly allow for the different functions and properties that 
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can be accurately characterized as unconscious.  I am in fundamental agreement 
with him in this assertion, and in thinking that it would best serve both 
psychoanalysis and the psychological and brain sciences to be careful in 
definitively attributing properties to unconscious mental life.  There is no doubt 
that psychoanalysis has offered the longest and most sustained study of 
unconscious psychology; however its clinical observations and theoretical 
assertions must be bounded by research evidence.  The same holds for 
academic research evidence that neglect clinically informed psychoanalytic 
observations of disclaimed but operative aspects of mental functioning.  If those 
outside psychoanalysis find it hard to give credence to such psychological 
operations, a mutually informing dialogue would require alternate explanations.  
Currently the separation between academic psychology and psychoanalysis 
does not allow for collaborative research activity, from hypothesis-generating to 
finding theoretical constructs to make sense of research data.    
My review of the empirical literature in Chapters One and Two showed first 
how the romantic love research privileges one’s conscious reasoning about love 
and then explained the limitations of this approach.  Psychoanalytic ideas of a 
dynamic unconscious are able to provide a conceptual framework to understand 
why certain thoughts, feelings and motivations in love may be disavowed though 
still remain highly activated or operative in relationships.  That which is 
psychologically disowned but still influences one’s romantic life cannot just be 
theorized about, clinically observed and then generalized.  It will take empirically-
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based systematic investigations to more completely ascertain what is involved in 
forms of dynamic unconscious regulation.    
It is far too speculative to say, for example, that that Oedipal longings for the 
opposite sex parent, narcissistic self-object needs, tenderness or aggressive 
impulses have a high likelihood to be rendered dynamically unconscious in the 
context of romantic relationships.  What the psychoanalytic literature provides are 
additional ways (to those that can be derived from the empirical literature) of 
hypothesizing what sorts of things can and may get psychologically split-off from 
consciousness.  However, the actual frequency of occurrence and the ways this 
process works are research questions that have yet to be properly posed, and 
answered.    
As I will discuss in a later point, what gets dynamically disowned in romantic 
love has to be understood in the context of a whole host of factors that are 
pertinent to the person and romantic couple.  The psychoanalytic and 
relationship research literatures can be used to identify some of these factors 
that could be important variables in romantic love, and further research can then 
be initiated to demonstrate under what kinds of conditions does something 
become affectively intolerable enough to be dynamically rendered unconscious.  
I do believe that the key to this level of understanding will be conceiving of such 
affective regulatory processes as being linked to motivational concerns.  In other 
words, thoughts, feelings, representations and impulses that get dissociated from 
one’s experiential self and conscious awareness in love should be understood for 
motivational components (and compromises between them)  
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Just as I do not support the idea of inherently antagonistic drives, instincts 
and motivations, I do not advocate characterizing unconscious mental life as 
inherently consisting of those aspects of people’s inner life that are too repugnant 
to own as part of oneself.  It is a research question to answer what sorts of things 
can be experienced and understood as affectively intolerable to one’s conception 
of self in relationships (and in one’s general self-representation) to need to be 
made alien from oneself, pushed outside of consciousness, while remaining 
reactive to activation in romantic situations.  Conversely aspects of one’s 
romantic partner may elicit an affectively aversive response that necessitates 
unconscious acts of distortion or denial.  Here is where another important 
psychoanalytic concept needs to be brought into this discussion, that of defense 
mechanisms.   
Defenses can be used to describe automatic, unconscious mental processes 
(that occur on a range of adaptiveness) that a person uses to regulate 
uncomfortable affective states (Westen, 2002; Zimmer et al., 2005).  Defenses 
can be employed by romantic partners in a couple in the service of regulating 
their affective responses to aspects of the other or of their relationship.  As I will 
describe subsequently, defensive processes lend themselves to empirical study 
and are a viable way of investigating the psychological work that can be done on 
an unconscious level to transform, modify, and deny one’s inner states in relation 
to motivations.  In the notion of something being dynamically unconscious, the 
dynamic aspect refers to the combination of processes (conflict, defense, 
compromise) that operate to render and maintain something as unconscious.   
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Let me explain by way of an over-simplified example.  One may derive a 
certain level of comfort and satisfaction in a particular love relationship that 
resembles Lee’s storgic type (quiet and companionate).  This could indicate a 
heavily positively valenced motivation towards stability and consistency for a 
person that is being fulfilled in this relationship.  However, this same person may 
have another motivation for passion and sexual excitement that she does not find 
in this current relationship.  To the degree that the two motivations are in conflict 
with one another, a compromise may be made.  Of course a compromise 
between sexual passion and stability in relationships can be made at the 
conscious level, specifically if one is valued to a greater degree than the other.   
What if this is not the case, and a relationship aim of sexual pleasure is closer in 
importance as stability concerns?  Then, in a relationship, where one’s sex life 
does not fulfill passionate aims, what must one do with such needs?    
Such conflicts can be managed by compromise formations in which certain 
aspects of one’s romantic motivations are rendered unconscious (through 
defensive processes).   In order to allow one set of motivations to be experienced 
and possibly fulfilled in less obstructed ways, aspects of the other may need to 
be kept unconsciously defended against.  This does not necessarily mean that a 
complete motivation is kept outside of one’s awareness.  Aspects of a motivation 
(affective intensity, ideational components) that prove incompatible with one’s 
self-organization may be disowned and rendered unconscious.  By the terms of 
this compromise, by rendering motivational components unconscious, one 
reduces the affective discomfort of being consciously aware of such a conflict 
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(i.e., simultaneous aims not being fulfilled).  Not only do aspects of motivation 
move outside of awareness, but also the conflict between such motivations and 
the process of unconscious transformation itself.  However, this does not 
eliminate such a conflict, but rather leaves it less accessible to direct 
introspection.   
The conflict between stability and sexual passion in this hypothetical 
relationship may be resolved by an unconscious defense that minimizes one’s 
conscious experience of sexual impulses.  This is not to say that one will not be 
sexually responsive, but rather may unconsciously dampen down activities 
leading towards sexual aim in order to experience the achievement of the 
stability of her relationship.  This compromise can be made at an unconscious 
level, so that she consciously experiences sexual dissatisfaction to a lesser 
degree while being able to satisfy stability needs.  Of course, this is an overly 
simplified example that does not take into account the range of contextual factors 
that allow for such a situation of conflict, defense and compromise to take place.   
I will develop this idea further in a later point addressing the importance of 
contextuality.   
The point is that a conception of dynamically unconscious processes allows a 
broad framework to consider how almost all motivational aspects of 
psychological romantic life can be thought of as potentially affectively intolerable 
—whether aims of competition, reproduction, agency, tenderness, attachment, 
companionship, or sexuality.  In my next guiding point, I will discuss further the 
importance of investigating romantic love in terms of managing multiple 
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motivations in relationships.  I am proposing that psychological organization can 
require a dynamically unconscious process of affect regulation, which resolves 
conflict by defensively closing off conscious access to certain mental processes, 
states and representations.23   
 
Implications for Research Designs: 
• Research must attempt to demonstrate that psychological aspects, 
influencing how one loves romantically, may operate outside awareness, 
and to link these aspects to some level of a person’s affective discomfort.  
A first general research point is that psychoanalytic researchers have 
already attempted to operationalize dynamically unconscious processes.  
For example, I propose Bucci’s measures, which track the phases of 
referential process through computerized narrative analysis, are relevant 
to the present discussion (1997, 2002).  As described in Chapter Three, 
her measures of Referential Activity assess the degree to which a 
person’s language is connected to nonverbal experience including 
imagery, bodily and subsymbolic emotional experience.  Applied to 
                                                 
23 Outside the general scope of my study, but important to be mentioned is a 
psychoanalytic approach to the pathological forms of such defensive closings of 
symbolic mediation.  Assuming a starting point of mental organization existing on 
a parallel series of somatic-symbolic, nonverbal-verbal, action-reflection 
continuums, one can state the aim of psychoanalytically informed treatments is 
the movement towards possibilities of fluid integration of such self-states (Bucci, 
1997; Freedman, 1980; Sugarman, 2006). After allowing for the role of 
dynamically unconscious mental life, researchers will be able to investigate and 




romantic love, it may be fruitful to measure shifts in RA as a person 
speaks about aspects of romantic relationships.  Particularly because it 
can serve as a window to track dissociation from affective experience, RA 
could be a potentially useful measure to investigate the role of affect 
regulatory dynamically unconscious processes around motivational 
conflict and compromise.  The inference here would be that affectively 
aversive topics related to romantic love require elevated degrees of 
regulation that may, in fact, lead to defensively dissociative mechanisms.  
RA provides an empirical measure to track the ebb and flow of 
symbolizing and desymbolizing activity, with the latter implicated as a 
dynamic means to inhibit conscious awareness of romantic mental states. 
• Along these same lines, I suggest the incorporation of already established 
measures on defenses (e.g., Cramer, 1996; Haan, 1977; Perry and 
Cooper, 1989) into romantic love studies.  One could investigate the 
relationship between measures of a person’s overall defensive style or 
defensive maturity level to any of the existing relationship scales for 
commitment, satisfaction, passion, investment, etc.   Further, researchers 
could relate these measures to reports from subjects’ partners about 
different relationship domains.  The goal here would be to assess how 
defensive mechanisms (the types and quality employed) influence a 
subject’s awareness about various aspects of a romantic relationship that 
are reported by one’s partner.  This is not to say that partner confirmation 
is needed to grant the validity of one’s self report.  However, to illustrate 
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the role of dynamic unconscious processes, one could attempt to 
demonstrate that a person with a certain defensive profile denies or 
distorts aspects of a relationship, which are affectively aversive.  For 
example, a subject might identify that displaying affection and behavioral 
indicators of caring are important in relationships (on a self-report 
questionnaire).  While the subject may consciously report this, high levels 
of defensive denial (as measured through a defense measure) may not 
allow one to realize that this is actually desired more from romantic 
partners and dreaded on one’s part.  Through a rating form filled out by or 
an interview with a romantic partner, it is revealed that the subject 
begrudgingly displays any affection and expects it to be given in an 
unsolicited fashion.  There is no doubt that this subject’s romantic partner 
also has a defensive profile that is operative.  However, one can take this 
person’s report as evidence that the subject has limited awareness about 
a relationship domain while endorsing a certain defensive profile.  One 
explanation for this as an example of a dynamically unconscious process 
is that the subject is motivated to receive care in relationships without 
reciprocation.  It is intolerable not only for the subject to give care, but also 
affectively aversive to be aware of this motivation (as measurable 
physiologically).  The subject denies the awareness of this through a form 
of defensive reaction formation, which allows endorsing the opposite 
motivation, which is displaying care.  The incorporation of a defense 
 264
measure allows for the inferential explanation of an operative dynamically 
unconscious process.    
• Attachment interviews, discussed in Chapter Two, while still developing a 
tradition in romantic love research could also serve as a useful model for 
studying affect-regulatory defensive processes.  This would require the 
development of coding systems, similar to Main and Goldwyn’s 
attachment security coding (1994).  However, in this case I would suggest 
moving away from categorizing of someone’s romantic attachment style.  
Rather, I would focus qualitative discourse analysis on discrepancies, 
consistencies and non-coherencies in the way a person discusses and 
acknowledges motivational themes.  For instance, if a person answers an 
interview question defining romantic relationship priorities and needs, 
these responses should be reflected in later portions of the interview 
during which one is asked to specify examples of how these needs are 
operative in current relationships or have been in past ones.  Another 
further point of attention are consistent relationship motivational themes 
that emerge in the course of an interview as being operative across 
relationship, but are not explicitly “claimed” by the person as a salient 
factor.   
The discourse analysis of these interview methods would target a 
person’s level of defensive functioning around relationships.  One could 
operationalize defense as instances when a person exhibits a lack of 
awareness or consistency in the way one discusses motivational concerns 
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in relationships.  Rather than supposing that the average research subject 
is psychologically minded or insightful, an interview would not require a 
person to articulate any kind of elaborate rendering of his psychological 
process in love. Discourse analysis would target contradictory statements, 
denials of previously reported content, and implicit descriptions of 
romantic motivational themes that the person does not explicitly 
acknowledge or identify.  Researchers should allow for people to not be 
aware of how much a certain factor or component influences their love 
relationships.  However, the way to establish that a factor is operative can 
be by probing about other relationships (not just romantic ones) in which 
the person has engaged.  If a certain factor or theme emerges across a 
subject’s various relationships, one can infer that despite a person’s lack 
of acknowledgement, it plays an operative role.  Another task is to provide 
opportunities for a person to display conscious, or especially unconscious, 
strong affective responses to such denied elements of relationship life.  
This could add evidence for the process of defensive denial for the 
purposes of regulating affect.  This could be accomplished through 
priming tasks or physiological measures (for facial muscle movements or 
brain wave activity). 
• As a more general point, the incorporation of multiple research methods is 
most important in demonstrating the existence of unconscious romantic 
processes.  For example, the use of diary tasks, videotaped observation of 
couples engaged in a conversation or activity, physiological measures of 
 266
arousal, or the use of multiple sources of information (comparing subject’s 
self-assessment with partner’s assessment of subject) can help 
researchers overcome relying soley on self-report questionnaires.  There 
is also a neglect of coding systems for projective measures specifically 
developed to assess unconscious and implicit motivational themes (e.g. 
McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989).   The purpose of multi-method 
designs is to demonstrate the discordance that can exist between what 
one consciously acknowledges as constituting his psychology of romantic 
love, and what is evidenced through other means.  For example, one can 
compare diary entries to information acquired through interview or self-
report, or monitor (unacknowledged) affect through physiological 
measures of arousal and video-taped observations of nonverbal behavior.   
 
 
3. Multiple motivational systems 
 
This recommendation focuses on the interplay of a variety of motivational 
systems, such as I have discussed in my first two points.  A multiple motivational 
psychology is a departure from various schools of thought.  In Chapter Three, I 
discussed the limits of an approach that reduces the complexity of human aims 
to one or two motivations (see Westen, 1999).  The degree to which romantic 
love researchers focus on motivations in relationships vary, with biological-
evolutionary models doing this more explicitly.  Researchers may discuss 
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romantic relationship dimensions, components or facets, but I have argued that 
many of these empirically-investigated aspects can best be understood in a 
motivational context. 
To make this point clearer, let me go back to Chapter Two where I reviewed 
the different research investigations into love.  Amongst the models I canvassed, 
one can discern motivational dimensions in romantic relationships including self-
preservational, reproductive, affiliative, sexual and pleasurable arousal, 
attachment, care-giving, reciprocity, self-reward, homeostasis and self-
consistency.  Adding to this is the psychoanalytic contribution of motivations such 
as sexual, aggressive, self-preservative, relatedness, self-coherency, and self-
esteem/agency.  The psychology of romantic love should not be viewed as solely 
belonging to or dominated by the concerns of any single motivational system.  
Romantic love results from conscious and unconscious compromise solutions to 
a variety of aims, fears, goals, needs and wishes related to different motivational 
systems.  This means that researchers would be wise to avoid explaining 
romantic relationship behavior as under the influence of a few motivational 
systems.  The narrowness of explanatory motivations in relationship research is 
reflective of one’s particular research or theoretical orientation values.   
Expanding the range of motivations that can be used to explain behavior 
allows for greater freedom and potential interdisciplinary research.  Rather than 
explaining a person’s romantic relationship life in terms of attachment, 
evolutionary, self-consistency, Oedipally-based libidinal aims, all of these factors 
should be taken into account.  I am proposing is that romantic relationship 
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research investigate the processes involved in negotiating multiple motivational 
systems.  This means starting with the assumption that one enters into and 
engages in romantic relationships, as in all relationships, with a variety of 
motivations.  Some motivations may seem less directly related to obvious 
relationship goals.  A person’s motivations impact one’s romantic relationship life 
whether or not they originate romantically or interpersonally.  All that is necessary 
is evidence that such motivations become activated in the relationship, origin and 
eventual desired goal notwithstanding.   
A simple example of this would be one’s motivation to feel like a responsible 
family member to his family of origin coming in conflict or informing his care-
giving and attachment aims in his romantic relationship.  One can also imagine 
autonomy, dominance and achievement motives influencing one’s romantic 
relationship aims.  Rather than reducing these seemingly non-romantic 
motivational aims to superordinate evolutionary or sexual and aggressive drives, 
there is more utility in another approach.  This would involve researching them as 
aims in themselves that consciously and unconsciously affect one’s romantic 
relationships, while not being directly romantically derived.      
The danger of using a narrow motivational approach is that it forces one to 
reduce a range of complex relationship thoughts, feelings and behaviors to a 
underlying hierarchical system of goals.  For example, a model’s explanatory 
power is limited when one is forced to reduce repetitive unfaithfulness only to 
attachment or evolutionary reasons.  While it may be empirically expeditious, it is 
intellectually unappealing to be constrained to use certain theories or disciplines 
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to understand certain relationship behaviors and not others.  An integrative multi-
motivational approach allows for each romantic relationship behavior to be 
understood complexly as a result of the interplay of a variety of possibly salient 
motives.  Research should offer a range of motivational factors in romantic 
relationships, with the valence of motivations coming from research subjects.  
Research subjects can be presented with a range of motivational options that 
they will be responsible for granting both importance to and demonstrating 
evidence to show how such aims are negotiated, if at all.  
Of course, a researcher should have the ability to limit an investigation to 
certain motivational confines of his choosing, but this should be done in an 
informed way that acknowledges the restriction of salient variables.  One 
possible way to constrain the range of motivational possibilities is by using 
neuroscientific research to ground one’s assumptions.  For example, using 
Panksepp’s (1998) identification of the “basic-emotion command systems” of: 
SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR and PANIC and related subsystems, is a way of 
understanding if theoretical motivational constructs can be accounted for in brain 
architecture.  This is not to say that one should only consider motivations that 
have a direct identifiable neurocorrelate, since the literature on brain systems is 
still in its relative infancy.  However, the fact that motivational systems implicated 
in sexual arousal, lust, social bonding, and parenting can be grounded in  
neuroscientific evidence supports existence of such aims.  It also suggests 
another level of investigation to study how these systems interact and function.  
Advances in neuroscience should help inform and constrain the degrees of one’s 
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theoretical speculations, just as one’s conceptualizations can refine the way brain 
research is undertaken to map out motivational structures in the brain.     
A psychoanalytic perspective can help frame how the empirically researched  
romantic love variables (from Chapter One) are among a host of other potentially 
simultaneous operative factors.  The adoption of a multi-motivational perspective 
becomes even more important when one seriously considers the ideas of 
dynamically unconscious mental life and intrapsychic processing, as just 
previously discussed.  As psychoanalytic theory has presumed and empirical 
research (described in Chapter Two) has demonstrated, there are limits to one’s 
awareness of operative motivations.  A focus on unconscious motivations that 
influence romantic relationships would then involve an investigation of how one 
manages various intrapsychic tensions and conflicts.   
Though its origin is in a psychoanalytic model of different mental agencies, 
the idea of intrapsychic conflict does not necessarily need to adhere to this 
original formula.  To apply the idea of intrapsychic conflict to research 
applications of romantic, one must only think of the tensions that arise, on both 
conscious and unconscious levels, when a number (at least two, but possibly 
more) motivations are simultaneously activated.  This again entails a departure 
from classical psychoanalytic theory, as I am not starting with the assumption of 
inherently conflicting motivations (as does Freud’s dual instinct theory).  I do not 
believe certain universal antagonisms between motivations should be assumed, 
no matter how intellectually probable they may be (i.e., aggression-
affiliation/attachment).  A direction for research should be the investigation of 
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which motivations tend to cause tension for partners in a romantic relationship, 
how this can develop, be maintained and get resolved. 
Rather than investigating the inherent properties of motivational aims and 
systems in love, researchers would be wise to move the brunt of their inquiry to 
the process by which motivational aims and systems interact in relationships.  In 
this sense, social-cognition researcher may prove helpful with its emphasis on 
interpersonal processes.  If I, as a researcher, am trying to understand why a 
couple is reporting increased relationship satisfaction across a period of eight 
years, I should not have to choose between social exchange explanations of 
equity and investment, marital observational approaches of couple interaction 
style around conflict, or psychoanalytic ideas about how the couple balances 
unconscious aggression towards each other while still remaining dependent on 
each other.  To a certain degree all of these approaches may be useful as they 
all speak to different motivational currents.  The goal for research should be to 
identify which are the salient motivations that are frequently activated within a 
particular romantic relationship and the process by which each member of the 
couple (and the two as a unit) manages these different aims. 
An inherent tension for social science research exists between the particular 
and general, and this is, of course, the case in romantic relationships.  I am not 
advocating investigation of salient variable configurations at the ideographic level 
at the sake of nomothetic applicability.  Rather, I am endorsing a view that allows 
for a potentially broad range of motivational configurations, with a focus on the 
process level of how romantic partners, individually and together, manage 
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conflictual aims through sets of compromise.  This entails a back and forth 
process between ideographic and nomothetic interests, concentrating first on 
content (which motivations become activated and come into conflict in romantic 
relationships) and then, and more importantly, on process (what avenues are 
available consciously and unconsciously to manage such aims).  As I will explain 
further in a later proposition, a benefit of a model that includes learned, malleable 
motivational systems is that it allows understanding relationship aims, 
compromises, incompatibilities and conflicts in the context of one’s culture.    
In this view, it is wrong-headed to assume the primacy of certain motivations 
over others in romantic relationships.  Allowing for unconscious aspects of 
romantic life, not to mention such psychoanalytic principles as multiple function, 
overdeterminancy, and sublimation, grants that even those motivations that are 
assumed to be primary are the result of compromise formations of various other 
component aims.  For example, understanding Sternberg’s prominent triangular 
theory of love in this way would necessitate exploring his component of 
commitment not just for related affiliative, reproductive or attachment needs.  
Commitment would also have to be understood for its potential compromise 
between other motivations such as excitement/arousal exploration, agency, self-
coherency.  These motivations are not inherently antagonistic to commitment-
related motivations, but rather have the possibility to contribute to motivational 
conflict that manifests in romantic relationships.   
Staying with this example, imagine a person for whom commitment also holds 
the meaning of settling down and having a family with someone who would serve 
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as a secure base.  Say for this same person that he also has motivations to be a 
success in his profession that would require a lot of traveling to foreign countries 
and 80 hours of work a week.  It is not only for logistic reasons that this person 
may experience some degree of conflict at some level.  His anxiety around 
commitment in a romantic relationship could then be understood as being due to 
conflicts around these sets of motivations.  This is only a relatively surface 
understanding of what this person’s motivational profile is, and it is one that is 
maybe too easily dichotomized into work and love concerns.  Remaining in the 
realm of simply defined relationship motivations, one could imagine this person 
having conflicts about romantic attachment to a person, if the rewards (social 
exchange models) aside from attachment are minimal, with potentially better 
alternative relationships available, and with the couple having an unsatisfying sex 
life.  Entered into this equation is that the couple have a fairly healthy conflict 
management style, and they both consciously and unconsciously feel that the 
other fulfills certain emotional and self-regulatory needs that they have lacked 
previously in their life.  With these sets of competing motivational factors some 
level of compromise must be reached whether a person stays in this relationship 
or decides to end it.  At any given time in a romantic relationship, a host of 
motivations will not be satisfied at the same time that others are.  Research into 
love should aspire towards demonstrating the adaptive and less adaptive 
intrapsychic and interpersonal processes of motivational compromise.    
It is possible to think that psychological compromises associated to 
relationship satisfaction are those in which motivational conflict is of a tolerable 
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degree.  Relationship behavior that can serve multiple cross-motivational 
purposes may also potentially lead to romantic satisfaction.  For instance, one 
can imagine a relationship, which serves evolutionary goals (self-preservation 
and reproduction), while also achieving attachment, sexual, care-giving, 
reciprocal reward receiving and self-continuity.  In this same relationship, a 
person can feel that novelty-seeking/exploration and aspects of his more 
powerful self do not get a chance to be expressed.  For this person, the former 
set may prove to outweigh the latter and lead to a series of compromise 
solutions.  However, this may only last for a certain amount of time, before the 
person becomes dissatisfied and seeks to achieve agency goals in the context of 
a relationship that does not allow for it.  At this point, the compromise terms must 
be re-negotiated if the relationship is to continue proving satisfying. 
Obviously, other factors aside from the content of current motivations involved 
are important to consider here, including the history and development of one’s 
motivational life, personality structure, and a range of situational variables (length 
of relationship, one’s relationship history, whether the couple has children, 
availability of alternatives, etc.).  As psychoanalysis teaches, motivational 
conflicts occur not only because of intrapsychic, relationship/interpersonal, or 
cultural factors, but because of the interplay of all three (not to mention other 
dimensions that influence psychological life).     
I must take this opportunity to include one sub-recommendation within this 
larger one.  Though I have mentioned it as a focus of both psychological and 
psychoanalytic models of romantic love motivations, let me also make the plea 
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for a more rigorous study of sexuality as a motivational force in romantic love.  In 
Chapter One, sexuality was featured as: a part of various researchers’ 
passionate love construct (Hatfield, Lee); one of Fisher’s tripartite motivational 
systems (lust); as a component of Sternberg’s triangular component of passion; 
as a primary evolutionarily programmed behavioral system within Buss’ work; 
and as a main motivational system for attachment researchers alongside care-
giving and attachment.  However, in all of these models and throughout the 
literature, it was the least developed on a psychological level.   
As some of these researchers have noted, the underdevelopment of a 
psychological theory of sexuality (Fraley & Shaver, 2000) has ramifications for 
romantic love models.  It is often treated at the behavioral level or in regards to 
physiological arousal, rather than also including the psychological dimensions of 
sexuality as a motivating force and component of romantic relationship life.  
Rather than just measuring how one values and has sex, research needs to 
focus on how sex is psychologically registered, represented and organized.  
Sequestering sexuality off to the “passionate” beginning stages of romantic 
relationship does a disservice to a thorough understanding of romantic life.  This 
implicitly positions sexuality as an example of a romantic compromise one 
makes, as other presumably more stable, aspects of romantic life emerge and 
become primary (attachment, commitment, care-giving).    
While sexuality may be a difficult area to research due to problems finding the 
appropriate means to solicit participants’ private reflections and attitudes about 
the subject (Hatfield & Rapson, 1996), one may wonder whether methodological 
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issues are responsible for the current underdeveloped state of the research.  
Looking at the psychoanalytic literature, it is interesting that despite its roots in 
Freudian theories of psycho-sexuality, some have noticed a similar trend in a 
gradual de-emphasis on sexuality (Fonagy, 2006; Green, 1995).  These writers 
have asserted the elevation of relational and interpersonal factors at the expense 
of more traditional concerns with the embodied mental life, which includes an 
understanding of the bodily roots of psychological experience.   
This minimization or neglect of psychological dimensions of erotic life serves 
as a curious example of the compromises made at a scholarly level (perhaps 
more reflecting American cultural biases) in the study of romantic love relations.  
Of the various motivational aims that should be included in all researchers’ 
investigation of romantic relationship conflict and compromise, psycho-sexuality 
deserves inclusion and exploration.  As opposed to the prominent academic 
treatment of sex as primarily a means for reproduction captured in evolutionary 
accounts of relationships, the study of romantic love could use a reinvigoration of 
the psychoanalytic coupling of the reproductive and pleasurable aspects of 
sexuality.        
The range of motivations that come to bear on one’s romantic relationship will 
have degrees of connection to what can be considered relationship aims.  The 
empirical study of romantic love has concerned itself with identifying various 
factors (which can be conceived as motivational) that are salient in romantic 
relationships.  However, I have argued that it inadvisable (not to mention difficult) 
to separate “relationship” motivations from a person’s “individual” motivations.  
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With an understanding of multiple motivational systems, when one is in a 
romantic relationship, or even when one is not, research should consider a 
person’s motivations in total.  It should be a research question to investigate how 
one negotiates a whole range of motivations in a romantic love context.    
      
Implications for Research Designs:  
• There are already current research models that study motivations by 
investigating people’s representations of ideal standards (and 
discrepancies) in regards to self-other representations in intimate 
relationships (e.g., Overall, Fletcher, &Simpson, 2006; Simpson, Fletcher 
& Campbell, 2001).  In addition, Sternberg (1988) measures a person’s 
ideal conception of the levels of commitment, intimacy and passion in 
romantic relationships to demonstrate discrepancies between actual and 
ideal relationship representations.  I am proposing that romantic 
relationship research continue to integrate what has been learned about 
self-representation discrepancy processes (Higgins, 1990; Strauman, 
1992).  As a suggestion for future research, an area of study could focus 
specifically on eliciting open-ended descriptions of a person’s ideal 
prototype of self, romantic other, self in a romantic relationship and 
romantic couple. 
Some researchers (Fehr, 1988; Aron & Westbay, 1996) have already 
applied a prototype perspective (Rosch, 1975) to studying romantic love.  
This approach shifts the emphasis to how a person conceptualizes and 
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understands which characteristics describe love better than others.  A 
more open-ended interview approach could further examine romantic 
relationship descriptions for ideal prototypes that influence one’s 
experience in love.  These descriptions can be coded for certain themes 
that seem reflective of motivational aims.  Further “actual” descriptions 
should also be collected, along with a person’s understanding of how this 
has changed across time (e.g., ideal romantic other of five years ago). 
The method may access a person’s ideals across various self-other-
romantic couple categories (which can serve as a proxy for motivations).  
Aside from assessing the discrepancy between actual and ideal 
representations, motivational changes across time can be demonstrated.  
This type of research would combine methods of qualitative semi-
structured interviewing and self-report ratings. Subjects can be asked to 
describe various past relationships and rate them for how they were able 
to achieve the ideals/ motivations they generated.  A potential finding from 
such research would be information about how aware a person is of what 
motivations they have in romantic relationships, and in general, how they 
go about seeking them (what kinds of relationships do they get into, do 
they match motivational aims in this subject’s view).    
• As I have explained, there are various romantic relationship models that 
reduce love to its components.  These components should be transformed 
to motivational variables and given to a person to rate how they evaluate 
the importance of such aspects of their current relationship, and one or 
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two specific past romantic relationships. The question would have to be 
posed in terms of importance of relationship components, rather than how 
much the relationship provided such aspects.  For example, a grouping of 
relationship components transformed into motivational aims could include: 
commitment, intimacy, passion, attachment security, sex drive, attraction, 
fairness, self-consistency, self-esteem, mate-retention, care-giving, 
reproduction/family-building, resource gathering, companionship, etc.  
Obviously these terms could be renamed, offered as a set of statements 
or as a description.  For example, resource-gathering could be defined as 
a relationship motivation to find a relationship that has potential to provide 
financial or material security in the future.  To fully accord with my multi-
motivational view, I would also suggest having subjects rate a group of 
motivations that may not seem directly related to relationships but may still 
be operative.  These could include achievement, power, mastery, 
independence, self-coherency, etc.  Subjects can also be asked to 
generate what they would consider their salient motivational factors, if not 
provided.  After filling out such questionnaires, subjects can then rate past 
and present relationships for satisfaction, happiness, and achievement of 
relationship/motivational goals.  A component of this design would be to 
study how these ratings may change as a person gets older and has 
different motivational experiences and successes.  This rating process 
could then include a longitudinal component of following people over a 
number of years.  A semi-structured interview could also be used to 
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directly address how someone discusses and views potential overlaps and 
conflicts between relationship motives, and methods of achieving 
resolution.   
The point of this research, which would require a self-report 
questionnaire method, would be to assess how important empirically-
generated constructs in romantic love are to people’s everyday 
psychology of romantic relationships.  Also, this type of research could 
demonstrate more motivational factors than the two or three that most love 
models propose.  Further, it may be that the romantic motivations most 
frequently identified do not work in the proposed ways.  For instance, if a 
subject identifies intimacy as the most important factor in a current 
romantic relationship, it should be looked at in relation to where other 
motivational aims rank in importance—leading to information about 
compromise.  Intimacy should not be thought of as the most important 
motivating factor, but in context of other motivations and what conflict and 
compromises might have occurred.  Seeing how people rate motivations 
achievement in relationships would of course also provide information at 
the nomothetic level in terms of the various motivational conflict and 
compromise patterns would be evidenced.   
• Aside from ideals, relationship motives can be investigated on the level of 
“wishes,” “fantasies,” and “fears.”  The whole realm of relationship 
fantasies, wishes and fears has not been thoroughly mined in psychology.  
In this way, the discussion can be steered towards a study of motivations 
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either towards a desired state, self-representation, or relationship, or away 
from a feared/dreaded state, self-representation or relationship.  I envision 
a semi-structured interview format that asks questions about a person’s 
relationship fantasies, fears and wishes. Questions could include 
distinguishing wishes and fears that are based on the future repetition of 
an event that actually occurred.  It would also be important to explore what 
a person does to manage their wishes and fears.  What are the 
relationship behaviors that result from their wishes and fears?  If a person 
dreads abandonment, does this person then compensate by clinging 
behavior or avoidance of relationships?  Alternatively, due to the private 
nature of this area, I can imagine a diary/journal method being useful.  It is 
also an area of the burgeoning field of social neuroscience and fMRI 
research that has not been explored (at the time of this writing).  I imagine 
the utility of mapping the neurocorrelates of the brain as a person is in a 
wishful state, feared state and fantasizing, both in connection to 
relationships and generally speaking.  Physiological measures of arousal 
during interviews would also be helpful in tracking the affective quality 
attached to such relationship fantasies, fears and wishes.  Framing 
sexuality in the context of fantasies, wishes and fears may also be an 
excellent avenue to explore these motivations in relationships, which has 
been researched mainly in behavioral ways.     
This poses the motivational question in a different light, as one can 
understand someone’s identification of companionship as an organizing 
 282
motivation in relationships as a desire for affiliation or as a dreaded 
avoidance of isolation or solitude.  Soliciting relationship fears and wishes 
may be the best approach to accessing the complex conscious and 
unconscious interplay that leads to a motivational conflict and 
compromise.  Through semi-structured interviewing, people can talk about 
relationship wishes and what has stood in the way of their pursuit.   
• Finally, I have also discussed the continued need for theoretical 
speculation to be constrained by empirical observation, and vice versa.  In 
this spirit, it could be fruitful for future research to continue to explore how 
motivational systems interact with each other on the neurochemical level 
of brain processes.  Some of Fisher’s work (2004), as well as Bartels and 
Zeki (2000, 2004), have already begun to investigate the interplay of 
various proposed brain systems (i.e., those associated with attachment, 
sexuality, mentalizing etc.).  However in reviewing the early conclusions 
from this research, I propose that the focus be moved from finding the 
inherent antagonisms between various systems and allow for possibilities 
of shifting conflicts and compromises.  While I am not arguing against 
such findings as the proposed biochemical separability of attachment 
(oxytocin) and sexuality (testosterone) systems, I am questioning whether 
this mutual antagonism between motivational systems is best conceived of 
as statically as these early findings report.  While my suggestion may 
need to await certain technological advances in brain mapping techniques, 
it would seem necessary to advance to a stage where researchers could 
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study the neural correlates of the “conflicted” mind in love.  More important 
than learning how the brain responds when aroused with certain romantic 
stimuli, is investigating what shapes these brain responses.  In other 
words, one should wonder, what leads certain relationship stimuli to 
activate and inhibit particular brain responses, how malleable is this 
process, and how disconnected it is from consciousness. 
 
4. Contextuality24  
 
This last guiding point I will offer has, in some ways, been implicit throughout 
the three preceding ones.  It involves the necessity of investigating what I will 
term contextualizing factors.  In my three previous recommendations, I have 
been arguing to ground romantic love relations, and the research already 
accumulated on this topic, in the context of multiple motivational systems, 
dynamically unconscious processes and object relations.  
I am now proposing the principle that motivations within romantic love have to 
be situated as occurring simultaneously in various identity contexts.  I am 
encouraging something further than acknowledging the setting and 
circumstances that surround a romantic relationship.  Similar to how I discussed 
multiple motivational systems, I do not think it is useful (from a research 
                                                 
24 I share a related general spirit that has been articulated by Stolorow and 
Atwood (1992) and colleagues (Stolorow, Atwood & Orange, 2002) in 
publications on phenomenological intersubjective contextualism.  However, I am 
not asserting any direct adherence to their model of clinical understanding. 
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respective) to assign which identity contexts are important.  Part of my point is 
that this should actually be a research question.  Further, it is the responsibility of 
researchers to not just acknowledge and identify such identity contexts, but 
investigate how these influence aspects of romantic relationship psychology.   
There will, of course, be reasons to study one set of factors within the context 
of another (i.e., social exchange processes in the context of couples who report 
low sexual satisfaction in their relationships).  However, the bi-directional shifting 
influence of contextually motivating factors should remain an open research 
question.  This, of course, should not be a surprising thought to empirical 
researchers doing correlational work, as correlation does not equal causality and 
the directional influence of variables is always an open question requiring 
conceptual grounding.  Thus even in my proposal for an interest in investigating 
the object relations level of romantic love, a principle of contextuality considered 
with a multiple motivational systems view would allow for evolutionary concerns 
to envelop object relations motivations and vice versa.   As I discussed earlier, 
my framework for studying love does not assume a superordinate motivational 
system, and in fact allows for shifting motivational concerns.  It is a research 
question to investigate which motivational concerns or contextual factors are 
bearing on one’s romantic relationship at any given time or in a more persistent 
way. 
Let me illustrate how one needs to think about adding rings to the interlocking 
structure of concentric circles that should be the contextualizing study or 
romantic love.  For example, evolutionary and personality factors have been 
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used to explain motivations in love relationships.  In a sense, one can say that 
personality factors can be understood in the context of evolutionary concerns 
about reproduction and self-preservation (and vice versa).  Further, Sternberg’s 
passion, intimacy and commitment variables in love can be studied in the context 
of attachment, just as the role of sexuality can be understood in the context of 
neurobiological processes.  The term “context” suggests that something is 
occurring within a surrounding factor or set of factors.  I think it is important that 
researchers resist the temptation to assign static positions to various contextual 
identities.  The factors involved in romantic love relationships should be 
investigated for their potentially shifting importance throughout the course of a 
person’s life.   
The topic of shifting motivational concerns brings up one important area for 
contextual exploration, that of a temporal quality for romantic relationships.  This 
is one contextual area that I propose should be incorporated into any romantic 
love model.  A conceptualizing principle attributes a much-needed quality of 
dynamism to the study of one’s romantic psychological life.  One’s motivational 
profile includes, not only, the persistence of certain motivational aims but also the 
changes and adaptations that take place.  The role of one’s self-consistency or 
reproductive objectives may surely be different at age 20 than at age 50.  There 
are motivational directives that seem to dominate a person’s psychological life 
and drive them towards or away from certain romantic relationships.  It is a 
research question to discover the terms of motivational persistence and flux in 
the context of development and lifespan issues.   
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Though I also discussed the importance of conceptualizing motivations in a 
developmental context in my discussion of object relations, I can by no means 
assert that psychoanalytic perspectives have espoused the spirit of 
contextualization that I am advocating here.  Notable areas of regrettable neglect 
throughout psychoanalysis have been in the area of gender, queer studies and 
cross-cultural research.  Advances have occurred to improve the research 
scholarship of the complex interplay of gender identity, sexual identities and 
orientations, and ethnic-cultural factors in romantic love and interpersonal 
relations.  However, both the psychoanalytic literature and romantic love 
empirical literature still have deficits in understanding the contextual identities 
people assume that require urgent attention and remedying. 
For example, a good portion of cross-cultural studies on the subject of 
sexuality and love approach the topic with the goal of identifying similarities and 
differences between cultures, relationship norms within cultures, and societal 
factors of influence (e.g., Doherty et al., 1994; Goodwin & Findlay, 1997; Hatfield 
& Rapson, 1996; Ingersoll-Dayton, et al., 1996; Shibazaki & Brennan, 1998).  
Some extract one supposed construct of a culture (e.g., Japanese 
interdependence, Asian individualism-collectivism) and look for its ability to 
predict certain types of relationship styles.  This is a beginning attempt to 
contextualize how culture impacts romantic love.  It is far too static and does not 
adequately address the complex interactions of individuals living in a certain 
society with a particular cultural climate.  It imposes categories of relationship 
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styles and cultural variables from without rather than attempting to gauge this 
from within.  
Staying with the example of ethno-cultural factors, I would propose a research 
framework that allows for identifiable salient variables in love relationships to be 
contextualized within cultural identities.  This would mean attempting to 
understand how people’s motivations in love develop in a way that is culturally 
situated and derived.  This approach would tap people’s ideas on determining 
factors for romantic relationships within their particular identified culture.  I would 
recommend a change from the usual practice of researchers defining which 
cultural variable needs to be studied and then supplying the relationship factor it 
may be most related to.  Instead, I would propose a first step of drawing on 
subjects’ perceptions of which cultural aspects most affect certain parts of their 
relationship lives.   
So while there was some merit in a study that investigated the Chinese notion 
of yuan (“relational fatalism”) in relation to Lee’s love styles, the terms of this 
investigation were limited from the start (Goodwin & Findlay, 1997).  The 
alternate goal I am suggesting would be to explore a person’s perspective on 
where they stand in relation to dominant cultural romantic values and variables in 
an open ended fashion.  Rather than beginning with the premise of how yuan 
functions in romantic relationships, I would suggest that the research begin with 
exploring where yuan is situated in the range of Chinese cultural variables that 
may influence love relationships.  In other words, the research question before 
investigating the effects of yuan on love relationships, should have been whether 
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and how much yuan impacts people’s love relationships as opposed to other 
Chinese cultural variables.        
I have been using the example of culture as defined by ethnicity to discuss 
my ideas of contextuality in romantic love research.  However aside from gender, 
sexual identifications and orientations, I can imagine contextual identities related 
to class and religion as viably important spheres of influence also deserving 
attention.  Of course, I do not mean to equate one’s religion with one’s gender 
identity, nor one’s sexual orientation.  Research into each of these contextual 
factors would have to find the relevant investigative dimensions that would 
provide a complex enough understanding of the conscious and unconscious 
intrapsychic and interpersonal processes involved.    
The thrust of my principle of contextuality is that romantic love relationships 
cannot be studied in a vacuum of ideal or abstract categories or variables.  
Romantic love relationships are not thought experiments but are embodied 
experiences that occur on a phenomenologically, pragmatically, worldly plane.  
Evolutionary, attachment, intimacy, passion, commitment, sexuality, attraction, 
equity, investment, companionate, self-consistency, object relations concerns 
occur in shifting configurations of concentric circles of contextual influence.  I am 
advocating including important factors such as gender identity, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, religion and class to any consideration of salient variables 
in love relationships—joining personality and biological levels of inquiry.  It should 
be a research priority to understand how to investigate these variables of 
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importance and to demonstrate how they function simultaneously in the nature, 
course and determinants of romantic love. 
Contextuality must be considered as a guiding principle in order to integrate 
all current and future investigative levels of salience in romantic love 
relationships.  In other words, one’s self-reported elevated need for merger 
experiences in romantic love must be then understood in relation to one’s 
personality, family experience, gender identity, sexual orientation, object relations 
concerns, ethnic heritage, etc.  I am not promoting an endlessly exhaustive (and 
obsessive) approach to studying every possible variable that could have any 
meaningful and less meaningful impact on how and who one loves. I am 
suggesting the expansion of such variables to include dimensions of experience 
and influence that contribute to one’s psychology of romantic relationships.  It is a 
research, rather than just a conceptual, question, to understand and demonstrate 
how these elements interact and function in a person’s psychology of romantic 
love.   
In many ways, what I am broadly advocating concerns content and process 
domains that require exploration through research.  Despite my comments about 
the neglect that psychoanalysis has paid to rigorously considering cultural and 
other contextual identities, a psychoanalytic perspective can aid in 
contextualizing romantic love.  It can do so by providing avenues of thinking 
about a person’s subjective unconscious and conscious processes of appraisal, 
evaluation and interpretation of relevant contextual factors.  The first step of 
applying the principle of contextuality to romantic love research is by expanding 
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the content domains of investigation.  The second step includes an investigation 
of the psychological processes related to how one manages simultaneously 
occurring motives occurring within spheres of contextual influence.  This area of 
research involves an understanding of how certain motivations and contextual 
factors become more psychologically invested than others. 
To describe this further, there is no doubt that romantic relationships and 
motivations sought within can be looked at within a range of contextual factors. 
Psychological research should focus on an understanding of the process by 
which certain contextual spheres of influence take on a greater meaning for 
people and influence their motivations in romantic relationships more than others.  
This level of investigation involves unpacking, for instance, how one consciously 
and unconsciously develops and manages romantic motivations that may run 
contrary to dominant cultural beliefs.  This kind of inquiry would explore how one 
negotiates motivational conflict and compromise when the incompatibility is 
experienced at the level of one’s relation to one’s cultural context, as well as 
intrapsychically.   
For instance, one can imagine a woman who struggles with first-time sexual 
feelings in an intimate relationship with another woman in a contextual setting of 
a culture that disapproves of homosexual relationships.  This woman’s 
attachment and sexual aims for this other woman may then come in conflict with 
her culture’s dominant prohibitive attitudes towards homosexuality.  However, 
factored into the romantic math of this equation is this woman’s more 
unconscious motivation for self-consistency and predictability, which also conflict 
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with her growing sexual feelings for this other woman.  Let us now take into 
account that this first woman is married and though she did not want to have 
children, had them to please reproductive aims of her husband.  However, she is 
understood and feels more agentively powerful with this woman she is attracted 
to than ever before.  I could add more conflicting motivational factors into this 
picture.  However, it is important to understand that she may report her culture’s 
prohibition against sexual feelings for another woman and her responsibility to 
her children as her main motivations to not pursue this extra-marital relationship.  
However what does not get reported, and what research must find a way for 
ascertaining, is the role of her own unconscious motivations for self-consistency 
and regularity that may have driven the compromise between such competing 
motivational aims.  By this example I am not trying to paint a portrait of cultural 
factors as only being recruited to serve as conscious reasons for dynamically 
unconscious compromises (though this can be the case).  The point of this 
example was to illustrate the possibilities of such complex motivational 
configurations that must all be considered as salient contextual variables. 
Returning to a point I made before, aims that are played out in romantic 
relationships can be understood as occur within a developmental context.  
Research should conceive continuity and discontinuity of motivational conflict 
and compromise, occurring at conscious and unconscious levels in relation to 
under what conditions these aims may change across time.  Previously 
experienced motivational conflicts can resolve for a variety of factors including 
changes in physiology, life events, the achievement of an aim, or the shifting of 
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subjective valuing of an aim.  A psychoanalytic perspective teaches that 
motivational conflicts and compromises are not to be thought of as static 
constructs but rather are consistently kept operative on some level of mental life.   
Psychologically forged compromises require some level of intrapsychic 
attention to accommodate changes with one’s satisfaction with such 
compromises that can be the result of shifting contextual factors.  This then 
necessitates rearranging self-other representational dyads within a couple.  A 
psychoanalytic perspective contextualizes romantic love motivations in terms of a 
tension between continued development through adulthood in relation to life 
events (Levinson, 1978) and core aspects of psychic structure and functions.  
This speaks to the inherent tension between motivational continuities and 
discontinuities, as there are limits to the compromise formations that one can 
make as one grows older and grows more rigid in conscious and unconscious 
domains of information-processing.  Certain factors external to an individual or 
romantic couple (e.g., changes in social mobility, the addition of children) may 
require a shifting of psychological priorities that limit opportunities to seek out 
motivational aims in relationships or lessen the affective loading of conflicts. 
Research will be of assistance in first investigating which contextual factors 
are identifiable as influential in one’s romantic life, and at what level of 
awareness.  Secondly, it will be important to focus on the psychological 
processes involved in one’s organization of motivations across various identity 
contexts.  This depends on whether a person situates motivations in the context 
of a particular relationship, ethnic culture, gender identity, class distinction, 
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sexual orientation, religious set of beliefs, etc.  The multiple combinations of 
salience (e.g., the intersection of class and race as a contextual surround in love) 
and lifespan changes are also other levels of complexity that need empirical 
exploration.  In espousing a principle of contextuality, I am clearly advocating a 
stance towards complexity, to even a degree of over-complexity for empirical 
research.   I feel aspirations of this type are needed to approach a topic such as 
romantic love. 
 
Implications for Research Designs: 
•  The principle of contextuality applied to the future direction of research 
should have a focus of investigating how people arrive at relationship 
attitudes.  In many ways, some previous research suggestions implicitly 
included a principle of contextuality, including researching one’s 
motivations in romantic relationships in the context of other competing 
motivations.  Another way of doing this would be to accompany existing 
romantic love measures with a semi-structured interview to explore if self-
reported relationship attitudes and feelings indicate the kinds of romantic 
processes the researchers intended them to study.  This would mean 
asking research subjects how they understand certain relationship 
constructs that the self-report questionnaires feature.  For example, it 
would be useful to get information about how individuals define intimacy, 
support, trust, attraction, excitement, anxiety, avoidance, etc., in their own 
subjective way.  It is not enough to have a research result that suggests 
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that attraction is important.  Researchers should aim to know how 
subjects’ understand the nature of attraction, its roots, and how it works.  
For example, one can imagine a scenario in which a person endorses the 
importance of physical attraction in relationships, but through the course of 
a follow-up probing interview he reveals more.  He is attracted to 
extremely physically attractive women (in an “objective” sense), but when 
this leads to relationships, he finds himself ultimately unsatisfied.  What if 
he described a repetitive process of privileging superficial features as the 
expense of (or a defense against) intimacy?  How then would this make 
one think or re-think about the value of physical attraction, or any other 
relationship characteristic (stability, companionate feelings, etc.), that is 
not explored for how it functions in a romance?  The purpose of this 
research would be finding the middle ground between personal definition 
and general meaning—investigating how general constructs are invested 
with meanings that are contextually determined by factors.   
• The next step in this sort of research could then be constructing self-report 
measures to have subjects’ rank a range of contextual factors for level of 
influence for particular relationship attitudes, feelings, behavior.  
Researchers could either have subjects rank such contextual factors over 
time, or through a forced-choice model have them select which contextual 
factors exhibited influence at different points in their lives.  This area of 
research would involve an understanding of how certain motivations and 
contextual factors evolve and become more psychologically valenced than 
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others.  Conflicts between motivations and contextual factors, and 
between contextual factors themselves also are viable areas of research 
interest.  One could imagine a design of pairing questions currently found 
on many relationship self-report measures about sexuality with inquiries 
about what one attributes such sexual attitudes/behaviors to (family, 
culture, religion, etc.).   
• Instead of plainly using forced-choice questionnaires, in which subjects 
are made to choose which descriptive paragraph reflects some aspect of 
their relationship functioning, researchers could add a free-writing 
component.  This component would allow for people to supply their 
reasoning for selecting a certain item as being reflective of them.  This 
would provide information about contextual influences, which could further 
be used to generate contextual variables for future research.  Further, a 
free-writing section would allow research subjects to express the opinion 
that none of the choices adequately reflects them in romantic relationship 
and explain why.  For example, how would one explain, from an 
evolutionary perspective, a response in which a woman indicates that she 
is not motivated to ever have children— that, in fact, procreation is not 
important, nor is monogamy in relationships?  Would one have to look to 
other evolutionary explanations for this response or consider that it is 
evidence contrary to evolutionary hypotheses? By allowing subjects 
opportunities in research to indicate what contextual factors influence their 
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response (e.g., dismissive attachment style), researchers can gather more 
direct information about romantic relationship psychology. 
• Probably the most promising and already established method of applying 
a principle of contextuality to the future research of romantic love is the 
use of single-case study methods.  As touched on previously, since 
Freud’s work on hysteria (1905a), the case study method has been an 
important method for observing complex processes of the mind.  A 
textured and multi-leveled a phenomenon like romantic love requires an 
approach of inquiry that captures how various identity contexts impact 
one’s relationships.  A case study approach allows for one to witness and 
document the most directly accessible manifestations of the interplay 
between conscious and unconscious psychological functions.  
As psychoanalysis has taught, much about a person’s private 
psychological life can be best made apparent through intensive case 
studies.  This is the situation, when these in-depth reports are derived 
from individual psychotherapeutic treatments (where one may talk freely 
about one’s romantic life), couples’ sessions (where partners demonstrate 
their processes of making sense of their romantic other), and even 
detailed study of multiple pieces of information provided by an individual 
(structured interview, self-report questionnaire, projective testing, 
videotaped observation, life history data, etc.).  To remedy the empirical 
literature’s reliance on self-report data, which assumes the accessibility of 
mental states and accuracy in self-reporting, it is necessary to study an 
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individual’s psychology of love via a method that allows, as much as is 
possible, for the expression of a person’s natural mental proclivities.  A 
case study method permits investigators of romantic love’s unconscious 
workings to access a fuller range of how one feels and thinks about love 
unfettered by the constriction of forced-choice pre-designed questions 
currently utilized in self-report studies.  
There is a place for the coupling of single-case designs and 
quantitative procedures with a general, as opposed to only a clinical, 
population (Kazdin & Tuma, 1982).  Many of my research suggestions 
throughout this chapter have already implicitly endorsed a modified case 
study approach.  The combining of existing and modified self-report 
questionnaires with semi-structured interviews, videotaped sessions, and 
other techniques can provide an in-depth method of studying the romantic 
lives of individual research participants culled from a larger sample.  I 
further envision an exploration of motivational aims, conflicts and 
compromises in one’s relationship history through the kind of qualitative 
interviewing I have already proposed throughout this chapter.  Single case 
reports of romantic partners, followed throughout points in their 
relationship from the inception, could also provide valuable insights.  
Through a single-case format one can descriptively analyze patterns of 
object relations themes and dynamically unconscious defensive processes 
that would otherwise be obscured on a self-report measure.  I do follow 
Westen’s recommendation that the intensive study of individual cases, 
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selected at random from a larger database of research subjects, is most 
useful at “either the beginning or end of a series of studies that employ 
quantitative methods with larger samples” (2002, p. 42). The complexity 
and richness that a case study method provides can most benefit 
empirical researchers at the earliest stages of hypothesis generation or to 
further analyze and clarify the meaning of questionnaire-generated 
findings, specifically in regards to the various layers of contextual 
influence.     
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A concluding note on relationship rationality  
 
In this dissertation I have argued that the empirical research of romantic 
love’s psychology focuses on conscious mental processes.  The privileging of 
these aspects of psychological life has resulted in models of relationship 
reasoning that adhere to a kind of Enlightenment-period rationality.  By this I 
simply mean that approaches to studying romantic love reduce it to certain 
absolute components, which can be arrived at through conscious introspection 
and reasoning.  Further, this literature on romantic relationships suggests that 
people are generally aware of their motivations and experiences in love.  Since 
people are assumed to be accurate observers and reporters of their relationship 
objectives, romantic love research models take a more rational form than may 
exist in everyday life.        
This narrow view of the psychology of love is curious as there have been 
advances within empirical social science research regarding the existence of 
unconscious information processing.  This research on unconscious processes 
has expanded ways of thinking about how people “actually” reason, and has 
been applied to economic theory in notions of bounded rationality and satisficing.  
Efforts like these have led to alternative ways of understanding how the 
reasoning of everyday life departs from formal logical processes and includes an 
integration of conscious and unconscious cognitive-affective biases.  However, 
these revised models of reasoning have not been employed in the investigation 
into the kind of rationality featured in love.    
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To address this deficit in the empirical literature on love, I have called for a 
renewed interest in psychoanalytic models of the mind.  Specifically, I have 
advocated a way of broadly using psychoanalytic principles to create a 
framework to help integrate existing models of love, as well as guide future 
research investigations.  This resulted in my proposal of four conceptual guiding 
points, accompanied by suggested research applications.   
I first endorsed an object relations framework to approach romantic 
relationship investigations.  Grounding research in object relations 
conceptualizations offers a way of studying the interpretation, internalization and 
management of relationship aspects on a level of self-other representations in a 
motivational context.  The second point offered an understanding of unconscious 
processes in love as serving dynamic affect regulatory purposes.  I suggested 
that associated aversive affect might render many of the motivational conflicts 
and compromise solutions in love to become rendered at least partially outside 
awareness.  In this scheme, romantic mental states are not originally 
unconscious but are transformed in the service of maintaining the organization 
and regulation of the psychological self.  I then argued for a multi-motivational 
view in which researchers would investigate romantic love as involving the 
negotiation of simultaneously occurring aims (that at times conflict).  Researchers 
can derive salient motivational aims from both the existing psychoanalytic and 
empirical literature on love.  My final point supported a principle of contextuality 
that emphasized an exploration of the factors of shifting influence that impact 
one’s motivations and experiences in romantic relationships.  This somewhat 
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broad principle is meant to remedy the neglect of diverse developmental, cultural 
and identity issues in studying how one subjectively forms, implements, 
maintains and adapts a psychology of love relations.   
My efforts have targeted the variety of problems currently found in the 
academic empirical study of love.  I have attempted to present a psychoanalytic 
psychological approach to relationship research, that while addressing issues of 
underlying process and mechanisms, analyzes love at the level of reasons, 
motives and meanings.  My work has meant to expand and complicate the 
current academic psychological treatment of romantic relationship research.  I 
have used the psychoanalytic literature to support a position that teaches that 
human reasoning is constituted by the interplay between conscious and 
unconscious processes.  Based on this model of the mind, people’s 
acknowledged reasons for loving will always be partial and incomplete.  This 
leads to a different kind of relationship rationality than is currently assumed in the 
research literature.      
Reasoning in love involves the consideration of multiple motivations that may 
or may not be consciously evident due to the processes of psychological 
compromise formation.  Unconscious mechanisms manage aversive affective 
states that are related to motivational conflicts and tensions in love relationships. 
This being the case, more creative and complicated research methods and 
designs are needed to access and demonstrate the influence of factors outside 
people’s romantic awareness.  Further, an expanded view of relationship 
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reasoning is required to properly investigate the range of cognitive-affective-
bodily-sensory experiences that love demands.  
The way two lovers psychologically experience and conceive of each other is 
subject to varieties of motivational pushes and pulls.  People’s reasons for loving 
each other will have both articulatable and unarticulatable components.  The 
latter may reflect aspects of one’s psychological life rendered unconscious to 
maintain psychic organization.  These disowned bits of one’s motivational life 
may then manifest (in influence) in relationship behaviors or subsymbolic mental 
life that are beyond the direct grasp of verbal expression or conscious 
awareness.  The conscious aspects of romantic love, just like the conscious 
reasons for one why loves, are constrained by one’s unconscious mental life 
leading to a bounded rationality of romantic love.  Romantic partners’ capacity to 
act reasonably towards each other depends on their individual and joint abilities 
to manage unconscious dimensions of their relationship.  In other words, one’s 
conscious reasons in love are held in check by those aspects of mind that remain 
operative though beyond direct introspection.   
This idea of a bounded rationality of romantic love needs further elaborating 
to be useful.  The empirical romantic relationship research assumes that people 
have the capacity to introspect about themselves in a more complete way than 
seems accurate.  It assumes that people not only know what influences love 
relationships, both at a general and at a personal level, but further, that people 
would know how to act to then pursue and maintain varieties of valued 
relationships.  This is where psychoanalytic theory, being informed by clinical 
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practice, approaches the subject differently.  Psychoanalysis, by taking as its 
premise a model of mental life that is only partially available to introspection, 
assumes inherent limits to rationality.  With this way of understanding 
psychological life, gaps in one’s romantic reasoning occur on a continuum of 
adaptiveness.  In my reading of psychoanalysis, it does not teach that people aim 
to or even are capable of fully knowing the reasons behind their romantic pursuits 
in any sort of accurate way. People aim for accurate enough knowledge of their 
romantic reasoning that will allow them to minimize cognitive-affective conflict 
between motivations using compromises accomplished through conscious and 
unconscious means. 
The kind of multidisciplinary research approach I am advocating could expand 
the meaning of generally held relationship ideals, such as mutuality or reciprocity.  
Since a psychoanalytic psychology would assume only partial awareness of 
oneself in love, this would also have to extend to one’s knowledge of the mind of 
one’s loved other.  A revised understanding of relationship mutuality would go 
beyond the shared equitable qualities of two persons’ romantic relation, and 
towards the recognition of each others’ rights to have motivations in love that are 
similar, different, private, overlapping, conflicting, unformulated (Stern, 1997) and 
unthought but known (Bollas, 1987).  I believe that the psychological processes 
that facilitate and undergird the kind of reciprocity that allows lovers to hold each 
others’ needs as important as their own is a research question worth 
investigating.                
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As I conclude, let me take a moment to discuss how psychoanalysis’ clinical 
foundations shed another needed light on the topic of romantic understanding in 
love.  If the psychology of romantic love, as depicted in the empirical literature, is 
based on an understanding of mind as rational, then psychoanalysis represents 
an alternative view of the mind only as rational as it is irrational.  As Jurist 
recently stated, “this does not mean that it is impossible to be rational, but it does 
suggest that rationality cannot prevail over irrationality…” and further 
“…psychoanalysis must be able to describe how irrational and rational forces 
intermingle and coexist” (2005).  As primarily a clinical theory, psychoanalysts 
have based most of their theoretical suppositions on observations made in 
consulting rooms.  Here, clinicians have witnessed patient displays and accounts 
of love realized, repudiated and relinquished.  Often a patient’s engagement in 
therapy may be to specifically begin the process of reorganization due to a 
romantic love, past, present or future.  One can think of the position of the 
analyst as being on the side of helping the patient’s irrationality and rationality 
seem approachable, tolerable and understandable.  Psychoanalysis and 
psychological research share a joint responsibility to foster the identification, 
evaluation, appraisal, and acknowledgment of unconscious romantic life.  Only 
after achieving these steps can a person who is troubled in relationships be open 
to the reinterpretation of mental states in love that allows for tolerance, 
acceptance, or change. It is under these conditions, both within and outside of 
treatment, that a person is in the best position to live a romantic life with relative 
freedom and flexibility.  
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The study of the embodied mind in love, from the psychoanalytic perspective I 
am carving out, should examine the conditions that lead to divisions and 
harmonies between what is psychologically owned and disowned, claimed and 
disclaimed, integrated and dissociated, deemed personal or impersonal (Eagle, 
1984).  The inclusion of the psychoanalytic perspective to the psychology of 
romantic relationships allows for the making sense of what is otherwise 
distanced, felt to be outside one’s self-experience, judged irrational or only lived 
unconsciously.  
The clinical foundation of psychoanalysis provides a way of studying romantic 
relationships on a continuum of adaptive health understood in people’s unique 
subjective contexts.  For psychoanalysis, the question extends from whether a 
relationship is satisfactory or unsatisfactory (and on which factors this should be 
based), to the array of intrapsychic motivational compromises people employ to 
achieve relationship outcomes.  These compromises are understandable and 
researchable for their terms (advantages and disadvantages), affective qualities, 
and the psychological processes entailed to maintain them.   
Psychoanalytic notions of the mind allow one to treat the irrationality of 
relationships as an equally important subject for research as one’s conscious 
reasonings in and for love.  In many respects, one may reframe the rationality of 
love as bound inextricably to the negotiation of the irrational.  Along with adopting 
the psychoanalytic spirit to forge ways of integrating what is conscious and 
unconscious, romantic relationship research needs a commitment to the bridging 
of what is rational and irrational.  My articulation of a framework to conduct 
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romantic relationship research within embodies this spirit of opening up access to 
certain psychological functions previously disavowed in the empirical literature.  
My aim in this present work has been to help lay the groundwork for the rigorous 
kind of conceptualization, data gathering and research that needs to be done. 
     My psychoanalytic psychological approach to conceptualizing and 
researching romantic love is one that espouses to bridge the, at times, too rigid 
distinctions between conscious and unconscious, cognition and emotion, mind 
and body, and rational and irrational.  It is a way of researching love as both 
forwards and backwards looking, a multi-motivational phenomenon that occurs 
simultaneously on dynamically different mental levels, involving a multitude of 
people beyond the partners involved across a variety of ever-shifting identity 
contexts.  It is inherently a view of the mind disposed towards being just rational 
enough, and the mind in love as being conscious enough of its reasons. 
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